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“What is the best government? That which teaches us to govern ourselves” – Johann 
Wolfgang von Goethe, 1833 (Maxim 353) 
 
The above quote illustrates the importance of effective governance for society, 
including the functioning of its government and business community, and raises the question 
of what achieving it entails. Specifically, what are the multiple dimensions that comprise such 
effective governance, and how to strike a balance between internal and external supervision in 
this regard? The need for effective internal and external supervision to protect societal 
interests is clearly reflected in the diesel-emission scandal that involved many car 
manufacturers. The scandal first came to light at Volkswagen in September 2015, when it was 
revealed that the German car maker – while promoting their ‘clean’ diesel cars - used 
software to cover up the emissions of dangerous gases (nitrogen oxide) of their cars that 
exceeded regulatory requirements (Financial Times, 2016). Many high ranking members of 
the organization, including the CEO, other top executives, and several senior engineers, were 
involved in or at least aware of the fraud (Ewing, 2017). As a result, some of those top 
executives now face years in prison for fraud and stock market manipulation (New York 
Times, 2019; The Guardian, 2017, 2018, 2019a; U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 
2019), in addition, the car maker already had to pay 30bn Euros in fines, compensation and 
legal costs, and is also being sued by half a million German customers (The Independent, 
2019; The Guardian, 2019b).  
In the case of Volkswagen, the three main responsible parties, the Top Management 
Team (TMT), and both internal and external supervisory bodies, failed to perform at least part 
of their responsibilities to safeguard the welfare of the organization and its stakeholders. First 
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of all, the TMT executives, the senior executives including the CEO responsible for strategic 
decision making, made decisions that prioritized organizational – and their own – short-term 
interests (profit) over the public’s long-term interests (Ewing, 2017). The example also 
illustrates the failure of internal supervision, as deficiencies in the internal control system 
allowed the fraud to remain undiscovered (Crête, 2016), and the internal supervisory board 
failed to perform their supervisory duties and it lacked independence (Environmental 
Protection Agency, 2016). Moreover, the external supervisory bodies (e.g., the Environmental 
Protection Agency, EPA), were not able to monitor the impact of emissions on the 
environment effectively, due to the cheating software and hindrance by Volkswagen of their 
investigations (Ewing, 2017). Hence, the internal and external supervisory bodies failed or 
were obstructed to adequately monitor and challenge TMT decision making.  
Such failure of internal and external supervisory bodies is particularly problematic for 
society, as it trusts that these bodies will effectively monitor whether decisions of 
organizations are sound and protect the long-term interests of all relevant organizational 
stakeholders, including the general public (Aguilera, Desender, Bednar, & Lee, 2015). 
Internal supervisory bodies are formally installed by the organization (e.g., supervisory 
boards, and the compliance function), and these bodies perform such monitoring with all 
organizational duties and stakeholders in mind (Boivie, Bednar, Aguilera, & Andrus, 2016). 
External supervisory bodies are officially commissioned by important governmental 
stakeholders (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Tetlock, 1992), and include government inspectorates 
(e.g., the tax authority), and independent market institutions (e.g., supervisory authorities for 
the financial sector). These external supervisory bodies, monitor whether decisions of 
organizations are compliant with the law and safeguard public interests (Wouters & Van 
Kerckhoven, 2011). Cases like the diesel-emission scandal raise the question of: what makes 
each supervisory body and the combination of supervisory bodies effective in influencing 
decision making of TMTs and other groups in organizations? In this dissertation I use an 
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integrative and interdisciplinary approach, with the aim to provide a comprehensive 
understanding of the multiple dimensions that comprise supervisory effectiveness, by 
studying the independent and the joint impact of internal and external supervision on 
decisions made by TMTs, middle managers and employees (Aguilera et al., 2015). More 
specifically, with the empirical studies presented in this dissertation I will provide insight into 
the following three research questions:  
1. How will internal and external supervisory bodies, independently and in relation to 
each other, impact decision making of these organization members?  
2. What psychological mechanisms explain these effects? 
3. How do contextual factors impact these relationships?  
My dissertation is the result of a combined research project of De Nederlandsche Bank 
(DNB) and the University of Groningen, funded by DNB, and this combination provided a 
unique opportunity to link scientific concepts with supervisory practice in my research about 
the effectiveness and interplay of internal and external supervision in the Dutch financial 
sector. Consequently, I mostly studied financial organizations with two-tier board structures, 
as stipulated by the Dutch Financial Supervision Act (Wft), in which internal supervisory 
boards, as the controlling bodies, are formally and structurally separated from TMTs (i.e., 
management boards), as the executing bodies responsible for decision making (Maassen, 
1999; Mallin, 2007). Hence, I will use the terminology of TMTs and internal supervisory 
boards relevant to this two-tier board structure throughout this dissertation. It is important to 
note that, although this particular situation is formally different from one-tier board structures 
(i.e., where these functions are combined in one management body, the board of directors, 
with executives and non-executives), the respective division of core tasks of execution and 
controlling are similar in both board structures (Boivie et al., 2016; Mallin, 2007). Therefore, 
I believe that my research is also largely applicable to organizations with one-tier board 
structures. Given the financial sector as specific research context, in the next section I will 
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consider some of the recent developments in this particular industry that are relevant for 
internal and external supervision.  
 
THE CONTEXT OF THE FINANCIAL SECTOR 
The research questions I will examine in this dissertation are especially relevant for 
the financial sector given its developments over the last decade. The financial crisis (2007-
2009) - with its numerous high profile bankruptcies of financial institutions - had a shock 
effect on the financial sector as a whole and has made the importance of effective internal and 
external supervision for society highly visible. One of the major contributors to the financial 
crisis is considered to be a failure of corporate governance, and in particular the ineffective 
functioning of TMTs, and both internal and external supervisory bodies (Clarke, 2010; 
Turner, 2009; Kirkpatrick, 2009). Reports also highlight the strained interaction among these 
parties, such as the lack of critical challenge between internal supervisory boards and their 
TMTs (Lorsch, 2012), as well as distrust and less openness between these groups and external 
supervisory bodies (Group of Thirty, 2012; Walker, 2009). To prevent such problems in the 
financial sector in the future, several specific financial rules were introduced, such as 
increased bank capital requirements and guidelines to enhance effective governance (Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision 2010a,b; 2011). To monitor whether financial 
organizations comply with these increasing numbers of rules, the intensity of internal and 
external supervision increased as well. In addition, these supervisory bodies were given more 
tasks and powers to intervene in case of excessive risk-taking, (near) bankruptcy, and 
governance failures (Group of Thirty, 2012; Macroeconomic Assessment Group, 2010). 
Moreover, new international guidelines required more explicit monitoring of behavioral risks 
in financial organizations and their governance, and such monitoring is expected to be part of 
the regular risk assessment performed by internal and external supervisory bodies (Financial 
Stability Board, 2014; Group of Thirty, 2015). At the same time, these supervisory bodies 
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were also urged to consider their relationships with TMTs and each other (Group of Thirty, 
2013). Hence, in response to the financial crisis there has been an exceptional focus on 
enhancing the effectiveness and interplay of internal and external supervision. 
The remainder of the introduction is structured as follows. First, I will give a brief 
overview of the research gaps in current corporate governance literature on the effectiveness 
and relationship of internal and external supervision in relation to decision making that I will 
address in this dissertation. Second, I will describe my empirical approach to study the 
mentioned research questions, and I will outline the different chapters in this dissertation. 
Finally, I will describe the overall theoretical and practical contributions of my research. 
 
RESEARCH GAPS ADDRESSED IN THIS DISSERTATION  
Despite the aforementioned importance attributed to effective internal and external 
supervision in relation to sound decision making in organizations (e.g., Aguilera et al., 2015), 
there is only limited theoretical and empirical knowledge about the independent and joint 
effects of both forms of supervision on decision making by organization members. Corporate 
governance literature, and especially classic agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), has 
been most influential in this regard. Agency theory describes its preferred arrangement of 
roles between, on the one hand, the TMTs, the top executives (agents) that are responsible for 
making strategic decisions on behalf of the organization’s shareholders, or owners 
(principals), and, on the other hand, the internal and external supervisory bodies that monitor 
these TMT decisions (Fama & Jensen, 1983). In general, agency theorists believe TMTs to be 
mostly extrinsically motivated, and therefore prone to make short-term decisions focused on 
their own interests (Eisenhardt, 1989). The best way to counterbalance such self-serving 
decision biases, in this view, is to make TMTs justify their decisions towards internal and 
external supervisory bodies (i.e., accountability, Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). Thus, from an 
agency perspective, supervision by these bodies is believed to safeguard sound TMT decision 
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making that serves the interests of the organization and its shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976).  
As a response to agency theory, a fundamentally different perspective was introduced 
by stewardship theory (e.g., Donaldson, 1990; Donaldson & Davis, 1991), which argues that 
TMTs are in fact often intrinsically motivated to make sound decisions, with the 
organizational interests in mind. Moreover, in this view, these aligned interests of internal 
supervisory boards and TMTs should be reflected in good cooperation between the two 
parties in service of the organization (Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997). From a 
stewardship perspective, intensive monitoring by any supervisory body is believed to hamper 
TMTs’ felt autonomy of decision making (Davis et al., 1997), and to make TMTs distrust 
boards’ intentions (Frey, 1993). Therefore, such behaviors would undermine the positive 
intentions of TMTs to make decisions in the best interest of the organization (Corbetta & 
Salvato, 2004).  
Clearly, the two approaches represent different streams within corporate governance 
literature and have opposing assumptions about the effect of supervision, as agency theory 
expects a positive effect of supervision whereas stewardship theory is less optimistic about 
the benefits of such control (Davis et al., 1997; Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Therefore, I will 
use an interdisciplinary approach throughout this dissertation, which will cover these different 
streams of literature in corporate governance, combined with the fields of organizational 
behavior and social psychology. Below, I set out three research gaps that my dissertation will 
address and thereby will contribute new insights to the above debate between agency and 
stewardship theory.  
The first research gap concerns the fact that the empirical evidence for both theories 
has mainly considered the isolated effects of internal and external supervision on distant 
organizational-level outcomes, such as financial performance, and not on decision making of 
TMTs, middle managers and employees directly (Rechner & Dalton, 1991; Tosi, Brownlee, 
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Silva, & Katz, 2003). Moreover, these prior studies demonstrated mixed results for 
supervision in relation to firm performance (Dalton, Hitt, Certo, & Dalton, 2007), perhaps 
because such outcomes could also have been influenced by multiple other internal factors and 
external market contingencies (Desender, Aguilera, Crespi, & García-Cestona, 2013). 
Additionally, literature in adjacent fields to corporate governance, specifically organizational 
behavior and social psychology, suggests that organization members probably will react 
differently to internal and external supervisory bodies and to the combination of both bodies 
(e.g., Gino, Ayal, & Ariely, 2009; Pennington & Schlenker, 1999). Yet research that 
compares their respective impact on decision making of different groups of organization 
members is missing (Aguilera et al., 2015). Furthermore, the exact nature of the joint impact 
of internal and external supervision on decision making is still being debated (Bell, 
Filatotchev, & Aguilera, 2014; Walsh & Seward, 1990). As governance scholars have argued 
and found that these different kinds of supervision can either act as substitutes for each other 
and are mutually exclusive (e.g., Dalton et al., 2007; Desender et al., 2013), or are 
complementary such that they can compensate for each other’s weaknesses (e.g., Milgrom & 
Roberts, 1992; Tosi, Katz, & Gomez-Mejia, 1997). Hence, literature does not yet provide a 
full understanding of the independent effects of internal and external supervision in 
comparison to each other, as well as their relationship in terms of their joint impact on 
decision making in organizations (Aguilera et al., 2015; Green, Visser, & Tetlock, 2000).  
The second research gap relates to the strong emphasis in agency theory as well as in 
stewardship theory on the role of internal supervisory boards and their monitoring of TMT 
decisions (Aguilera et al., 2015). From an agency perspective, these boards are believed to be 
in the best position to control TMT decisions (Boivie et al., 2016; Daily, Dalton, & Cannella, 
2003; Jensen & Meckling, 1976), whereas from a stewardship point of view, boards are 
considered most effective as a strategic partner that provides guidance and advice to TMT 
decision making (Anderson, Melanson, & Maly, 2007; Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003). The 
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focus on internal supervisory boards has yielded fruitful insights, for example, into the 
challenging circumstances under which these boards have to operate, and their ability to 
impact organizational-level decision making (e.g., Boivie et al., 2016; Neville, Byron, Post, & 
Ward, 2018). These outcomes, however, do not provide insight into the relationship between 
other internal supervisory bodies and decisions of employees, which also impact an 
organization’s ability to achieve its goals and serve all stakeholders' interests (e.g., Kaptein, 
2008; Van Riel & Fombrun, 2007). Moreover, these outcomes do not account for the 
influence of contextual factors in the institutional environment on this relationship, such as 
collective cultural values (Davidson, Dey, & Smith, 2015). The compliance function is an 
important internal supervisory body in this regard, as it can influence the daily decisions of 
employees by directly monitoring their work actions (e.g., Basel Committee for Banking 
Supervision, 2005), but its actual impact on these decisions is limited (e.g., Treviño, Den 
Nieuwenboer, Kreiner, & Bishop, 2014). Moreover, it is well established that collective 
cultural values can influence decision making of employees (Kish-Gephart, Harrison, & 
Treviño, 2010), yet the evidence for the interactive effect of such values with the presence and 
activities of the compliance function is inconclusive (e.g., McCabe, Treviño, & Butterfield, 
1996; Weaver & Treviño, 1999). Hence, there is a blind spot in current corporate governance 
research regarding the effectiveness of internal supervision by the compliance function, 
together with organizational values, in relation to employee decisions.  
Finally, over the last decade, studies have examined structural governance 
characteristics of internal and external supervisory bodies in relation to firm performance in 
an attempt to proxy the behavioral group processes that are generally assumed to enhance 
TMT decision making (i.e., independent challenge, Boivie et al., 2016; diversity of thinking, 
De Dreu, 2002; reflexivity West, 2000), but have neglected to study actual psychological 
processes in this regard (e.g., Westphal & Zajac, 2013). For example, research on 
characteristics of internal supervisory bodies has focused on the impact of the independence, 
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tenure, and diversity of these bodies (for reviews and a meta-analysis, see Dalton, Daily, 
Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998; Johnson, Schnatterly, & Hill, 2013), and for external supervisory 
bodies, the role of their structural presence, independence, and power was examined (e.g., 
Barth, Caprio, & Levine, 2004; Barth, Lin, Ma, Seade, & Song, 2013). Moreover, there have 
been some initial attempts to theoretically understand, how internal and external supervision 
impact behavioral group processes, such as the relationship between internal supervisory 
boards and TMTs, and how such processes may explain supervisory bodies’ impact on TMT 
decision making (Halevy, Halali, & Zlatev, 2019; Hambrick, Werder, & Zajac, 2008; 
Hillman, Nicholson, & Shropshire, 2008). Hence, to date, a direct empirical link between the 
mentioned structural governance factors, the presumed behavioral group processes and TMT 
decision making is still missing (e.g., Filatotchev, 2008). 
In sum, there are still theoretical and empirical ambiguities regarding the independent 
and joint influences of internal and external supervisory bodies on decision making of TMTs, 
middle managers and employees, what psychological processes explain these effects, and how 
can contextual factors determine these relationships. My dissertation consists of three 
empirical chapters that together address these research gaps. Specifically, Chapter 2 examines 
and compares the independent and joint impact of internal and external supervision in relation 
to decision making of middle managers and employees; Chapter 3 examines how internal 
supervision by the compliance function and its activities (i.e., compliance programs) affects 
employees’ decisions, in conjunction with the presence of organizational values; Chapter 4 
examines the links between internal supervision and structural governance factors, such as the 
composition of internal supervisory boards, with behavioral group processes, such as 
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EMPIRICAL APPROACH AND OVERVIEW OF THIS DISSERTATION 
The central goal of my dissertation is to study how, why and when internal and 
external supervision, independently and together, impact decision making of TMTs, middle 
managers and employees in organizations. To reach this goal, Chapters 2-4 present the 
empirical studies I conducted to examine the relationships in the research models depicted in 
Figures 1.1 and 1.2 (presented in order of the level of analysis). First, Figure 1.1 specifies 
how internal and external supervision, independently and jointly, are related to team decision 
making by TMTs (Chapter 4), and Figure 1.2 illustrates these relationships for individual 
decision making of middle managers and employees (Chapters 2 and 3). Furthermore, the 
models specify the psychological mechanisms that I expect will explain this impact of internal 
and external supervision, in particular perceptions of supervisory body power (Chapters 2 and 
3) and Board-TMT conflict (Chapter 4). Finally, the research models highlight the contextual 
factors that I propose will determine these relationships, specifically organizational values 
(Chapter 3) and structural board composition (Chapter 4). The proposed relationships in both 
figures will be further explained in the description of the respective chapters below. 
The empirical chapters combine different research methods, such as cross-sectional 
field surveys (Chapters 2 and 3), a scenario study (Chapter 2), and a multi-level field dataset 
(Chapter 4). For each empirical chapter new data were collected, mostly among members of 
organizations in the Dutch financial sector, and my samples include subject-matter experts 
from different hierarchical organizational levels, which either represent an internal 
supervisory body or are controlled by internal and external supervisory bodies. Furthermore, I 
will study decision making at the team level as shown in Figure 1.1 (i.e., TMTs), and at the 
individual level as depicted in Figure 1.2 (i.e., middle managers and employees). The use of 
multiple sources, research methods, and multiple levels of analyses, is an important strength 
of my research.  
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FIGURE 1.1 
Research Model for the Independent Impact of and Relationship between Internal and 
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Notably, I study internal and external supervision in general terms (i.e., accountability 
to an internal and external supervisory body; Chapter 2), and I also use specific proxies to 
measure a variety of internal and external supervisory bodies and their activities (i.e., the 
compliance function’s program of activities, Chapter 3; monitoring by external supervisory 
bodies for the financial sector, and the internal supervisory board, Chapter 4). I belief that 
using a wide range of measurements enhances the applicability of my research to a diverse 
range of organizations. Before I will introduce the three empirical chapters, it is important to 
note that these chapters are written as independent articles, and therefore there may be some 
overlap in the theoretical and methodological approaches used.  
 
Chapter 2: The Independent and Joint Impact of Internal and External Supervision 
Chapter 2 examines the independent and joint impact of internal and external 
supervisory bodies on the decisions of middle managers and employees. More specifically, 
Chapter 2 compares the perceived power for both supervisory bodies (French & Raven, 
2001), and examines whether such power explains each body’s respective impact on the 
decisions of these organization members. First, I expect internal supervisory bodies to have a 
stronger impact on middle managers and employee decisions than external supervisory 
bodies. As internal supervisory bodies are located inside the organization, they can more 
frequently and closely monitor organization members than external supervision can (Brass, 
Butterfield, & Skaggs, 1998; Westphal, 1998).  
Moreover, I expect this stronger influence of internal supervisory bodies to be 
explained by their higher levels of perceived power over the decisions of middle managers 
and employees, as such power will actually motivate these members to change their behavior 
(Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003). This power can stem from 
different kinds of control, or power bases, derived from either supervisory bodies’ formal 
position or their personal characteristics (French & Raven, 2001). Based on social psychology 
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and organizational behavior literature, I argue that internal supervisory bodies are perceived to 
hold more power because they, unlike external supervisory bodies, represent fellow 
organizational citizens who organization members can trust (e.g., Gino et al., 2009). 
Specifically, these bodies have greater access to organizational resources that these members 
depend upon (i.e., rewards and punishments, e.g., Emerson, 1962), and can engage in more 
frequent contact and relationships with organization members (Ellemers, De Gilder, & 
Haslam, 2004). Hence, I argue that internal supervisory bodies are perceived to hold more 
power than external supervisory bodies do, based on their formal position as well as their 
personal characteristics (Brass et al., 1998; French & Raven, 2001).  
Finally, I will explore the combined presence of both supervisory bodies, and based on 
the above it can be argued that internal supervisory bodies may already offer such strong 
behavioral guidelines to organization members, that adding external supervisory bodies could 
be superfluous (Ellemers, Van Rijswijk, Bruins & De Gilder, 1998).  
To test these propositions, I use multiple research methods, namely a field survey, 
among 418 middle managers and employees of a diverse range of organizations (Study 2.1), 
and an experimental scenario, among 62 financial middle managers (Study 2.2).  
 
Chapter 3: Internal Supervision and the Role of Organizational Values 
Chapter 3 studies how internal supervision by the compliance function impacts 
employees’ decisions, in conjunction with the presence of organizational values. Based on 
organizational behavior literature, I expect that the presence of the compliance function with 
its supervisory activities (i.e., compliance programs) and collectively shared organizational 
values will both signal to employees what is desired behavior in terms of sound decision 
making (e.g., Kaptein, 2015; Weaver & Treviño, 1999). Moreover, I will explore their joint 
impact, as organizational behavior theory and research suggests that compliance programs 
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and organizational values will interactively determine employee decisions (e.g., Smith-Crowe, 
Tenbrunsel, Chan-Serafin, Brief, Umphress, & Joseph, 2015; Weaver & Treviño, 1999). 
Furthermore, I expect that compliance programs and organizational values will both 
achieve the desired behavior that fosters sound decision making (e.g. Weaver & Treviño, 
1999), by creating perceptions of internal supervisory power. I also propose that they do so 
through different power sources or bases, derived from either their formal position or personal 
characteristics (French & Raven, 2001). Specifically, I expect that compliance programs will 
create perceptions of compliance officers’ power, based on their formal position to monitor 
and sanction rule violations, which will make organization members refrain from undesired 
behavior in terms of sound decision making (Kaptein, 2015; Tyler & Blader, 2005). 
Additionally, I propose that organizational values will signal power of compliance officers 
based on their personal characteristics, because such officers provide organization members 
with informal guidance to understand the common social norms (e.g., Van Knippenberg, 
2011). Consequently, these members will display desired behavior and make more sound 
decisions (Pagliaro, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2011).  
To examine these predictions, I conduct a field survey among 78 compliance officers. 
 
Chapter 4: Internal and External Supervision and the Role of Structural Board 
Composition and Board-TMT Conflict  
Chapter 4 examines the link between internal supervision and board composition, as 
structural governance factor, with intergroup conflict, as behavioral group process, and TMT 
decision making, in relation to the role of external supervision. First, I predict that frequent 
internal supervision is related to conflict between internal supervisory boards and their TMTs 
(Board-TMT conflict). Identity literature (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), suggests that frequent 
internal supervision by boards of TMT decisions may be perceived as criticism of a TMT’s 
group identity that they are keen to protect (i.e., their collective image and the values they 
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stand for as a group; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). As a result, such criticism can emphasize pre-
existing relational tensions between both groups (Brewer, 2001), or disrupt relatively good 
interpersonal relationships (Davis et al., 1997). Research indeed shows that frequent internal 
supervision may result in higher conflict between internal supervisory boards and TMTs 
(Eddleston & Kellermanns, 2007; Falk & Kosfeld, 2006).  
Moreover, based on social psychology literature, I expect that the composition of the 
internal supervisory board in terms of tenure, and particularly the degree to which new 
members have entered the board recently, will reduce the likelihood of such conflict between 
internal supervisory boards and TMTs (e.g., Hogg, 1992; Pelled & Adler, 1994; Haslam & 
Ellemers, 2005). This reasoning is in line with research showing the impact of groups’ 
composition on their attitude towards other groups (e.g., Dunbar, Saiz, Stella, & Saez, 2000; 
Petersen, Dietz, & Frey, 2004), and especially groups with newly joint members are more 
likely to have constructive relationships with other groups (Schwartz, Struch, & Bilsky, 
1990). 
I further argue that if such Board-TMT conflict does arise, it can harm TMT decision 
making, because it will make TMTs more focused on processing information in their own 
favor, instead of information that may harm their positive self-image (e.g., Knapp, Dalziel, & 
Lewis, 2011; Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981). Research shows that such conflict indeed 
tends to harm team functioning, including the decision-making abilities of TMTs (e.g., De 
Wit, Greer, & Jehn, 2012). However, I expect that increased external supervisory monitoring 
or the intervention by an independent third party with legitimate authority can prevent harm to 
TMT decision making (e.g., Jehn & Bendersky, 2003). Research demonstrates the ability of 
third parties with such intervention authority, like external supervisory bodies, to suppress the 
negative effect of conflict between other parties (Keashley & Newberry, 1995).  
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To test these predictions, I use a multi-source field dataset on the team-level among 
111 TMT members and 152 members of internal supervisory boards from 56 Dutch insurance 
companies. 
 
Chapter 5: General Discussion 
In Chapter 5, the general discussion, I will discuss the main findings presented in the 
three empirical chapters (2-4), and I will reflect on the findings in light of the three research 
questions and their specific contributions to corporate governance literature. I will further 
discuss the strengths and limitations of the research approach that I used, and I will propose 
avenues for future research. Finally, I will reflect on the practical implications of my research 
for organizations, supervisory bodies, and policymakers to enhance the effectiveness of 
internal and external supervision and their relationship in relation to sound organizational 
decision making. 
 
THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL CONTRIBUTIONS  
Overall, the empirical research presented in this dissertation contributes to corporate 
governance literature, by enriching this body of work with insights based on organizational 
behavior and social psychology literature. This interdisciplinary and integrative approach was 
key to gain a comprehensive understanding of the multiple dimensions that comprise 
supervisory effectiveness, by studying the unique influence ánd the interplay between internal 
and external supervision in relation to decision making of TMTs, middle managers and 
employees in organizations (Aguilera et al. 2015; Pennington & Schlenker, 1999). In doing 
so, my dissertation contributes to the earlier identified gaps in current corporate governance 
research. First, my research goes beyond studying the isolated effects of internal and external 
supervision, and includes more direct measures of decision making than the usual proxies 
used in prior research regarding financial performance (e.g., Tosi et al., 2003). In addition, by 
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examining the role of psychological mechanisms, such as perceived power perceptions of 
supervisory bodies and intergroup Board-TMT conflict, my research adds insight to why 
internal and external supervision, also in combination, have a certain impact on decision 
making. Moreover, by including contextual factors on the team and organizational level, such 
as structural governance factors (board composition) and organizational values, my research 
creates insight into boundary conditions determining when internal and external supervision, 
independently and together, impact decision making (Filatotchev, 2008).  
This dissertation also makes several practical contributions. First, by studying samples 
of organization members from the top executive level and the lower organization level 
(LeBlanc & Schwartz, 2007), my research provides insights into the effectiveness and 
relationship between internal and external supervisory bodies in real-life organizations. 
Second, as was illustrated by the Volkswagen example, effective internal and external 
supervision are both crucial in safeguarding sound decision making that protects the interests 
of all organizational stakeholders, including the public interest. In this respect, my research 
provides practical insights regarding the independent and joint effects of internal and external 
supervision on decision making in organizations, and under which circumstances and why 
different kinds of supervision are effective. These insights can be used to design tailor-made 
approaches for an organization’s specific context, to improve the effectiveness of internal and 
external supervision, and to optimize their relationship to safeguard sound decision making. 
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CHAPTER 2 
HOW INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL SUPERVISORY BODIES IMPACT 
ORGANIZATION MEMBERS’ SELF-SERVING DECISIONS1 
 
ABSTRACT 
This chapter examines the independent and joint impact of internal and external 
supervisory bodies in relation to self-serving decisions of organization members (i.e., middle 
managers and employees). We propose that internal supervisory bodies will have more impact 
on these decisions than external supervisory bodies, because they are believed to hold more 
power over organization members, based on their formal position (i.e., position power) and 
personal characteristics (i.e., personal power). The results of a field survey among 418 
organization members (Study 2.1), and a scenario study among 62 organization members 
(Study 2.2) largely confirm these predictions. The presence of internal supervisory bodies was 
indeed more strongly negatively related to participants’ self-serving decisions than the 
presence of external supervisory bodies. This stronger relationship for internal supervisory 
bodies was explained by their higher perceived power, and especially position power, but not 
their personal power or proximity. The findings further suggest that the presence of both 
supervisory bodies did not automatically provide additive value. These findings advance 
knowledge on the relative and combined impact of both supervisory bodies, with power as 





1This chapter is based on De Waal, M.M., Rink, F.A., & Stoker, J.I. (2015), published as part of the DNB working 
series (no. 464), How internal and external supervisors influence employees’ self-serving decisions. The paper was presented 
at the 75th conference of the Academy of Management (2015) in Vancouver, Canada, and its abstract is included in the 
Academy of Management proceedings (Vol. 2015, No.1).  
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A number of financial scandals have shown that organization members (i.e., middle 
managers and employees) can make self-serving decisions that are destructive and not in the 
interests of the organization or the larger society (De Cremer & Van Knippenberg, 2004; 
Howell & Shamir, 2005). The Libor case in 2012, for example, revealed that in as many as 
twenty banks, organization members had manipulated the most commonly used interest rate 
used for selling financial products to personally profit from trades (i.e., the Libor rate; 
Financial Times, 2013). This is a classic situation that implies moral hazard that can easily 
lead to self-serving decisions, such that it allows organization members to maximize their 
own utility to the detriment of their organization and its customers (Kotowitz, 2008). The 
Labor rate has a direct impact on the prices that customers pay for loans and influences the 
interest customers receive on their savings, and therefore the Libor case raised a fierce public 
debate on how these banks can restore societies’ trust in financial personnel.  
In order to prevent organization members from making such self-serving decisions, 
many organizations appoint internal supervisory bodies, such as internal supervisory boards 
or audit committees, to lay down rules for proper practices (i.e., codes of conduct; Treviño, 
Den Nieuwenboer, Kreiner, & Bishop, 2014), and to control whether work actions are in the 
interest of the organization. After the financial crisis (2007-2009) the main public response 
was to further strengthen the position of external supervisory bodies, such as tax authorities, 
accountants and formal governmental or independent supervisory agencies, which are 
responsible for safeguarding the stability of the industry, and as such, also supervise the risks 
that organizations pose to their customers and the public interest (Wouters & Van 
Kerckhoven, 2011). Advocates of this public response assume that organization members will 
be sufficiently aware that their organization has to justify its decisions to external supervisory 
bodies, and will make more sound decisions accordingly. It remains to be investigated, 
however, whether internal and external supervisory bodies are indeed both effective in 
reducing organization members’ self-serving decisions on a day-to-day basis. The current 
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research therefore sets out to answer this question, by examining the relationships of internal 
and external supervision independently, and explore their relationship with regard to 
organization members’ self-serving decisions.  
The research presented in this chapter contributes to existing corporate governance 
and organizational behavior literature in two important ways. First, corporate governance 
literature demonstrates that external supervisory bodies have a significant role in controlling 
organizational actions and, in this capacity, influence organizational outcomes and individual 
CEO decisions (e.g., Barth, Caprio, & Levine, 2004; Laeven & Levine, 2009; Westphal, 
1998). However, this area of research has not yet directly examined whether external 
supervisory bodies also have a direct impact on the daily work decisions of organization 
members operating at lower levels within the organization (Hambrick, Werder, & Zajac, 
2008). Research in organizational behavior did examine this question (Barreto & Ellemers, 
2000; Smith & Louis, 2009), and suggests that internal supervisory bodies, which can monitor 
the everyday activities of organization members directly, should be particularly effective in 
reducing their self-serving decisions (Brass, Butterfield, & Skaggs, 1998). Although these 
different theoretical developments reflect the topic’s relevance across multiple disciplines, 
they also indicate that research to date has examined the effectiveness of each supervisory 
body only in isolation and at different levels of analyses (i.e., organizational and CEO level 
vs. individual organization member level). By conjointly examining the impact of internal and 
external supervisory bodies on organization members’ self-serving decisions, the present 
research aims to integrate the two streams of literature to offer a broader, more conclusive 
viewpoint on this matter. Such an integrative approach will help to more fully understand the 
independent and combined impact of internal and external supervision in relation to 
individual organization members’ decisions (e.g., Aguilera, Desender, Bednar, & Lee, 2015). 
Second, in this chapter we also examine why organization members are affected by 
internal and external supervisory bodies. We propose that organization members’ dependency 
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on a supervisory body (in terms of receiving resources or getting punished) drive their 
motivation to make self-serving decisions (Emerson, 1962). Knowledge on this underlying 
process is critical as it will provide valuable insights into the psychological foundations of 
organizational members’ behavior and informs society why certain sources of control, or 
power bases, relate to individual organization members’ decisions more strongly than others.  
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The Role of Supervision  
The work decisions organization members make often reflect judgments that are 
motivated by their own self-interest, even when they seem indefensible to others. Such self-
serving decisions tend to be caused by general psychological biases, such as people’s 
tendency to process information in manners that support their pre-existing views (i.e., self-
serving bias, Haidt, 2001). However, organizational forces, like certain incentives or work 
structures, can also persuade organization members to make decisions that maximize their 
own utility (Dowd, 2009).  
Given that organization members’ self-serving decisions tend to be detrimental to their 
organization and often also harm the larger society (Pitesa & Thau, 2013), there is general 
agreement among practitioners, policy makers and scientists that their actions should be 
supervised closely. Supervisory bodies execute this supervision process; they are formally 
installed to hold organization members accountable for their decisions (Bovens, 2005; Frink 
& Klimoski, 1998). Supervisory bodies thus require organization members to explain their 
activities in a transparent manner and to justify their conduct (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999).  
There is abundant empirical evidence that organization members indeed make less 
self-serving decisions when they are held accountable for their behavior (De Cremer & 
Bakker, 2003; De Cremer, Snyder, & DeWitte, 2001; Kerr, 1999). Given that people have a 
basic human need to get approval from others (Baumeister & Leary, 1995), they tend to 
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experience self-presentational concerns to perform well when their behavior is being 
monitored (Baumeister & Hutton, 1987). Nonetheless, supervisory bodies do not always 
establish desirable effects. For example, some studies show that organization members who 
have to justify their decisions to a supervisory body can also become relatively strategic in 
their actions; they merely depict a more positive image of their accomplishments, but do not 
change their behavior substantially (Frink & Ferris, 1998; Lerner & Tetlock, 1999).  
Some scholars have argued that the effectiveness of supervisory bodies is contingent 
on the kind of behaviors that they hold organization members accountable for (Frink & 
Klimoski, 1998; Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). There are studies demonstrating that organization 
members make significantly less self-serving decisions when they have to justify the process 
to reach their work decisions (i.e., procedural accountability), than when they only have to 
account for the quality of those outcomes (i.e., outcome accountability; Siegel-Jacobs & 
Yates, 1996). So, when organization members are held accountable for how they make their 
decisions, they make a more even-handed evaluation of decision alternatives (Pitesa & Thau, 
2013). Other scholars have proposed that the effectiveness of supervision may also depend on 
who is supervising organization members (Frink & Klimoski, 2004; Pennington & Schenkler, 
1999). Organization members often have to justify their actions to external supervisory bodies 
outside their organization (Abelman, Elmore, Even, Kenyon, & Marshall, 1999), and/or to 
internal supervisory bodies inside their organization (Frink & Klimoski, 2004). However, it 
remains to be investigated which type of supervisory body will most effectively reduce the 
likelihood that organization members make self-serving decisions, and why these supervisory 
bodies have this influence.  
 
The Power of Supervisory Bodies 
External and internal supervisory bodies both control important resources upon which 
organizations and their members depend (Brass et al., 1998; Frink & Klimoski, 1998; 
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Milgram, 1963). External supervisory bodies, such as tax authorities, accountants, and formal 
governmental or independent supervisory agencies, are often commissioned by important 
governmental stakeholders (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Tetlock, 1992), and have legitimate 
authority to sanction organizational operations (Adams & Ferreira, 2012), to change 
organizational and incentive structures, and ultimately to replace top managers (Barth et al., 
2004). Studies in the corporate governance domain demonstrate that external supervisory 
bodies therefore tend to reduce negative organizational outcomes, such as organizational risk-
taking (e.g., Laeven & Levine, 2009), and enhance a collective focus among organizations’ 
CEOs (Westphal, 1998).  
Internal supervisory bodies are also installed by important organizational stakeholders 
and can control organizational operations, incentive policies and managerial positions 
(Finkelstein, 1992; John & Senbet, 1998). Organizational behavior literature argues that, 
because of this position, internal supervisory bodies, unlike external supervisory bodies, can 
engage in frequent contact with organization members, and thus build personal relationships 
with them (Ellemers, De Gilder, & Haslam, 2004). According to this reasoning, external 
supervisory bodies might be less effective in influencing the everyday decisions of lower-
level organization members than internal supervisory bodies. Empirical research in this area 
indeed shows that most organization members, because they feel committed to their 
organization and to those members who represent it (Ellemers, Van Rijswijk, Bruins, & De 
Gilder, 1998), are influenced more strongly by the opinions of organizational members than 
by the opinions of outsiders (Brass et al., 1998; Gino, Ayal, & Ariely, 2009).  
More importantly, because of their unique position within an organization, internal 
supervisory bodies have more specific options to sanction or reward organization members’ 
daily work activities than external supervisory bodies have (Brass et al., 1998; French & 
Raven, 2001). This notion is based on studies demonstrating that organization members feel 
highly dependent on internal supervisory bodies for gaining certain organizational resources, 
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such as promotions or incentives (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). Accordingly, there is reason to 
believe that internal supervisory bodies may be perceived to hold more power over 
organization members than external supervisory bodies do, as the latter can only monitor 
them indirectly and infrequently (e.g., Brass et al., 1998; Foucault, 1982; Haslam, 2004). We 
therefore present the following three hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: The presence of internal supervisory bodies is more strongly negatively 
related to organization members’ self-serving decisions than the presence of external 
supervisory bodies. 
Hypothesis 2: Internal supervisory bodies are perceived to hold more power over 
organization members than external supervisory bodies do. 
Hypothesis 3: Internal supervisory bodies’ perceived power level will mediate the 
relationship of their presence with organization members’ self-serving decisions.  
Note that we do not hypothesize that external supervisory bodies are not related to 
organization members’ decision making at all. As said, external supervisory bodies do have 
legitimate authority, to sanction organization members’ self-serving decisions if it harms the 
organizational or societal interest, so they should influence organization members’ work 
actions at least to some extent. We merely expect that organization members perceive internal 
supervisory bodies to be more powerful, and hence are more strongly negatively related to 
their self-serving decisions, than external supervisory bodies.  
Finally, since organizations and policy makers can of course (and often do) present 
organization members with both internal and external supervisory bodies (Walsh & Seward, 
1990), we will also examine their interactive relationship with organization members’ self-
serving decisions. We did this for explorative reasons as to date, little is known about the 
effects of the combined presence of both bodies (Green, Visser, & Tetlock, 2000). On the one 
hand, corporate governance scholars argue that a combination of both supervisory bodies 
should have an additive effect and thus will be most effective in reducing organization 
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members’ self-serving decisions, because they can then compensate for each other’s 
weaknesses (Adams & Ferreira, 2012; Walsh & Seward, 1990). On the other hand, however, 
organizational behavior literature suggests that internal supervisory bodies, with their 
relatively high levels of power, may already offer such strong behavioral guidelines to 
organization members that the combination with external supervisory bodies may have little 
additive value (Ellemers et al., 1998).  
 
Overview of Studies 
The goal of the presented research in this chapter is to examine how the presence of 
internal and external supervisory bodies, independently and together, are related to the self-
serving decisions of organization members (i.e., middle managers and employees) in daily 
practice. We executed two studies to test our predictions. The first cross-sectional study 
(Study 2.1) was conducted among a large sample of organization members, 418 middle 
managers and employees, to get initial insights into the extent to which these members 
recognize that they have to justify their work actions to internal and external supervisory 
bodies. This study further assessed to what degree organization members perceive that both 
supervisory bodies hold power over them, and demonstrate a tendency to adapt their self-
serving decisions accordingly. Study 2.1 thus allowed us to observe the natural relationships 
between organization members’ decisions and the presence of internal and external 
supervisory bodies, without interference of specific organizational or task conditions. 
Study 2.2 was conducted among 62 financial middle managers and used a scenario 
methodology to confirm the causal direction of our predicted relationships. Moreover, by 
using an experimental design, we could also make a more systematic comparison of the 
independent and combined relationships of internal and external supervisory bodies with 
organization members and also of the possible power bases of the two supervisory bodies. 
The financial managers were asked to solve an investment dilemma in which they had to 
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choose between their own personal interests and the organization’s interests (i.e., self-serving 
decisions; Komorita & Parks, 1994). They were informed that their decision would be 




Procedure and Sample. The study was part of a large-scale research questionnaire 
presented to readers of Intermediair, a Dutch weekly magazine aimed at highly-educated 
professionals. In total, 473 respondents participated voluntarily in the questionnaire online in 
return for participating in a book-token raffle. However, 55 respondents were excluded a 
priori from this sample due to incomplete responses. This yielded a final sample of 418 
respondents (247 men, 171 women, Mage = 43.4 years). Half of these respondents held a 
middle management position (50%). In terms of education, 43% had a Bachelor, 41% a 
Master, and 9% a Post doctorate degree or similar. In terms of economic sector, 22% worked 
in industry, 33% worked in trade and commercial services, 30% worked in non-commercial 
services, and 15% worked in other sectors.  
 
Measures  
Presence of internal and external supervisory bodies. Organization members’ 
awareness of the presence of internal supervisory bodies and external supervisory bodies was 
measured with two single items (Frink & Ferris, 1998): “I am held accountable for my work 
by the top management within my organization” and “I am held accountable for my work by a 
party outside of the organization”. These items were assessed on a 7-point Likert scale 
ranging from 1 (“totally disagree”) to 7 (“totally agree”). 
Self-serving decision. Organization members’ tendency to make self-serving decisions 
was measured with one dichotomous item; “When I experience conflict between my personal 
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interests and the organization’s interests at work, I tend to choose; (0) the organization’s 
interests or (1) my personal interests”. Accordingly, a higher score on this measure refers to 
more self-serving decisions. 
Perceived power. The extent to which organization members perceived each 
supervisory body to hold power over them was measured with scales consisting of two items 
each (Lammers, Stoker, & Stapel, 2009). For internal supervisory bodies, the items were: “To 
what degree do you think that top management has power in your organization” and “To what 
degree do you think that top management has influence in your organization”. Together, these 
items represented a reliable scale (r = .82, p < .001). For external supervisory bodies, the 
items were: “To what degree do you think that external parties, such as external supervisory 
bodies, have power in your organization?” and “To what degree do you think that external 
parties, such as external supervisory bodies, have influence in your organization?” These 
items also represented a reliable scale (r = .83, p < .001). All questions were assessed on a 7-
point Likert scale ranging from 1 (“totally disagree”) to 7 (“totally agree”). 
Control variables. Past research has emphasized the critical role of having 
management experience (i.e., in a middle management position or equivalent) within the 
organization, for how often organization members have contact with, and respond to, 
supervisory bodies (e.g., Mulgan, 2000). We therefore included this organization member 




Descriptive statistics. Table 2.1 presents the means, standard deviations, and Pearson 
zero-order correlations for all Study 2.1 variables and control variable. This table shows that 
there was a negative correlation between management experience and organization members’ 
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self-serving decisions2. Interestingly, organization members’ awareness of the presence of 
internal supervisory bodies was uncorrelated with their awareness of the presence of external 
supervisory bodies, suggesting that the presence of the two supervisory bodies are indeed 
believed to be distinct from each other. Table 2.1 further shows that the presence of internal 
supervisory bodies was negatively correlated with organization members’ self-serving 
decisions, whereas the presence of external supervisory bodies was not. 
 
  TABLE 2.1 
 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations among Variables and Control Variable  
in Study 2.1  
Variables Mean SD  1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 
1. Management experience 1.50 0.50       
2. Self-serving decisions 0.16 .16 -.14**      
3. Presence internal supervisory 
bodies 
4.81 1.59 .12* -.10*     
4. Presence external supervisory 
bodies 
2.90 1.86 -.04 .08   .08    
5. Power internal supervisory bodies 5.31 1.33 .01 -.12* .25** -.03   
6. Power external supervisory bodies 4.17 1.65 -.11* .08   .07 .29** .14**  
N = 418 (listwise) * p < .05,  ** p < .01 (two-tailed) 
 
Statistical analyses. To test Hypothesis 1 and 2, we standardized all independent 
variables following Aiken and West (1991) and conducted multiple logistic regression 
analyses. In all analyses, we first entered the control variable in step 1, and then the presence 
of internal supervisory bodies and the presence of external supervisory bodies as our main 
independent predictors in step 2, and their interaction term in step 3. For Hypothesis 2 we 
 
2 Given this significant correlation we further examined the impact of management experience, and these 
exploratory analyses did not change the main result presented here. Interestingly, it did provide an additional insight that 
organization members in management positions perceived internal supervisory bodies to be most powerful, we will discuss 
this result in relation to the design of Study 2.2 (for more detailed results, see the Appendix).  
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conducted two separate regression analyses, one to predict the perceived power of internal 
supervisory bodies and one to predict the perceived power of external supervisory bodies. To 
test our mediation as proposed in Hypothesis 3, we first conducted another logistic regression 
analysis to examine whether the perceived power levels of both supervisory bodies predicted 
organization members’ self-serving decisions. Subsequently, we performed a SPSS process 
macro that provides the bias-corrected and accelerated bootstrap confidence intervals for 
mediational relationships (Hayes, 2012).  
Hypotheses testing. Hypothesis 1 proposed that the presence of internal supervisory 
bodies is more strongly negatively related to organization members’ self-serving decisions 
than external supervisory bodies. Our results revealed that there was a significant and 
negative direct relationship between the presence of internal supervisory bodies and 
organization members’ self-serving decisions (B = -.25, p = .05, R² = .06), whereas we found 
no significant relationship for the presence of external supervisory bodies (B = .25, p = .07,  
R² = .06). Moreover, we found no significant interaction of the combined presence of internal 
and external supervisory bodies in relation to organization members’ self-serving decisions (B 
= .08, p = .52, R² = .06), and this suggests that there may be no additive value in combining 
both supervisory bodies. Together, these findings suggest that the presence of internal 
supervisory bodies may indeed be more strongly negatively related to organization members’ 
self-serving decisions than the presence of external supervisory bodies.  
Hypothesis 2 proposed that internal supervisory bodies are perceived to hold more 
power over organization members than external supervisory bodies do. The regression results 
with regard to the perceived power of internal supervisory bodies revealed that their power 
was predicted only by the awareness of organization members that internal supervisory bodies 
were present (B = .35, p = .00, R² = .06). There was no significant direct relationship between 
the presence of external supervisory bodies with the perceived power of internal supervisory 
bodies (B = -.06, p = .31, R² = .06), and we also found no significant interaction of the 
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combined presence of both bodies (B = -.05, p = .36, R² = .06). Moreover, the results for the 
regression on external supervisory bodies power largely showed a similar pattern of results; 
their power level was also only predicted by organization members’ awareness of their 
presence (B = .46, p = .001, R² = .09), and not by the presence of internal supervisory bodies 
(B = .10, p = .20, R² = .09). In this case, however, we did find a significant interaction of the 
combined presence of both bodies in relation to the perceived power of external supervisory 
bodies (B = .20, p = .01, R² = .10). This latter result suggests that external supervisory bodies 
were perceived to be most powerful when organization members were aware of the presence 
of both external and internal supervisory bodies.  
To make a more direct comparison between the perceived power levels of both 
supervisory bodies, we conducted a paired samples t test. The results showed that on average 
the perceived power level of internal supervisory bodies (M = 5.32, SD = 1.33) was 
significantly higher than the perceived power level of external supervisory bodies (M = 4.14, 
SD = 1.64), t(417) = 12.36, p = .00, d = 1.18. Hence, the results further support Hypothesis 2.  
Hypothesis 3 proposed that internal supervisory bodies’ power level will mediate the 
relationship with organization members’ self-serving decisions. Consistently, our results show 
that only the perceived power of internal supervisory bodies had a significant relationship 
with organization members’ self-serving decisions (B = -.36, p = .01, R² = .07; perceived 
power of external supervisory bodies; B = .26, p = .08, R² = .07). The mediation analysis 
confirmed that the direct relationship between the presence of internal supervisory bodies and 
organization members’ decisions became insignificant (B = -.16, p = .23), while the indirect 
relationship through internal supervisory bodies’ perceived power became significant (B = -
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Discussion 
The findings from Study 2.1 provide initial evidence for our Hypotheses 1-3. As 
predicted, the presence of internal supervisory bodies was more strongly and negatively 
related to organization members’ self-serving decisions than the presence of external 
supervisory bodies. This stronger relationship can be explained by the higher power of 
internal supervisory bodies perceived by organization members compared to external 
supervisory bodies. So, even though organization members granted power to both supervisory 
bodies when they were aware of their presence, organization members’ self-serving decisions 
were more impacted by the power of internal supervisory bodies. Interestingly, we found no 
significant relationship for the combined presence of both bodies with organization members’ 
self-serving decisions. This result tentatively suggests that there may be no automatic additive 
value in the combination of internal and external supervisory bodies.  
An important strength of this first study is that we collected data among a large 
working population from real-life organizations operating in diverse business sectors. We 
therefore feel confident that our findings reflect natural relationships that extend to a broad 
range of organization members working across different organizational contexts. However, as 
Study 2.1 was cross-sectional in nature, we could not make causal inferences based on these 
results, or use different measurement methods to assess our constructs (Podsakoff, 
MacKenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003). To address these limitations, we conducted a second 
experimental study among financial managers, in which we manipulated the presence of 
internal and external supervisory bodies, independently and in combination, and subsequently 
asked these financial managers to make a hypothetical investment decision with possible 
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STUDY 2.2 
In addition to testing the causal direction of our proposed relationships, there were a 
few other reasons why we designed Study 2.2. First, as we cannot draw firm conclusions how 
the presence of both supervisory bodies impacts organization members’ decisions on the basis 
of the results obtained in Study 2.1, we decided to examine the combination of internal and 
external supervisory bodies again in Study 2.2. The use of an experimental design allowed us 
to make a more systematic comparison between the independent and combined presence of 
the two supervisory bodies.  
Second, the results from Study 2.1 were in line with our predictions as they suggest 
that external supervisory bodies are less influential than internal supervisory bodies. However, 
we found that external supervisory bodies did not have any significant relation with 
organization members’ decisions. We consider it unlikely that external supervisory bodies are 
completely incapable of motivating organization members’ behavior. After all, external 
supervisory bodies represent quasi-legal institutions that can use formal powers, to control 
organizational activities and organization members (Wouters & Kerckhoven, 2011). So, 
perhaps external supervisory bodies did not have a strong relationship with organization 
members’ self-serving decisions in Study 2.1, because we did not sufficiently capture this 
particular power base. In Study 2.2, we thus examined whether organization members 
recognize what exact sources of control of organizational resources, or power bases, internal 
and external supervisory bodies hold over them, and also how the dependency on the related 
resources shapes the motivation of organization members to make self-serving decisions (e.g., 
Brass et al., 1998).  
In light of the above, literature makes a distinction between two relevant sources of 
control, or power bases, namely position power and personal power (Yukl & Falbe, 1991). 
Position power stems from a formal division of roles, whereas personal power is based on 
personal characteristics of the power holder (French & Raven, 2001). As mentioned earlier, 
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external supervisory bodies are formally commissioned by important governmental 
stakeholders to control organization operations (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999; Tetlock, 1992). 
Research therefore suggests that external supervisory bodies may hold some perceived 
position power over organization members, as they are found to have legitimate authority to 
sanction and reward organizational actions (Barth et al., 2004). It is assumed, however, that 
internal supervisory bodies are perceived to hold more position power over organization 
members’ decisions than external supervisory bodies. As these bodies are formally appointed 
by the organization and due to this internal position, they can more closely monitor and 
control organization members’ work actions (Finkelstein, 1992; John & Senbet, 1998). 
Therefore, these bodies, compared to external supervisory bodies, can more directly and more 
immediately administer rewards and punishments for organization members’ behavior, and 
thus can have a stronger influence on organization members’ decisions (Brass et al., 1998).  
In addition, research shows that, internal supervisory bodies are also perceived to have 
higher levels of personal power, because they can, unlike external supervisory bodies, create a 
shared commitment among organization members to organizational goals, by using their 
personal relationships and because they represent the ethical values of an organization (Brass 
et al., 1998; Cole, Schaninger, & Harris, 2002; Yukl & Falbe, 1991). With such perceived 
personal power internal supervisory bodies can provide social approval to organization 
members, and therefore they can have a stronger influence on these members’ decision 
making (French & Raven, 2001).  
Based on the above, compared to external supervisory bodies, we argue that internal 
supervisory bodies’ are perceived to hold more position and personal power. As internal 
supervisory bodies have more direct access to organization resources on which organization 
members depend, and this dependency shapes these members’ motivation to make less self-
serving decisions (Brass et al., 1998). So, even though we believe external supervisory bodies 
are perceived to hold some power and influence over organization members’ decisions, we 
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expect this impact to be stronger for internal supervisory bodies. In other words, we propose 
that internal supervisory bodies are perceived to hold more power over organization members 
than external supervisory bodies do, and therefore they will have a stronger negative 
relationship with organization members’ self-serving decisions in comparison. Formally 
stated: 
Hypothesis 4a: Internal supervisory bodies are perceived to hold more position and 
personal power over organization members than external supervisory bodies do.  
Hypothesis 4b: Internal supervisory bodies’ perceived personal and position power 
mediates the stronger negative relationship between the presence of internal 
supervisory bodies and organization members’ self-serving decisions.  
Finally, in addition to testing this fourth hypothesis, we also conducted Study 2.2 to 
rule out a possible alternative explanation for why internal supervisory bodies may have a 
stronger negative relationship to organization members’ self-serving decisions than external 
supervisory bodies. Some scholars suggest that internal supervisory bodies are so impactful 
because they are simply more proximal to organization members (Frink & Klimoski, 1998). 
So, rather than that internal supervisory bodies are perceived to hold more position and 
personal power over organization members than external supervisory bodies do, the influence 
of internal supervisory bodies could also be due to the fact that internal supervision is 
perceived to be closer. Due to this proximity, organization members feel that they are under 
constant surveillance by internal supervisory bodies. This possibility could explain why the 
exploratory analysis in Study 2.1 (see the Appendix) revealed that organization members in 
middle management positions, who are more proximal to internal supervisory bodies than 
organization members who are not in such a management position, perceived internal 
supervisory bodies to be most powerful. So, in Study 2.2, we included a proximity measure, 
but more importantly we focused on organization members with a middle management 
position only.  
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Method 
Design and sample. This study used a one factorial (presence of supervisory body: 
internal supervisory body present/external supervisory body present/both supervisory bodies 
present) between-subjects design3. We recruited specifically organization members with 
management experience (i.e., organization members who occupied a position as middle 
manager) in the financial sector, through snowball sampling by using personal networks. We 
aimed for a minimum of 80 organization members, but ended up with 62 members from 
different organizations who filled out the questionnaire correctly. Of these participants, 29% 
was female (Mage = 38.79, SD = 13.02; Myears of work experience = 12.42, SD = 11.42) and 94% held 
a college degree or higher. Participation in the study was voluntary, and the participants were 
randomly and equally assigned to one of the three conditions (roughly 20 participants per 
condition) and received all study materials online.  
Scenario. The participants were presented with a hypothetical decision dilemma 
adapted from Pitesa and Thau (2013), but realistic for the daily business practice of financial 
middle managers. They had to decide how much money the organization should invest in a 
new business project. The hypothetical project could be highly profitable due to its size and 
prospects, but also carried significant risks because its feasibility was difficult to estimate. 
Participants learned that they would get a sizeable bonus if the project would be successful. In 
case of failure, there would be no major personal consequences for the organization members 
(e.g., job loss); only the organization’s performance and market position would be at stake. As 
such, the investment decision implied moral hazard, in the sense that the participants could 
maximize their own utility to the detriment of others (Kotowitz, 2008), which represents an 
opportunity for making self-serving decisions. 
 
3 We originally also designed a condition where both supervisory bodies were absent. However, most of the 
participants who were assigned to this condition failed the manipulation checks because they were reluctant to believe that 
they did not have to justify their actions to any supervisory body. Similar difficulties are reported in previous research (see 
Skitka, Mosier & Burdick, 2000). This condition was therefore removed from the study design.  
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Presence of supervisory bodies (manipulation). After the participants had read about 
the business project, we introduced the presence of a supervisory body to whom they had to 
justify their decision (based on Frink & Ferris, 1998). In the internal supervision condition, 
the participants learned that they had to justify their decision to internal supervisory bodies 
within the organization, which control whether they act in line with formal internal policy 
rules (e.g., an organization’s management board or an internal audit committee). In the 
external supervision condition, the participants learned that they had to justify their decision 
to external supervisory bodies outside the organization, which control whether they act in line 
with formal external legal rules (e.g., tax supervisory bodies or external accountants). In the 
condition where both supervisory bodies were present, the participants received information 
about the internal and external supervisory bodies (with the internal supervisory bodies 
always presented first).  
To test the effectiveness of this manipulation, the participants had to answer three 
checks at the end of the questionnaire that contained our dependent measures (see Frink & 
Ferris, 1998; Siegel-Jacobs & Yates, 1996): 1)”I had to justify my investment decision”; 2) “I 
was held accountable for my decision by an internal supervisory body”; and 3) “I was held 
accountable for my decision by an external supervisory body”. All questions had to be 
answered on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 7 (“strongly agree”).  
The results of a series of one-way ANOVAs with the manipulation conditions as 
independent factor confirmed that across all three conditions, participants felt that they had to 
justify their decision, Maverage = 5.60, SDaverage =  1.06, F (2, 59) = .980, p = .38, ƞ²= .03. 
Moreover, we found the intended results on the second check; in the condition with the 
presence of only an internal supervisory body and in the condition where both supervisory 
bodies were present, participants believed more strongly that they were held accountable by 
an internal supervisory body (respectively M = 5.90, SD = .85 and M = 6.14, SD = .48), than 
in the condition with only external supervisory bodies (M = 4.76, SD = 2.07), F (2, 59) = 6.44, 
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p = .00, ƞ²= .18. Post hoc testing (Tukey HSD) revealed that the first two conditions did not 
differ significantly from each other (p = .83). Finally, the results on the third check were also 
in the expected direction; in the condition with external supervisory bodies only and in the 
condition where both supervisory bodies were present, participants believed more strongly 
that they were held accountable by an external supervisory body (respectively M = 5.00, SD = 
1.55 and M = 5.38, SD = 1.53), than in the condition with internal supervisory bodies only (M 
= 3.80, SD = 1.93), F (2.59) = 4.92, p = .01, ƞ²= .14. The first two conditions did not differ 
significantly from each other (Tukey HSD post hoc test, p = .74). Together, the results thus 
demonstrate that our manipulation was successful.  
 
Measures  
Self-serving decision. Participants’ tendency to make a self-serving decision was 
measured with one continuous item; “How much money would you invest in the new business 
project?” The answering scale ranged from 0 Euros to 1.000.000 Euros (following Pitesa & 
Thau, 2013). A higher score on this measure refers to more self-serving decisions since the 
investment of a large amount of money carried risks for the organization only, not for the 
participants. The participants could in fact benefit from this investment personally (i.e., in 
terms of a larger bonus), when the project turned out to be successful.  
Perceived power bases. The extent to which participants perceived each supervisory 
body to hold position power over them, was measured with the following four items 
developed by French and Raven (1959): “These supervisory bodies can: 1) influence my 
personal pay level; 2) influence whether or not I get a pay raise; 3) influence whether or not I 
get a promotion; and 4) provide me with special benefits”. Together these items formed a 
reliable scale (α = .94). The extent to which participants perceived each supervisory body to 
hold personal power over them was also measured with four items from French and Raven 
(1959): “These supervisory bodies can: 1) make me feel valued; 2) make me feel like they 
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approve of me; 3) make me feel accepted; and 4) make me feel important as a person”. These 
items also formed a reliable scale (α = .92). All questions had to be answered on a 7-point 
scale ranging from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 7 (“strongly agree”). 
Perceived proximity. The extent to which participants perceived each supervisory 
body to be relatively close to them was measured with three self-developed items: 1) “I expect 
to meet these supervisory bodies on a regular basis”; 2) “I expect to have personal contact 
with these supervisory bodies.”; and 3) “I expect to give personal updates to these supervisory 
bodies”. These three items also had to be answered on a 7-point scale ranging from 1 
(“strongly disagree”) to 7 (“strongly agree”) and formed a reliable scale (α = .93).  
 
Results 
Descriptive statistics. Table 2.2 represents the means, standard deviations and Pearson 
zero-order correlations for all study 2.2 variables. This table shows that only position power is 
correlated with participants’ self-serving decisions. Proximity was associated with both 
perceived power bases of supervisory bodies. Interestingly, Table 2.2 further shows that 
position power and personal power are positively correlated. 
 
TABLE 2.2 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations among Variables in Study 2.2 
Variables Mean S.D. 1. 2. 3. 4. 
1. Self-serving decisions 56.1451.63 33.3903.13     
2. Position power 3.95 1.85 -.36**    
3. Personal power 4.72 1.50 -.16 .51**   
4. Proximity 5.00 1.58 -.14 .35** .43**  
    N = 62 * p < .05, ** p < .01 (two-tailed) 
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Hypotheses testing. The results for our dependent variables were obtained by 
performing a series of one-way ANOVAs with the manipulation condition as the independent 
factor. We tested our Hypotheses 1-3 again, that internal supervisory bodies are more stronger 
negatively related to participants’ self-serving decisions, because they are perceived to hold 
more power than external supervisory bodies. Moreover, we tested Hypothesis 4A-B, 
predicting that internal supervisory bodies are perceived to hold more position and personal 
power than external supervisory bodies do, and that this explains these bodies’ stronger 
negative relationship with participants’ self-serving decisions. 
Self-serving decision. The results of the ANOVA on participants’ self-serving 
decision revealed a main effect of the supervisory bodies manipulation (F [2, 59] = 3.87, p = 
.03 ƞ² = .12). Participants were significantly less inclined to invest money in the business 
project (i.e., made a decision that was less self-serving) in the condition with internal 
supervisory bodies only (M = 402.500 Euros, SD = 355.215 Euros) than in the conditions 
with external supervisory bodies only (M = 669.048 Euros, SD = 298.947 Euros), or with 
both supervisory bodies present (M = 605.238 Euros; SD = 302.285 Euros; Tukey post hoc, p 
= .03 for the internal supervisory bodies-only versus external supervisory bodies-only 
contrast, p = .80 for the external supervisory bodies-only versus both supervisory bodies 
contrast). So, in line with Hypothesis 1, the results show that the presence of internal 
supervisory bodies was more strongly negatively related to participants’ self-serving decisions 
than the presence of external supervisory bodies, and also stronger than the combined 
presence of both bodies.  
Perceived power bases. The results of the ANOVA on perceived position power of the 
supervisory bodies revealed a main effect of the supervisory bodies manipulation (F [2, 59] = 
5.40, p = .01, ƞ² = .15). Participants believed that external supervisory bodies alone held 
significantly less position power (M = 2.95, SD =1.55) than internal supervisory bodies alone 
(M =4.27, SD = 1.76), or than both supervisory bodies combined (M = 4.63, SD = 1.89; 
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Tukey post hoc, p = .05 for the external supervisory bodies-only versus internal supervisory 
bodies-only contrast, p = .80 for the internal supervisory bodies-only versus both supervisory 
bodies contrast).  
For personal power, the results of the ANOVA revealed a similar pattern (F [2, 59] = 
6.31, p = .00, ƞ² = .18). Participants believed that external supervisory bodies alone hold 
significantly less personal power (M = 3.84, SD =1.60) than internal supervisory bodies alone 
(M = 5.17, SD = 1.38), or than both supervisory bodies combined (M = 5.19, SD = 1.19; 
Tukey post hoc, p = .01 for the external supervisory bodies-only versus internal supervisory 
bodies-only contrast, p = 1 for the internal supervisory bodies-only versus both supervisory 
bodies contrast). Together, these results support Hypothesis 2, such that internal supervisory 
bodies are perceived to be more powerful than external supervisory bodies, and Hypothesis 
4a, such that internal supervisory bodies are indeed believed to hold more position and 
personal power than external supervisory bodies do. However, external supervisory bodies’ 
position power was lower than expected. Interestingly, a combination of the two supervisory 
bodies was also perceived to be relatively powerful in terms of position as well as personal 
power.  
Proximity. The results of the ANOVA on perceived proximity of the supervisory 
bodies also revealed a main effect of the supervisory bodies manipulation (F [2, 59] = 7.25, p 
= .00, ƞ² = .20). Participants believed that external supervisory bodies alone were significantly 
less proximal to them (M = 4.08, SD = 1.91) than internal supervisory bodies alone (M =5.18, 
SD = 1.29) or both supervisory bodies combined (M = 5.75, SD = .94; Tukey post hoc, p = 
.04 for the external supervisory bodies-only versus internal supervisory bodies-only contrast, 
p = .43 for the internal supervisory bodies-only versus both supervisory bodies contrast). 
These results demonstrate that internal supervisory bodies are indeed perceived to be more 
proximal than external supervisory bodies. It is worth nothing, however, that a combination of 
the two supervisory bodies was also believed to be highly proximal.  
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Mediation. To test our mediation Hypothesis 4b, we contrasted the internal 
supervisory bodies-only condition and the external supervisory bodies-only condition against 
the condition were the respective body was absent (see Field, 2005). For this purpose, we 
created an ‘internal supervisory bodies’ dummy by labelling the internal supervisory bodies-
only condition as “1” and the external supervisory bodies-only condition as “0”, and an 
‘external supervisory bodies’ dummy by labelling the external supervisory bodies-only 
condition as “1” and the internal supervisory bodies-only condition as “0”. We subsequently 
used a bootstrapping technique developed by Hayes (2012) to test for multiple mediation 
patterns in the relationship between the presence of internal supervisory bodies and 
participants’ self-serving decisions, while controlling for the presence of external supervisory 
bodies. With this technique (Model 4 of the process macro, Preacher & Hayes, 2008), we 
could test and compare the explanatory value of our two mediators, internal supervisory 
bodies’ position power and personal power, in relation to participants’ self-serving decisions. 
Interestingly, the results revealed a significant indirect effect for internal supervisory bodies’ 
position power only (B = -103.122, SE = 72.666, p = .37; CI 95%= -312,909, -12.043, N = 
41; 5000 re-samples), and not for their personal power (B = 13.108, SE = 58099, p = .80; CI 
95% = -89.568, 148.155). These findings suggest that the relationship between the presence 
of internal supervisory bodies and participants’ self-serving decisions was primarily explained 
by their position power. 
To test the alternative explanation that proximity explains why the presence of internal 
supervisory bodies is stronger related to participants’ self-serving decisions than the presence 
of external supervisory bodies, we conducted a second multiple mediation analysis where 
proximity was added as a third possible mediator. However, again we did not find a 
significant indirect effect for proximity (internal supervisory bodies dummy; B = -5.347, SE = 
47.459, p = .89; CI 95% = -117.563, 80.562). Moreover, the inclusion of this additional 
mediator variable did not change the found indirect effects of internal supervisory bodies’ 
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position and personal power significantly. Accordingly, we can conclude that the stronger 
negative relationship of internal supervisory bodies with participants’ self-serving decisions 
was not due to their degree of closeness to the participants. For an overview of the combined 
results of these analyses see Figure 2.1. 
 
FIGURE 2.1 
Path Model for Mediation of Two Power Bases and Proximity in the Relationship 
between the Presence of Internal Supervisory Bodies and Participants’ Self-serving 











The results of Study 2.2 also largely confirm our Hypotheses 1-3. Again, we found 
that the presence of internal supervisory bodies was more strongly negatively related to 
participants’ self-serving decisions than the presence of external supervisory bodies, because 
participants believed that internal supervisory bodies held more power over them (compared 
to external supervisory bodies). We further predicted (Hypothesis 4a) that internal supervisory 
bodies are perceived to hold more position and personal power over organization members 
than external supervisory bodies do. The results of Study 2.2 also support this hypothesis, as 
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participants indeed believed that internal supervisory bodies possess more power derived from 
these sources than external supervisory bodies do, and almost to the same extent as a 
combination of the two supervisory bodies. However, contrary to what we had expected (see 
Hypothesis 4b), the results also showed that only internal supervisory bodies’ position power 
(i.e., their ability to reward and punish organization members) directly explained the stronger 
negative relationship of internal supervisory bodies with participants’ self-serving decisions. 
Moreover, it turned out that the combination of supervisory bodies was less strongly related to 
participants’ self-serving decisions than the presence of internal supervisory bodies alone, 
despite their equally high levels of power. We will elaborate on these issues in the general 
discussion below.  
 
OVERALL DISCUSSION 
Our research adheres to public calls to examine how to prevent that organization 
members make self-serving decisions that may harm their organization and customers. 
Therefore, this research drew on literature in the areas of corporate governance and 
organizational behavior, to articulate a contingency theory of the relationships between the 
presence and power levels of internal and external supervisory bodies with organization 
members’ self-serving decisions. Across a large field survey and an experimental study, we 
found that the sole presence of internal supervisory bodies was more strongly negatively 
related to organization members’ self-serving decisions than the sole presence of external 
supervisory bodies, or the combined presence of both bodies. So, simply combining internal 
and external supervisory bodies did not automatically provide an additive advantage. These 
results further showed that this stronger influence of internal supervisory bodies is explained 
by their higher power over organization members compared to external supervisory bodies. 
Study 2.2 additionally demonstrated that the stronger relationship of internal 
supervisory bodies with participants’ self-serving decisions was not explained by their high 
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level of perceived personal power over organization members or by their high degree of 
perceived proximity to organization members. Instead, the presence of internal supervisory 
bodies was stronger related to participants’ self-serving decisions, because they are perceived 
to hold more position power over organization members (at least more so than external 
supervisory bodies do).  
 
Theoretical Implications 
The findings presented in this chapter have several important implications for existing 
corporate governance and organizational behavior literature. First, our findings imply that the 
impact of supervisory bodies on organization members’ decisions is indeed contingent on who 
is holding organization members accountable (Pennington & Schlenker, 1999), and in 
particular that internal and external supervisory bodies have a significantly different impact 
on organization members’ decisions. Although corporate governance researchers find that 
external supervisory bodies have an impact on organizational outcomes and CEO decisions 
(e.g., Laeven & Levine, 2009; Westphal, 1998), our results show that they are less strongly 
related to the day-to-day decisions of lower level individual organization members than 
internal supervisory bodies. This finding supports research in organizational behavior 
suggesting that internal supervisory bodies have more control over the concrete work 
activities of organization members than external supervisory bodies do (Platow & Van 
Knippenberg, 2001).  
Second, we predicted and found that internal supervisory bodies are perceived to hold 
more power over organization members, and in particular more position and personal power, 
than external supervisory bodies do. However, the level of perceived position power for 
external supervisory bodies was lower than expected. This result may be due to the fact that 
these bodies can only reward and punish organization members indirectly through fining the 
organization or by influencing the incentives of its top management instead of its organization 
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members (Adams & Ferreira, 2012). In this light, certain traditional viewpoints in corporate 
governance literature may need to be reconsidered, such as the idea that external supervisory 
bodies are effective because of their strong formal intervention powers (Barth, Lin, Ma, 
Seade, & Song, 2013; Beck & Laeven, 2006). 
Third, although organizational behavior scholars have theoretically explained the 
ability of internal and external supervisory bodies to impact organization members’ self-
serving decisions through their respective power bases (Rus, Van Knippenberg, & Wisse, 
2011), our research demonstrates this link empirically and shows that position power is more 
important for internal supervisory bodies than personal power. Hence, our results suggest that 
organization members’ decisions are more dependent on this position power of internal 
supervisory bodies to provide or withhold organizational resources (rewards and punishments; 
Emerson, 1962). So, by explaining why organization members are affected differently by 
internal and external supervisory bodies, the findings have implications for how organizations 
may choose to control organization members.  
Fourth, our findings tentatively suggest that the combined influence of internal and 
external supervisory bodies may not immediately have an additive value in relation to 
individual organization members’ self-serving decisions. At first sight we thus do not find 
strong evidence for the corporate governance view that external supervisory bodies as the 
stronger party automatically complements the presence of internal supervisory bodies (Walsh 
& Seward, 1990). Our findings could imply that, next to the attention for external supervisory 
bodies, organizations could increase awareness among organization members about the 
presence of internal supervisory bodies that control them.   
 
Strengths, Limitations, and Future Research 
The research presented in this chapter has several strengths. First, we used different 
populations across our two studies; Study 2.1 used organization members (i.e., middle 
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managers and employees) from a wide range of organizations, whereas Study 2.1 used 
financial middle managers. Second, we measured organization members’ self-serving 
decisions in general terms (Study 2.1) and in relatively specific terms (i.e., investing in a risky 
business project which may harm the organization but not the self-interest, Study 2.2). Third, 
we captured the naturally occurring relationships between internal and external supervisory 
bodies, their power levels, and organization members’ decisions in Study 2.1, and established 
the causal direction of these relationships with an experimental scenario in Study 2.2. Finally, 
our findings largely replicated across the two studies, leading to greater confidence in the 
ability to generalize our findings.  
Nonetheless, our research suffers from some limitations as well. For example, we did 
not go beyond observing organization members’ intentions to engage in self-serving 
decisions. So, we recognize that future research could employ more objective data from real 
organization members’ behavior in order to further establish the validity of our findings.  
Another limitation of our work is that we defined the presence of internal and external 
supervisory bodies in relatively general terms. In this way, we could ensure that all 
respondents, who worked in a wide range of different organizational contexts, were 
sufficiently familiar with the examples we provided for both internal and external supervisory 
bodies. In doing so, however, we left out certain specific kinds of internal and external 
supervisory bodies that apply to specific sectors. In the financial sector, for example, external 
supervisory bodies consist of independent and/or governmental, legal supervisory authorities, 
such as the Federal Reserve in the United States, which may be seen as more powerful than 
the external supervisory bodies highlighted in the current chapter. As, for example, external 
accountants may have a different power position and less independence, because of their 
relation with client firms, which can impact their influence (Chan & Wu, 2011). Moreover, 
we also did not include certain specific internal supervisory bodies that are more common in 
larger organizations, such as the internal supervisory board and internal compliance function. 
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It is therefore important that future research creates more certainty under which circumstances 
specific internal and external supervisory bodies have an impact on organization members’ 
decisions (see also Chapters 3 and 4 of this dissertation).  
Moreover, given their joint occurrence in real life, we also examined the combined 
impact of internal and external supervisory bodies on organization members’ decisions. We 
took an exploratory approach to this question as to date, little is known about the effects of the 
combination of both supervisory bodies (Green et al., 2000), and there are diverging 
theoretical views whether it creates an additive advantage. The results of both studies 
presented in this chapter suggest that the combination of supervisory bodies may not 
automatically have an additive value. However, this result should be interpreted with care, as 
there may be circumstances or other behavioral group processes that we did not consider yet 
that could determine and explain the exact nature of their relationship (Ward, Brown & 
Rodriguez, 2009). After all, organization members did believe that the two supervisory bodies 
together held high degrees of position and personal power. One possible reason why this 
situation did not impact organization members’ self-serving decisions could be that the added 
presence of an external supervisory body triggers organization members to believe that the 
organization has to justify her actions to these supervisory bodies, rather than organization 
members personally (Sinclair, 1995). Or, the combination of the two supervisory bodies may 
have confused organization members as to whom they have to justify their actions, or bodies 
communicate different norms to organization members and therefore members may try to 
avoid accountability altogether (Green et al., 2000). Accordingly, we acknowledge that more 
research into the combined effects of both supervisory bodies and the role of contextual 
factors and behavioral group processes is needed, in order to create a more comprehensive 
understanding of the respective impact and relationship of these bodies (see also Chapter 4 of 
this dissertation). 
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Finally, our research also raises the question of whether internal supervisory bodies 
will have a lasting impact on organization members’ self-serving decisions if they primarily 
rely on their positon power. Although there is meta-analytical proof that the ability to reward 
and punish others directly indeed enhances organization-interested decisions among 
organization members (Balliet, Mulder, & Van Lange, 2011), there is also research 
demonstrating that such control has a negative side, particularly when used by supervisory 
bodies within an organization (Subašić, Reynolds, Turner, Veenstra, & Haslam, 2011). For 
example, one study suggests that internal supervisory bodies that use position power may 
reduce organization members’ sense of autonomy (Pierro, Cicero, & Raven, 2008), which 
may hinder the intrinsic motivation to demonstrate the desired behavior in the long term 
(Deci, Koestner & Ryan, 1999; Gagne, 2003; Joussemet, Koestner, Lekes, & Houlfort, 2004). 
Hence, internal supervisory bodies that predominantly stress their position power could yield 
mere short-term compliance, and may be unable to maintain control over organization 
members’ decision-making behavior in the long run. It would therefore be worthwhile to re-
examine the effects of internal and external supervisory bodies on organization members’ 
decisions with a longitudinal research design.  
 
Conclusion and Practical Implications 
In conclusion, the financial crisis and organizational scandals, such as the Libor case, 
have emphasized the importance of internal and external supervisory bodies to control 
organization members’ decision-making behavior. This research shows that internal 
supervisory bodies relate to organization members’ self-serving decisions more strongly than 
external supervisory bodies, through their higher levels of position power. Based on our 
findings we advise organizations to make more use of the potential influence of internal 
supervisory bodies. In most situations, however, both external and internal supervisory bodies 
are present. In these cases, we advise external supervisory bodies to collaborate closely with, 
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and exert their influence via, internal supervisory bodies, rather than to work independently 
from them. In addition, external supervisory bodies can make organization members more 
aware that, in addition to controlling organizational-level outcomes, they also control their 
personal day-to-day activities.    
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APPENDIX 
Exploratory Analyses 
In Study 2.1 we also explored how adding organization members’ management 
experience (i.e., experience in a position as middle manager or equivalent) to our conceptual 
model as an additional moderator (and not as a control variable) would affect the 
hypothesized relationships. In a series of OLS regression analyses, the presence of internal 
supervisory bodies, the presence of external supervisory bodies and organization members’ 
management experience were entered as independent predictors in step 1. All possible two- 
and three-way interaction terms between the presence of internal supervisory bodies, the 
presence of external supervisory bodies and organization members’ management experience 
were entered in step 2.  
Organization members’ management experience did not significantly interact with the 
presence of internal supervisory bodies, the presence of external supervisory body or their 
joint presence to predict organization members’ self-serving decisions (lowest p-value; B = -
.14, p = .34), nor did it affect the results we initially obtained on this variable.  
Organization members’ management experience also did not change the main results 
we obtained on the perceived power level of external supervisory bodies. There was only an 
additional significant interaction between the presence of internal supervisory bodies and 
organization members’ management experience (B = .20, p = .01). This interaction revealed 
that the presence of internal supervisory bodies also made the meaning of external supervisory 
bodies more salient when organization members have experience as middle manager.  
Adding organization members’ management experience as moderator, however, did 
provide different insights in relation to the main results we obtained on the perceived power 
level of internal supervisory bodies. Their power level was again significantly predicted by 
organization members’ awareness of their presence (B = .35, p = .00), but this time, the effect 
was qualified by an interaction with the presence of external supervisory bodies and 
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organization members’ management experience (B = -.13, p = .05). This interaction pattern 
revealed that organization members perceived internal supervisory bodies to be most powerful 
when they were clearly aware of their presence, clearly aware of the presence of external 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE POWER OF COMPLIANCE: HOW FORMAL COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS 
AND INFORMAL SHARED ETHICAL VALUES RELATE TO EMPLOYEES’ 
ETHICAL DECISION MAKING4 
 
ABSTRACT 
This chapter examines how internal supervision by the compliance function and its 
program of activities (i.e., formal compliance programs), together with informal shared ethical 
values, such as integrity, are related to employees’ unethical behavior and ethical awareness. 
We predict that formal compliance programs and informal shared ethical values will both 
impact these outcomes, and also explore their joint impact. We expect that they do so through 
signaling power of compliance officers based on, respectively, compliance officers’ formal 
position (i.e., position power), or their personal characteristics (i.e., personal power). The 
results of a field survey among 78 compliance officers show that either formal compliance 
programs or informal shared ethical values are negatively related to unethical behavior and 
positively related to ethical awareness among employees. Yet the combined presence of 
formal compliance programs and informal shared ethical values did not have a stronger 
impact. Additionally, the relationships between informal shared ethical values and these 
outcomes were explained by compliance officers’ perceived personal power, but position 
power did not explain the predicted relationships for formal compliance programs. This 
chapter enriches our understanding of how internal supervision by the compliance function, in 
conjunction with organizational values, relates to sound decision making, and the explanatory 
role of compliance officers’ power. 
 
4 This chapter is an adapted version of De Waal, M., Stoker, J., & Rink, F. (2015). Formal and Informal 
Dimensions of Compliance Effectiveness. Business Compliance, 02, 15-27. 
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Whenever corporate fraud scandals occur that harm societal interests, there is 
immediate public discourse on whether supervision of these organizations was adequate to 
safeguard sound decision making. Public criticism primarily focuses on the role of external 
supervision by independent or government authorities, responsible for supervising an 
industry’s adherence to the law (Barth, Caprio & Levine, 2004), and their lack of timely 
intervention to protect the public interest. Yet, several scandals illustrate the ineffectiveness of 
internal supervision by the compliance function, responsible for ensuring that employees 
follow formal legislations and ethical standards (Basel Committee for Banking Supervision, 
2005). Such ineffective internal supervision can result in unethical behavior that harms the 
organization’s interest, including its integrity, reputation and continuity (Ethics & Compliance 
Initiative, 2016a; Van Riel & Fombrun, 2007). For example, at ING, a large Dutch systemic 
bank, the internal controls failed due to inadequate execution of compliance policies regarding 
client due diligence and transaction monitoring, which enabled money laundering and 
consumer bribing through the bank’s accounts (Financial Times, 2018). This resulted in a 
large regulatory fine of 775Mio Euros, as well as public outrage and reputational damage. 
Such cases raise the question of how internal supervision by the compliance function can 
reduce unethical behavior and increase a sense of ethical awareness among employees within 
organizations5 (Kaptein, 2015; Weaver & Treviño, 1999).  
To achieve this kind of behavior the compliance function or department present in 
most organizations executes a formal compliance program of activities, including codes of 
conduct, monitoring and training programs (Ethics & Compliance Initiative, 2016b; Kaptein, 
2015). Such compliance programs are indeed found to effectively influence employees’ 
unethical behavior and ethical awareness (e.g., Kaptein, 2015; Rottig, Koufteros, & 
 
5Although these outcomes are linked, they are not automatically related (Rest, 1986), as increasing ethical 
awareness will not immediately reduce unethical behavior, because this requires motivating employees to change their 
behavior (Deci & Ryan, 1995). Nonetheless, such ethical awareness is important, as it helps employees to recognize and 
report unethical behavior (e.g., Weaver & Treviňo, 1999). Therefore, we focus on both outcomes as dependent variables.  
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Umphress, 2011). Moreover, research shows that employees’ ethical behavior is also greatly 
influenced by the presence of informally shared ethical values within their organization, for 
example the degree to which it embraces integrity (Paine, 1994, Weaver & Treviño, 1999; for 
a meta-analysis, see Kish-Gephart, Harrison, & Treviño, 2010). Hence, organizations can 
effectively reduce unethical behavior and increase ethical awareness by having either a formal 
compliance program or informal shared ethical values.  
It remains to be investigated how formal compliance programs and informal shared 
ethical values work together when they are both present in organizations, as there is mixed 
evidence in this regard. Ethics scholars argue, that there should be a stronger combined effect 
in reducing unethical behavior if both characteristics are consistent in promoting ethical 
behavior (Tenbrunsel, Smith-Crowe, & Umphress, 2003; Weaver, Treviño, & Cochran, 
1999). Although there is some evidence for this surplus effect (Weaver & Treviño, 1999), 
other research shows that the combined presence of formal compliance programs and 
informal shared ethical values can also have negative effects and create more unethical 
behavior (McCabe, Treviño & Butterfield, 1996; Smith-Crowe, Tenbrunsel, Chan-Serafin, 
Brief, Umphress, & Joseph, 2015).  
Moreover, there is little insight into why formal compliance programs and informal 
shared ethical values influence employees’ unethical behavior and ethical awareness, and 
there is especially little clarity about the role of compliance officers in this regard (Kish-
Gephart et al., 2010; Treviño, Den Nieuwenboer, Kreiner, & Bishop, 2014). Based on power 
literature, we propose that formal compliance programs and informal shared ethical values 
signal different sources of control, or power bases, of compliance officers over employees’ 
ethical behavior (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003). We 
argue that the relationship between formal compliance programs, on the one hand, and 
employees’ unethical behavior and ethical awareness, on the other hand, can be explained by 
compliance officers’ position power (Kaptein, 2011; Weaver & Treviño, 1999). Such position 
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power, based on compliance officers’ formal task to enforce these programs by sanctioning 
rule violations (French & Raven, 2001), is argued to make employees refrain from unethical 
behavior and become more ethically aware (e.g., Thomas & Bishop, 1984; Treviño, 
Butterfield, & McCabe, 1998; Weaver & Treviño, 1999). Moreover, we propose that the 
relationship between informal shared ethical values and employees’ unethical behavior and 
ethical awareness, can be explained by compliance officers’ personal power. Such personal 
power, based on compliance officers’ personal characteristics (French & Raven, 2001), as 
representatives of these ethical values such as integrity (i.e., prototypicality, Van Knippenberg 
& Hogg, 2003; Ethics & Compliance Initiative, 2016a), makes them trusted role models for 
employees’ unethical behavior and ethical awareness (Van Knippenberg, 2011). 
In sum, this chapter presents a conceptual model of how and why formal compliance 
programs and informal shared ethical values relate to unethical behavior and ethical 
awareness among employees. Our central research goals are to, 1) investigate the 
relationships of formal compliance programs and informal shared ethical values with these 
employee outcomes, and explore their interactive relationship, and 2) to study the role of 
compliance officers’ position power and personal power bases as underlying mechanisms of 
these relationships. 
This research makes two important contributions to corporate governance literature 
and ethical decision-making literature. First, prior research has focused on the isolated effects 
of either formal compliance programs (Kaptein, 2015; Rottig et al., 2011), or informal shared 
ethical values in relation to employees’ unethical behavior and ethical awareness (Treviño, 
1990). However, these organizational characteristics are highly related and are often both 
present in practice (Granovetter, 1985; Tenbrunsel et al., 2003), and in line with similar calls 
made by governance scholars we will therefore explore their interactive relationship 
(Davidson, Dey, & Smith, 2015). In this way, we aim to increase our understanding of the 
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independent and combined impact of both formal compliance programs and informal shared 
ethical values in relation to sound decision making by employees in organizations. 
Second, by examining compliance officers’ power bases as possible underlying 
mechanisms we aim to explain how formal compliance programs and informal shared ethical 
values relate to employees’ unethical behavior as well as their ethical awareness. 
Understanding which sources of power underlie these relationships, can help organizations to 
better communicate the role of compliance officers in organizations and thereby improve 
employees’ ethical decision making. In this regard, our research adds new insights to 
corporate governance literature about how internal supervision by the compliance function 
impacts ethical decision making (Kaptein, 2015), and thereby provides practical 
understanding of the role of compliance in organizations (Treviño et al., 2014). We have 
conducted a field survey among a professional sample of 78 compliance officers from 
different organizations, which provides insight into how compliance officers evaluate their 
own position and personal power bases and how these power bases relate to employees’ 
unethical behavior and ethical awareness. In the next sections we introduce the hypotheses of 
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THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
The Role of Formal Compliance Programs and Informal Shared Ethical Values  
Ethics scholars argue that formal compliance programs and informal shared ethical 
values can both influence employees’ unethical behavior and ethical awareness (e.g., Kaptein, 
2015; Rottig et al., 2011; Tenbrunsel et al., 2003; Treviño, 1990, Treviño, Gibson, Weaver, & 
Toffler, 1999). Formal compliance programs are primarily designed to reduce unethical 
behavior and increase ethical awareness, and for this purpose these programs usually consist 
of codes of conduct, ethical awareness training, monitoring and hotlines to report misconduct 
(Ethics & Compliance Initiative, 2016b; Kaptein, 2015). The presence of such multi-facetted 
formal compliance programs influences employee behavior by signaling that unethical 
behavior is undesired in an organization, which will make employees refrain from such 
behavior (Treviño et al., 1999; Weaver & Treviño, 1999).  
Studies indeed demonstrate that multi-facetted formal compliance programs are 
negatively related to employees’ unethical behavior (Kaptein, 2015; Weaver & Treviño, 
1999), for instance because employee activities are closely monitored (Kaptein, 2015), and 
due to ethics training (Warren, Gaspar, & Laufer, 2014). Furthermore, research shows that 
formal compliance programs are positively related to ethical awareness of employees (Rottig 
et al., 2011; Weaver & Treviño, 1999), especially when they clearly communicate the 
compliance rules to employees (Rottig et al., 2011), and train employees to recognize ethical 
issues (Rottig & Heischmidt, 2007).  
Moreover, employees are strongly influenced by the presence of informal shared 
ethical values, such as integrity (Paine, 1994), which shape the ethical culture of an 
organization (Treviño, 1990; Weaver & Treviño, 1999)6. These informal shared ethical values 
 
6 The concept of ethical culture is often used interchangeably with ethical climate (Victor & Cullen, 1987, 1988), 
as they are conceptually overlapping and empirically closely related (Kish-Gephart et al., 2010). As both concepts focus on 
the informal shared ethical values in an organization we will use this term in this chapter to avoid confusion about these 
concepts. 
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inform employees about the social organizational norms with regard to desired ethical 
behavior (Schneider, 1990; Treviño et al., 1998), and employees will adapt their behavior in 
line with these norms to gain acceptance and respect from peers and superiors (Pagliaro, 
Ellemers, & Barreto, 2011).   
Recent research demonstrates that such informal shared ethical values indeed were 
negatively related to unethical behavior of employees (for a meta-analysis, see Martin & 
Cullen, 2006; Mayer, Kuenzi, & Greenbaum, 2010), specifically in terms of less unethical 
choices (for a meta-analysis, see Kish-Gephart et al., 2010), and less ethical violations 
(Bartels, Harrick, Martell, & Strickland, 1998). Moreover, research shows that the degree to 
which these informal ethical values are shared was positively related to employees’ ethical 
awareness (Hayibor & Wasieleski, 2009; Butterfield, Treviño, & Weaver, 2000), for instance 
by increasing their moral imagination (Moberg & Caldwell, 2007). In sum, formal 
compliance programs and informal shared ethical values are both expected to influence 
unethical behavior and ethical awareness, because they signal what is (un)desired behavior to 
employees in relation to ethical decision making. Formally stated we propose the following: 
Hypothesis 1: There is a negative relationship between formal compliance programs 
and employees’ unethical behavior, and a positive relationship with employees’ 
ethical awareness. 
Hypothesis 2: There is a negative relationship between informal shared ethical values 
and employees’ unethical behavior, and a positive relationship with employees’ 
ethical awareness. 
 
The Role of Power of the Compliance Officer 
It remains to be investigated, however, why formal compliance programs and informal 
shared ethical values have this predicted impact on employees’ ethical decision making (Kish-
Gephart et al., 2011), and in particular how this is associated with the role of compliance 
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officers in organizations. Based on power literature, it can be argued that these organizational 
characteristics are both associated with employees’ unethical behavior and ethical awareness, 
because they signal some form of control or power of the compliance officer over employee 
actions. In fact, those people or bodies that possess such perceived power can motivate 
employees to change their behavior (Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; Keltner et al., 2003). 
Literature on power posits that one’s power over others can be based on a formal division of 
roles (i.e., position power), including the power to reward or sanction behavior, or on the 
basis of personal characteristics of the power holder (i.e., personal power; French & Raven, 
2001; Yukl & Falbe, 1991). To date, it is unclear whether both organizational characteristics 
signal the same kind of power bases of compliance officers to employees, and how these 
different power bases relate to employees’ unethical behavior and ethical awareness.  
Ethics scholars argue that formal compliance programs are related to employees’ 
ethical decision making, because they represent the organizational channel that links unethical 
behavior to sanctions and rewards (Kaptein, 2011; Tenbrunsel et al., 2003). According to 
deterrence theory, knowing that unethical behavior is sanctioned will make employees refrain 
from such behavior in order to avoid punishment (Thomas & Bishop, 1984; Williams & 
Hawkins, 1986). Moreover, sanctions also make employees more ethically aware, as it 
provides an incentive to increase their knowledge of the compliance rules and their vigilance 
in ethical situations (Rottig et al., 2011). In other words, active enforcement of formal 
compliance programs by compliance officers, by detecting and sanctioning unethical behavior 
(Tyler & Blader, 2005; Basel Committee for Banking Supervision, 2005), ensures that 
employees believe that such programs are ‘followed through’, and that when rule violations 
are detected employee behavior will actually be sanctioned (Treviño & Weaver, 2001; 
Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999). Such enforcement could thus provide compliance officers with 
position power. Accordingly, we argue that the presence of formal compliance programs will 
be negatively related to unethical behavior and positively related to ethical awareness among 
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employees, because these formal compliance programs will be associated with compliance 
officers’ position power.  
Past research offers suggestive evidence for our proposition. For instance, the 
strongest reduction in unethical behavior is found when formal compliance programs are 
enforced (Kish-Gephart et al., 2010), such that disciplinary actions are taken when rules are 
violated (Treviño & Weaver, 2001). Moreover, research shows that compliance’s formal 
power to administer sanctions on the violation of behavioral norms is associated with ethical 
awareness of employees (Rottig et al., 2011), such as their focus on the ethical aspects in 
business decisions (Reynolds, 2006; Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999).  
With regard to the influence of informal shared ethical values, however, the social 
identity theory of leadership (Hogg, 2001), argues that those organizational members who are 
perceived to embody organizational values – the organizational prototypical members – hold 
most power over employees’ ethical behavior (Hogg & van Knippenberg, 2003; Van 
Knippenberg, 2000). Central to this concept of prototypicality, is that employees will be open 
to the influence of these prototypical members, because they trust their organization-oriented 
intentions, and value their integrity to adhere to the shared ethical values (Giessner & Van 
Knippenberg, 2008; Mayer, Nurmohamed, Treviño, Shapiro, & Schminke, 2013; Van 
Knippenberg & Hogg, 2003). Such prototypical members can guide employees’ ethical 
behavior by acting as role models for what is appropriate behavior, and thereby help 
employees to recognize and deal with ethical situations (Sims & Brinkman, 2002; Van 
Knippenberg, 2011; Giessner & Van Knippenberg, 2008). Compliance officers are often seen 
as personal guardians, and thus as representatives or prototypical members, of an 
organization’s integrity (Ethics & Compliance Initiative, 2016a). Based on these 
characteristics, these officers should have personal power to exemplify the appropriate 
behavior and show appreciation of employees’ ethical behavior. Accordingly, we argue that 
the presence of informal shared ethical values, and especially integrity, will be negatively 
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related to employees’ unethical behavior, and positively related to their ethical awareness, 
because such values will be associated with personal power of compliance officers.  
Prior research indeed suggests that the personal power of prototypical organizational 
members who act as representatives of informal shared ethical values, are related to 
employees’ ethical decisions. For example, a leader’s representativeness predicts his or her 
effectiveness in influencing employee behavior, because it increases trust in this leader 
(Giessner & Knippenberg, 2008), and such trust is linked to personal power (Carson, Carson, 
& Roe, 1993). Moreover, Mayer and colleagues (2013) demonstrate that the effect of ethical 
role models (i.e., ethical leaders) on employees’ unethical behavior is related to the informal 
shared ethical values in organizations. Finally, high status prototypical members, with more 
personal power, are found to instigate ethical behavior in their interactions with employees 
(Ponsioen, 2014), and they can positively influence employees’ ethical awareness through 
role modelling (Dukerich, Nichols, Elm, & Vollrath, 1990).  
In sum, formal compliance programs and informal shared ethical values are both 
expected to influence unethical behavior and ethical awareness, but they do so through 
different power bases. We expect, on the one hand, that formal compliance programs are 
related to these outcomes through compliance officers’ position power. On the other hand, we 
expect that informal shared ethical values are related to these outcomes through compliance 
officers’ personal power. Together, this leads to the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 3: Compliance officers’ position power mediates the relationship between 
formal compliance programs and employees’ unethical behavior and ethical 
awareness, respectively.  
Hypothesis 4: Compliance officers’ personal power mediates the relationship between 
informal shared ethical values and employees’ unethical behavior and ethical 
awareness, respectively. 
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Combined Presence of Formal Compliance Programs and Informal Shared Ethical 
Values 
Formal compliance programs and informal shared ethical values are organizational 
characteristics that are interrelated and often coexist in organizations (Granovetter, 1985). 
Some scholars argue, that consistent implementation of formal compliance programs and 
informal shared ethical values will result in an even stronger effect on employees’ unethical 
behavior and ethical awareness (Maclean & Benham, 2010; Tenbrunsel et al., 2003; Weaver 
& Treviño, 1999). Moreover, ethics scholars argue that such consistency will increase the 
linkage between ethical values with employees’ daily work responsibilities, and align actual 
behaviors with formal internal procedures (Treviño et al., 1999). Relatedly, it has been argued 
that in cases of clear inconsistency, strong informal shared values can actually undermine the 
effect of formal compliance programs (Smith-Crowe et al., 2015). Such that, organizations 
that ‘do not walk their talk’ run the risk that formal compliance programs become ineffective, 
because they are not taken seriously by employees and therefore are just mere window 
dressing (Maclean & Benham, 2010; Treviño & Weaver, 2001).  
Empirically, however, there is no consistent evidence for a stronger combined effect of 
formal compliance programs and informal shared ethical values on unethical behavior and 
ethical awareness (Smith-Crowe et al., 2015; Treviño et al., 1999; Weaver & Treviño, 1999). 
For instance, some research clearly shows that the combined presence of both organizational 
characteristics has the strongest effect on reducing unethical behavior and increasing ethical 
awareness (Treviño et al., 1999; Weaver & Treviño, 1999). But Treviño and colleagues 
(1998) found a strong negative effect of informal shared ethical values on unethical behavior 
for organizations with and without codes of conduct as part of their formal compliance 
program. This finding suggests that it does not hurt to have both characteristics present in 
organizations. However, other research has found, that when these characteristics are 
inconsistent in promoting ethical behavior this combination may actually lead to more 
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unethical behavior (McCabe et al., 1996). Given these mixed results, we will explore the 
interactive relationship of formal compliance programs and informal shared ethical values 
with employees’ unethical behavior and ethical awareness. 
 
METHOD 
Sample and Procedure 
Our study was conducted among compliance officers from different organizations in 
the Netherlands, mainly active in the financial sector. We gained access to this specific group 
through a professional association (Vereniging van Compliance Officers, VCO), and an 
educational institute for compliance officers (Nederlands Compliance Instituut, NCI). These 
organizations had a combined database of approximately 500 members at the time of data 
collection. To ensure a maximum response rate we used several techniques, such as personal 
communication, anonymous and confidential treatment of the answers, and endorsements 
from both associations (Westphal & Stern, 2005). The survey was distributed in hardcopy on 
two separate conferences of both associations, and an online version was sent to all members 
of both associations by email and in newsletters.  
In total 81 compliance officers completed the questionnaire (response rate 16%). This 
low response rate may be due to the fact that participation was completely voluntary, and 
because the study concerned a large questionnaire. To ensure that our sample was not 
influenced by extreme cases, we screened the data for outliers following the procedure of 
Aguinis and colleagues (Aguinis, Gottfredson, & Joo, 2013). In the analyses with both 
dependent variables, unethical behavior and ethical awareness, 3 observations exceeded the 
minimum cutoff criteria for Cook’s D-statistic (>1), Mahalanobis Distance (>15), or 
DFBETA (>1), and deviated more than 2 to 3 standardized and studentized residuals from 
their predicted values. These three outlying cases were therefore removed from further 
analyses.  
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As a result, our final sample consisted of 78 respondents (Mage = 48.36 years, SD = 
9.44, 30% female). In this professional sample the respondents were highly educated, 
including Post doctorates (16%), University (62%) and College (18%) graduates, and 82% of 
the respondents followed a specific compliance training. The majority of respondents (55%) 
worked in companies of less than 1000 employees, and 45% worked in organizations with 
more than 1000 employees. The compliance officers in our sample have, on average, high 
levels of working experience. Almost 80% of the respondents worked for more than 5 years in 
their current position and 20% worked up to 15 years in the same function. Moreover, most of 
the compliance officers in our sample (80%) worked in the financial sector, and of this group 
50% worked for 20-40 years in this specific sector. We were unable to check for 
representativeness of this sample, as there are no official databases available regarding the 
background of compliance officers in the Netherlands.  
 
Measures  
As all the respondents were from the Netherlands, they received a questionnaire that 
was largely based on Dutch scale items translated from their original English formulation, 
through double-blind back-translation7. All questions were rated on a 7-point scale ranging 
from 1 (“strongly disagree”) to 7 (“strongly agree”), unless stated otherwise.  
 Formal Compliance Programs. The degree to which an organization had a multi-
facetted formal compliance program, was measured with the following six items adapted from 
Kaptein (2015)8: 1) “the presence of a compliance department”; 2) “translating regulations 
 
7 This method implies that after the first translation of the original English measures to Dutch, the Dutch version is 
then translated back by an independent translator into English, to evaluate its accuracy with the intended meaning of the scale 
items (Brislin, 1970). 
8 In the survey we also included other compliance activities, in line with Kaptein (2015), such as pre-employment 
screening, clean desk control, acting as a confidante and investigating incidents. However, our Principal Component Analysis 
(PCA) revealed that these items did not contribute to a reliable construct (α = .55) and were therefore excluded from further 
analysis. Based on this PCA with Oblimin rotation on 2 factors with Eigenvalues >1 we found that only 1 factor was reliable 
with an Eigenvalue of 3.0 (α = .74). Our measure of formal compliance programs is based on the underlying items of this 
factor. The PCA yielded a sufficient KMO statistic of .68 and a significant Bartlett’s Test of sphercity x2 (45) = 152.14, p < 
.0001.  
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into compliance policy”; 3) “formulating preventive compliance policy”; 4) “compliance 
training”; 5) “providing compliance advice”; and 6) “monitoring compliance rules”. The 
items were answered on a 7-point scale with the option to indicate that the question was not 
applicable (9), which we treated as a missing variable. The measure was composed of all 
items with valid answers and formed a reliable scale (α = .73). 
Informal Shared Ethical Values. The degree to which integrity as informal ethical 
value is shared within the organization was measured with the following two items, loosely 
based on Paine (1994): In my organization… 1) “integrity is an important core value” and 2) 
“the reputation regarding integrity is valued highly”. Due to the small amount of items, their 
reliability as a scale was low but close to the threshold (α = .60, Nunnally, 1976), and the 
inter-item correlation further confirmed that the items measure the same construct (r = .43; 
Clark & Watson, 1995).   
Employees’ Unethical Behavior. Our measure of employees’ unethical behavior 
consisted of 10 items developed by Kaptein (2008).9 Each item was preceded with the phrase 
‘this incident occurred in the past 12 months…’ to provide a relevant timeframe (Treviño & 
Weaver, 2003): 1) “falsifying or manipulating financial reporting information”; 2) “breaching 
computer, network, or database controls”; 3) “violating document retention rules”; 4) 
“providing inappropriate information tot analysts and investors”; 5) “trading securities based 
on inside information”; 6) “engaging in activities that pose a conflict of interest”; 7)“ entering 
into customer contracts or relationships without the proper terms, conditions, or approvals”; 
8) “offering bribes or other improper gifts, favors, and entertainment to influence customers”; 
9) “fabricating or manipulating product quality or safety test results”; and 10) “improperly 
gathering competitors’ confidential information”. The items were answered on a 7-point scale 
with the option to indicate that the question was not applicable (9), and we treated this answer 
 
9 To enhance the questionnaires’ relevance for compliance officers in the financial sector we focused on unethical 
behavior in the categories financers and clients, and we selected the items that reported the highest factor loadings (Kaptein, 
2008). 
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as missing data. The measure was composed of all items that received valid answers and 
formed a reliable scale (α = .87).  
Employees’ Ethical Awareness. Ethical awareness among employees of the 
compliance rules and ability to recognize an ethical situation was measured with the following 
six items adapted from Treviño and colleagues (1999): 1) “When integrity issues arise 
employees look for advice from compliance”; 2) “Employees of this organization are quick to 
notice when a situation raises compliance or integrity issues”; 3) “If someone here knew that a 
coworker was doing something unethical, he or she would report it to management or 
compliance”; 4) “Employees of this organization do not hesitate to go to their manager in case 
of an integrity issue”; 5) “Employees are aware of the compliance rules they have to adhere 
to”; and 6) “The compliance rules are clear to employees”. Together these items formed a 
reliable scale (α = .82). 
Compliance Officers’ Perceived Position Power. The extent to which compliance 
officers believed they hold position power over employees was measured with four items 
adapted from French and Raven (1959): Compliance can……1) “influence an employees’ 
personal pay level”; 2) “influence whether or not an employee gets a pay raise”; 3) “provide 
employees with special benefits”; and 4) “influence whether or not employees get a 
promotion”. Together these items formed a reliable scale (α= .68).  
Compliance Officers’ Perceived Personal Power. The extent to which compliance 
officers believed they hold personal power over employees was measured with four items 
adapted from French and Raven (1959): Compliance can….1) “make employees feel valued”; 
2) “make employees feel like they approve of them”; 3) “make employees feel accepted”; and 
4) “make employees feel important as a person”. Together these items formed a reliable scale 
(α = .78).  
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Control variables. We included several control variables that have been used in 
previous ethics research and were found to influence the studied dependent and mediating 
variables. Specifically, we included organization size as a control variable, as past research 
has emphasized its relationship with the frequency of unethical behavior and the degree of 
ethical awareness (Kaptein, 2008). Moreover, we included compliance officers’ tenure, in 
terms of years in the same organization, function and sector, as control variables, as tenure is 
found to influence their experience with unethical behavior in their organization (Weber & 
Fortun, 2005). Finally, we included compliance officers’ gender as a control variable, as some 
research suggests that there are differences between men and women when it comes to 
perceived power bases (Carli, 1999; Ragins & Sundstrom, 1990).   
 
RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics and Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
Table 3.1 shows the means, standard deviations, and Pearson zero-order correlations 
among our measures. The table shows that only organization size as control variable is 
significantly related to one of our dependent variables, unethical behavior, illustrating its 
importance as control variable for further analysis (Becker, 2005). The other control variables 
regarding compliance officers’ organization, function or industry tenure, or gender do not 
relate significantly to any of the dependent variables, unethical behavior and ethical 
awareness, or mediating variables, compliance officers’ perceived position or personal power. 
Including a large number of controls may affect statistical power and especially if they are 
non-significant these controls may induce biased parameter estimates (Becker, 2005). To 
avoid such effects, we excluded these non-significant controls from the main results (Becker, 
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2005), and we will only use organization size (1= “less than 50 employees” to 7= “more than 
1000 employees”) as control variable in the statistical analyses that we report below. 10  
Moreover, in line with Hypotheses 1 and 2, these correlation results show that formal 
compliance programs are positively related to ethical awareness (r = .30 , p = .01), and 
informal shared ethical values are negatively related to unethical behavior (r = -.39, p = .00) 
and positively related to ethical awareness (r = .56, p = .00). Table 3.1 also shows that both 
dependent variables, unethical behavior and ethical awareness, are negatively related to each 
other (r = -.28, p = .04).11 
Finally, we ran a confirmatory factor analysis to assess the convergent validity of the 
study variables. Given that compliance officers rated all variables, and ethical awareness and 
unethical behavior, our dependent variables, are interrelated (Rest, 1986), we estimated a 
model with 6 correlated, first order factors (formal compliance programs, informal shared 
ethical values, position power, personal power, unethical behavior and ethical awareness). 
This model was significant and yielded marginal acceptable fit to the data (X² = 809,673), df 
= 449, p < .001, CFI = .68, RMSEA = .10, TLI = .63). This indicates that factor loading for 




10 To further test the robustness of our results we also re-ran the analyses by including and excluding all control 
variables. Moreover, we performed an extra regression analysis on our hypothesized direct relationship in H1 and H2 that 
ruled out the moderating effect of organization size. These analyses did not change the main pattern of results and 
conclusions, therefore they are not included in the results reported here (for more details, see the Appendix). 
11 We have also performed a supplementary regression analysis on the relationship between unethical behavior and 
ethical awareness (see the Appendix). 
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TABLE 3.1 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlations 
Variables           Mean        S.D. 1. 2.   3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10.    11. 
1. Gender  1.31 4.64            
2. Organization size  4.85 2.34  .03           
3. Organization tenure  12.51 11.06  -.18  .31**          
4. Function tenure  4.57 3.11  -.10 .00 .16         
5. Industry tenure  19.85 11.19  -.19 -.02    .47** .22        
6. Unethical behavior  1.74 .74  .19   .37** .07 -.15 -.01       
7. Ethical awareness  5.28 .75  -.08 .09 -.03 .15 -.10 -.28*      
8. Formal compliance programs  5.02 .80  .04    .42** .11  .30* -.01 -.13 .30*     
9. Informal shared ethical values  6.02 1.01  -.12  .29* .21 .22 .06 -.39** .56** .29*    
10. Position power  2.50 1.14  -.10 .14 -.20 -.05 -.18 .19 .29* .14 .27*   
11. Personal power  4.40 1.36  -.17 -.13 .00 .10 -.08 .08 .42** .03 .37** .43**  
Note: Pearson’s correlation, pairwise comparison, without outliers.  
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (two-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (two-tailed)




To test Hypotheses 1 and 2, we standardized all independent variables following 
Aiken and West (1991) and conducted two separate Ordinary Least Squared Regressions 
(OLS) for each of our dependent variables. After entering the control variable, organization 
size, in step 1, we entered formal compliance programs and informal shared ethical values as 
our main independent predictors in step 2. To test the mediation Hypotheses 3 and 4, we used 




Hypothesis 1 and 2 proposed that formal compliance programs and informal shared 
ethical values, would be negatively related to unethical behavior, and positively related to 
ethical awareness, respectively (results reported in this order). Table 3.2 (Model 2) shows 
there was a significant and negative direct relationship between informal shared ethical values 
and unethical behavior (B = -.23, SE = .10, p = .02, R²= .27), whereas we found no significant 
relationship between formal compliance programs and unethical behavior (B= -.14, SE = .09, 
p = .15, 𝑅² = .27). Table 3.3 (Model 2) shows that there was a significant and positive 
relationship between formal compliance programs and ethical awareness (B = .20, SE = .10, p 
= .05, R² = .30), and we also found a significant and positive relationship between informal 
shared values and ethical awareness (B = .39, SE = .09, p = .00, R² = .30). Thus, we found 
partial support for Hypothesis 1, and full support for Hypothesis 2.  
 
12 As we hypothesized specific mediating variables for the relationships of formal compliance programs and 
informal shared ethical values with the dependent variables we deliberately used single mediation analyses. According to 
Preacher & Hayes (2008) when multiple mediators are involved it would be more precise to also test for these mediators in 
one model. Therefore, we performed parallel mediation analyses for both formal compliance programs and informal shared 
ethical values, which confirmed our results from the single mediation analyses (see the Appendix for the parallel mediator 
analyses). 
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Hypothesis 3 predicted that compliance officers’ position power mediated the 
relationship between formal compliance programs and unethical behavior and ethical 
awareness, respectively. The mediation analysis showed no significant indirect relationship 
through compliance officers’ perceived position power regarding the relation of formal 
compliance programs with unethical behavior (B = .00, SE = .02 , R² = .23; ns.; CI 95% = -
.0187, .0715, N = 45; 5000 re-samples), or with ethical awareness (B = .02, SE = .04, ns., R² = 
.24; CI 95% = -.0547, .1263, N = 66; 5000 re-samples). Thus, we found no support for 
Hypothesis 3.  
Hypothesis 4, proposed that compliance officers’ personal power mediated the 
relationship of informal shared ethical values on unethical behavior and ethical awareness, 
respectively. The mediation analysis showed a significant indirect relationship through 
compliance officers’ perceived personal power for the relations of informal shared ethical 
values with unethical behavior (B = .11, SE = .06, p < .05, R²= .41; CI 95% = .0202, .2650, N 
= 49; 5000 re-samples), and ethical awareness (B = .09, SE = .04, p < .05, R²= .35; CI 95%= 
.0244, .1943, N = 71; 5000 re-samples). Thus, we found support for Hypothesis 4.  
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TABLE 3.2 
Regression Analysis of the Direct and Interaction Effects of Formal Compliance 
Programs and Informal Shared Ethical Values on Unethical Behavior  
 
Note: N = 44; Two-tailed tests, **p < .001, *p < .05, †p < .10. Unstandardized 
regression effects are reported, and standard errors are noted in parenthesis. 
  
Variables Unethical Behavior 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Organization Size .23 (.09)* .36 (.09)** .37 (.09)** 
Formal Compliance Programs (FCP)  -.14 (.09) -.18 (.09)† 
Informal Shared Ethical Values (ISEV)  -.23 (.10)* -.19 (.10)† 
FCP x ISEV   .18 (.10)† 
(Adjusted) R² .11* .27* .30† 
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TABLE 3.3 
Regression Analysis of the Direct and Interaction Effects of Formal Compliance 
Programs and Informal Shared Ethical Values on Ethical Awareness  
Note: N = 66; Two-tailed tests, **p < .001, *p < .05. Unstandardized regression 
coefficients are reported, and standard errors are reported in parenthesis. 
 
Exploratory Analysis of Interaction effect 
To explore the possible interaction effect of formal compliance programs and informal 
shared ethical values we calculated their interaction term with standardized variables, and 
included this in the OLS performed for Hypotheses 1 and 2 as recommended by Aiken and 
West (1991). After entering the control variable, organization size, in step 1, we entered 
formal compliance programs and informal shared ethical values as our main independent 
predictors in step 2, their interaction term was added in step 3. We used simple slope analysis 
to plot the direct relationship between formal compliance programs and unethical behavior, on 
the one hand, and ethical awareness, on the other hand, at higher (+1 SD), and lower (-1 SD) 
levels of informal shared ethical values (Aiken & West, 1991). 
Variables Ethical Awareness 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Organization size .09 (.09) -.11 (.09) -.12 (.08) 
Formal Compliance Programs (FCP)  .20 (.10)* .29 (.10)** 
Informal Shared Ethical Values (ISEV)  .39 (.09)** .34 (.09)** 
FCP x ISEV   -.34 (.12)** 
(Adjusted) R² -.00 .30** .36** 
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Table 3.2 (Model 3) does not show a significant interaction with relation to unethical 
behavior (B = .18, SE = .10, p = .09, 𝑅² = .30). However, Table 3.3 (Model 3), shows a 
significant and negative interaction with relation to ethical awareness (B = -.34, SE = .12, p = 
.01, 𝑅² = .36). We did, however, decompose the nature of these interaction effects through 
further simple slope analyses (Aiken & West, 1991). The results indicated that the direct 
relationships of formal compliance programs with both unethical behavior and ethical 
awareness, respectively, were significant for lower levels of informal shared ethical values (-1 
SD, for unethical behavior: B = -.32, SE = .14, p = .03, for ethical awareness, B = .62, SE = 
.18, p = .00), but became non-significant for higher levels of informal shared ethical values 
(+1 SD: for unethical behavior, B = -.01, SE = .12,  p = .92, for ethical awareness, B = -.05, 
SE = .13,  p = .72). Although we do not find, that high levels of both organizational 
characteristics are associated more strongly with employees ethical decision making, our 
analysis tentatively suggests that the presence of formal compliance programs can compensate 
for lower levels of informal shared ethical values. The graphical representations of these 
relationships, depicted in Figures 3.2 and 3.3, suggest that it does not hurt to have both 
organizational characteristics present (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Ahearne, & Bommer, 1995). 
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FIGURE 3.2 
The Interaction Effect of Formal Compliance Programs and Informal Shared Ethical 
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DISCUSSION 
Our field survey among compliance officers examined how and why formal 
compliance programs and informal shared ethical values relate to employees’ unethical 
behavior and ethical awareness. We found that formal compliance programs and informal 
shared ethical values are both negatively related to unethical behavior and positively related to 
ethical awareness among employees. Additionally, we found that the relationship between 
informal shared ethical values and employees’ unethical behavior and ethical awareness, was 
mediated by compliance officers’ perceived personal power. Contrary to our expectations, the 
relationship between formal compliance programs and these outcomes was not mediated by 
compliance officers’ perceived position power. Finally, we also explored the possible 
interaction effect of formal compliance programs and informal shared ethical values in 
relation to employees’ unethical behavior and ethical awareness. We did not find that the 
combined presence of both organizational characteristics is more strongly related to the 
outcome variables. Instead, our results showed that formal compliance programs are only 
significantly related to these outcomes when informal shared ethical values are absent. Our 
findings thus suggest, that either a formal compliance program or informal shared ethical 
values can be associated with improved ethical decision making by employees. 
 
Theoretical Implications 
Our research has two important implications for ethical decision-making and corporate 
governance literature. First of all, by studying how formal compliance programs and informal 
shared ethical values together are associated with employees’ ethical decision making, our 
research contributes to previous ethical decision-making literature and gaps in corporate 
governance research (Dey et al., 2015; Treviño et al., 2014). In line with earlier research, we 
find that either formal compliance programs or informal shared values are associated with 
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these outcomes (e.g., Kaptein, 2011; Kaptein, 2015; Kish-Gephart et al., 2010). In this sense, 
our findings challenge the idea that the presence of both characteristics is a precondition for 
organizations to effectively influence unethical behavior and ethical awareness (Tenbrunsel et 
al., 2003; Weaver & Treviño, 1999). In fact, our results tentatively suggest that the combined 
presence of formal compliance programs and informal shared ethical values is not more 
strongly associated with improved ethical decision making of employees, but that it also does 
not hurt to have both characteristics present in an organization (Treviño et al., 1999). 
Moreover, our research suggests that formal compliance programs, designed to promote 
ethical behavior, can compensate for the absence of informal shared ethical values by serving 
as the primary ethical guideline in these situations (Kaptein, 2015).  
Furthermore, our research contributes to ethics research and corporate governance 
literature by providing new insights into the role of compliance officers’ power bases in 
relation to employees’ unethical behavior and ethical awareness. Surprisingly, our results 
show that the relationship of formal compliance programs and these outcome variables was 
not mediated by compliance officers’ position power. An explanation could be that formal 
compliance programs do not elicit explicit perceptions of compliance officers’ position 
power, as compliance officers cannot immediately or directly decrease employees’ salary, or 
demote and dismiss employees when compliance rules are violated. Rather, such ‘follow 
through’ of compliance programs, by means of disciplinary measures, may lie in the hands of 
the responsible manager (e.g., Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999; Treviño & Weaver, 2001). 
Our research did reveal that the relationship of informal shared ethical values and 
employees’ unethical behavior and ethical awareness was mediated by compliance officers’ 
perceived personal power. Although ethics scholars have suggested that compliance officers’ 
role and personal power might be related to employees ethical decision making (Treviño et 
al., 2014), our research is the first to demonstrate this link empirically. In line with research 
INTERNAL SUPERVISION: THE ROLE OF ORGANIZATIONAL VALUES  85 
 
on group prototypicality, our results suggests that compliance officers’ self-perceived 
prototypicality of the informal shared ethical values can give them personal power to 
influence employees’ ethical behavior (Giessner & Van Knippenberg, 2008). Ethics research 
shows that compliance officers can use such personal power through their interpersonal 
relationships with employees (Brown, Treviño, & Harrison, 2005; Van Knippenberg, Lossie, 
& Wilke, 1994). Together, our findings suggest that even when compliance officers lack 
position power, for instance when no formal compliance program exists, they can gain 
legitimacy and personal power, through their connection with the informal shared ethical 
values (Tyler, 2006; Tyler & Blader, 2005). 
 
Strengths, Limitations, and Future Research 
The current research has several strengths. First, our sample of professional and 
experienced compliance officers is a particular strength of this study. By studying the most 
informed organization members we got accurate information on compliance practices, and 
their relationship with actual unethical behavior and ethical awareness of employees (Thomas, 
Clarke, Goia, 1993), rather than employee perceptions (Kaptein, 2015; Treviño et al., 1999; 
Weaver & Treviño, 1999). With this unique sample, we were also able to study the 
hypothesized relationships quantitatively, whereas studies up till now mainly studied these 
relations qualitatively (Treviño et al., 2014). Second, we tested our hypotheses across a wide 
range of organizations of different size, and by controlling for organization size, we are 
confident that our results can be generalized to both small and large organizations. Finally, the 
robustness of our results is enhanced by studying the direct and interactive effect of formal 
compliance programs and informal shared ethical values in relation to two employee 
outcomes, namely unethical behavior and ethical awareness (Weaver & Treviño, 1999), 
86   CHAPTER 3 
whereas previous ethics research has focused on just one of these outcomes (for reviews, see 
Craft, 2013; O’Fallon & Butterfield, 2005).  
However, our research also has some limitations. First of all, as our study was cross-
sectional in nature it is not possible to make inferences about causal relationships, and 
longitudinal research is needed to examine the possible direction of causality. Second, 
although in this study we deliberately used a sample of compliance officers, we recognize that 
by relying on a single source to answer our survey measures our results may be vulnerable to 
common source and method bias. However, the effects of common method bias are limited 
because it cannot influence the found statistical significant interactions (Podsakoff, Makenzie, 
& Podsakoff, 2012; Siemsen, Roth, & Oliviera, 2010), and potential common source bias was 
limited through non-statistical measures as described in the method section (Podsakoff et al., 
2012). Nonetheless, a limitation of this sample is that we were only able to measure 
compliance officers’ own perception of their power, whereas our theoretical reasoning and 
hypotheses focus on the effect of compliance officers’ power bases from the perspective of 
employees. To fully address this latter limitation, future research could combine samples of 
compliance officers and employees in order to compare perceptions of these groups, 
especially regarding compliance officers’ power bases, to re-examine their effects on the 
studied relationships. A final limitation could be the used measure of position power adapted 
from French and Raven (1959, 2001), which blends rewards and sanctions in the same 
construct, and this might explain why we did not fully capture the deterrence effect of 
sanctions as predicted in Hypothesis 3. Future research could re-examine the studied 
relationships with a measure of position power that more clearly distinguishes between 
rewards and sanctions. 
Future research could also examine possible moderators of the studied relationships. 
For example, regarding the relationship between formal compliance programs and employees’ 
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ethical behavior, reward systems and target-setting, as they are considered as important 
contextual factors (e.g., Treviño et al., 2014). The associated pressures of attaining rewards 
could have a strong influence on employees’ ethical decision making (Murphy, 2004a), for 
instance it can make employees use shortcuts and act unethically as a result, and this pressure 
could be further fueled by compliance officers’ position power to ultimately influence the 
rewards of employees. Future research is needed, to create more clarity about how target-
setting is related to employees’ unethical behavior and ethical awareness (Locke & Latham, 
2006; Ordóñez, Schweitzer, Galinsky, & Bazerman, 2009). 
Moreover, future research could consider the moderating role of social identification 
of employees, the degree to which employees define themselves in terms of their association 
to the organization’s values, on the relationship between informal shared ethical values and 
compliance officers’ personal power (Hogg & Van Knippenberg, 2003; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, 
Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). After all, it seems highly likely that the influence of prototypical 
organization members, and thus their personal power, depends on how much employees want 
to be affiliated with the organizational values that these members represent (Hogg, 2001).   
 
Practical Implications 
Our study provides practical insights that can be translated into concrete guidelines for 
organizations, and in particular for compliance officers, to help improve employees’ ethical 
decision making. Our results suggest that organizations, through managers and compliance 
officers, can do so by influencing organizational characteristics that are within their control 
(e.g., Treviño et al., 1998), by either implementing a multi-facetted formal compliance 
program or stimulating that informal ethical values, such as integrity, are shared. It depends 
on the presence of formal compliance programs and informal shared ethical values which 
route is most beneficial for a specific organization. 
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Especially organizations that do not have a formal compliance program yet can benefit 
from implementing such a program. A multi-facetted formal compliance program is most 
effective when it encompasses more than just a code of conduct, and also includes training, 
guidance, communication of the compliance rules, and active enforcement. For instance, by 
providing training and practical guidance, compliance officers can help employees and 
managers translate formal compliance rules to daily work practices, and thereby minimizing 
the risk of decoupling these rules from the core processes of organizations (Maclean & 
Benham, 2010; Weaver et al., 1999). 
Organizations that already have a formal compliance program in place and wish to 
create an ethical culture could stimulate that informal ethical values, especially integrity, are 
shared. Our research indicates that most can be gained from communicating the role of 
compliance officers in terms of role modelling and safeguarding an organizations’ integrity, 
as an important ethical value, next to their traditional formal role of enforcing formal 
compliance programs. As our findings suggest that such personal power is a potential source 
of informal influence for compliance officers (Giessner & Van Knippenberg, 2008). 
Compliance officers can enhance this personal power by actively espousing that they 
represent integrity as an ethical value and displaying role modelling of desired behavior 
(Reicher & Hopkins, 2003; Van Knippenberg & Hogg, 2003). 
 
Conclusion 
To conclude, our study shows that either formal compliance programs or informal 
shared ethical values, such as integrity, are negatively related to unethical behavior and 
positively related to ethical awareness among employees. However, we do not find a surplus 
effect of the combined presence of formal compliance programs and informal shared ethical 
values in relation to these outcomes. Moreover, we find that the relationship between informal 
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shared values and employees’ unethical behavior and ethical awareness can be explained by 
compliance officers’ perceived power. In particular, their power based on personal 
characteristics (i.e., personal power), rather than power derived from their formal position 
(i.e., position power), was negatively related to employees’ unethical behavior and positively 
related to their ethical awareness.  
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APPENDIX  
Extra Statistical Analyses (in order of appearance in text) 
Extra Analysis on the Relationship between Unethical Behavior and Ethical Awareness  
We also tested for the assumption in Rest’s model on ethical decision making (1969) 
that ethical awareness precedes and, ultimately, can influence unethical behavior. A series of 
OLS regression analyses show that in our study ethical awareness is negatively related to 
unethical behavior (controlled for organization size), although we only find a moderately 
significant relationship (B = -.15, SE = .08, p = .06, R² = .21). That we do not find a strong 
direct relationship between these two variables is in line with Rest’s model (1969), since 
ethical awareness may not directly result in changes in unethical behavior as there are two 
intermediate steps (ethical judgement and intent) before individuals make an ethical decision. 
 
Extra Analysis with Parallel Mediators Perceived Position Power and Personal Power  
Following Preacher and Hayes (2008), we performed parallel mediation analysis in 
which we included both proposed mediators, compliance officers’ perceived position and 
personal power, simultaneously. The relationship of formal compliance programs with 
unethical behavior and ethical awareness cannot be explained by perceived position power 
(unethical behavior: -.0499, .0242; ethical awareness: CI 95% = -.0239, .0940), nor perceived 
personal power (unethical behavior CI 95% = -.0210, .0992; ethical awareness: CI 95%= -
.0346, .1653). The relationship of informal shared ethical values with unethical behavior and 
ethical awareness is only mediated by perceived personal power (unethical behavior: CI 
95%= .0141, .2741; ethical awareness: CI 95% = .0114, .1962) and not by perceived position 
power (unethical behavior: CI 95% = -.0353, .1115; ethical awareness CI 95% = -.0152, 
.0949). This is consistent with the results of the single mediation analyses reported in this 
chapter. 
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Robustness Check of Results including all Control Variables 
To further test the robustness of the results, we re-ran the analyses reported in the main 
body of this chapter including all control variables that were considered theoretically relevant, 
that is organization size, compliance officers’ organization, function or industry tenure, and 
gender. Notably, most of these control variables were not significantly correlated to the 
dependent variables (except organization size), and including a large number of control 
variables especially if they are non-significant may affect statistical power or induce 
parameter bias estimates (Becker, 2005), therefore these controls are not included in the main 
reported results.  
With all these control variables included we again found a significant and negative 
direct relationship between informal shared ethical values and unethical behavior (B = -.34, 
SE = .12, p = .01, R²= .25), but again we did not find a significant relationship between 
formal compliance program and unethical behavior (B= -.10, SE = .10, p = .35, 𝑅² = .25). 
Moreover, again we found a significant and positive relationship between formal compliance 
programs and ethical awareness (B = .23, SE = .11, p = .05, R² = .26), as well as a significant 
and positive relationship between informal shared ethical values and ethical awareness (B = 
.36, SE = .10, p = .00, R² = .26). The interaction analysis including all control variable does 
show a significant interaction of formal compliance programs and informal shared ethical 
values on unethical behavior (B = .25, SE = .12, p = .04, R² = .32), and again for ethical 
awareness (B = -.32, SE = .14, p = .03, R² = .31). So, with all control variable we still find 
partial support for Hypothesis 1 for formal compliance programs, full support for Hypothesis 
2 for informal ethical values, and stronger evidence for the interactive relationships than in the 
reported results.  
The Hayes Bootstrapping macro including all control variables again shows no 
significant indirect relationship though compliance officers’ perceived position power for the 
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relationship between formal compliance program and unethical behavior (B = .00, SE = .03 , 
R² = .24; ns.; CI 95% = -.0407, .0752, N = 43; 5000 re-samples), and also again not with 
ethical awareness (B = .03, SE = .05, ns., R² = .27; CI 95% = -.0505, .1395, N = 60; 5000 re-
samples). With all control variables included, the mediation analysis does not show a 
significant indirect relationship through compliance officers’ personal power for the 
relationship between informal shared ethical values and unethical behavior (B = .07, SE = .06, 
ns, R²= .45; CI 95% = -.0156, .2209, N = 45; 5000 re-samples), but it is again significant for 
ethical awareness (B = .07, SE = .04, p < .05, R²= .34; CI 95% = .0077, .1604, N = 62; 5000 
re-samples). Hence, also with all these control variables included we find partial support for 
Hypothesis 4, but still not for Hypothesis 3. 
 
Robustness Check of Results without Control Variables 
To further test the robustness of the reported results, we re-ran all analyses reported in 
the main body of this chapter without organization size as control variable. Without control 
variables, we found no significant relationship between formal compliance programs and 
ethical awareness (B = .13, SE = .08, p = .10, R² = .32), but again we found a significant and 
positive relationship between informal shared ethical values and ethical awareness (B = .40, 
SE = .08, p = .00, R² = .32). A significant and negative direct relationship between informal 
shared ethical values and unethical behavior (B = -.32, SE = .12, p = .01, R²= .10) was shown 
again, and also no significant relationship between formal compliance program and unethical 
behavior appeared (B= .00, SE = .10, p = .98, 𝑅² = .10). The interaction analysis without 
control variables does show a significant interaction of formal compliance programs and 
informal shared ethical values on unethical behavior (B = .26, SE = .13, p = .05, R² = .16), and 
again for ethical awareness (B = -.29, SE = .10, p = .01, R² = .38). So, without organization 
size as control variable we still find full support for Hypothesis 2 for informal shared ethical 
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values, but less support for Hypothesis 1 for formal compliance programs, and stronger 
evidence for the interaction effects than in the reported results. This outcome for formal 
compliance programs is not surprising as organization size is found to be related to the 
presence of multi-facetted compliance programs in organizations (Kaptein, 2015). To rule out 
the moderating effect of organization size on the presented relationships we have performed 
an extra analysis (see below). 
The Hayes Bootstrapping macro without control variables again shows no significant 
indirect relationship through compliance officers’ perceived position power for the 
relationship between formal compliance program and unethical behavior (B = .02, SE = .03 , 
R² = .05; ns.; CI 95% = -.0114, .1268, N = 49; 5000 re-samples), and again not with ethical 
awareness (B = .03, SE = .03, ns., R² = .18; CI 95% = -.0154, .1066, N = 71; 5000 re-
samples). The mediation analysis shows a significant indirect relationship though personal 
power for the relationship between informal shared ethical values and unethical behavior (B = 
.09, SE = .06, p < .05, R²= .21; CI 95%= .0048, .2150, N = 53; 5000 re-samples), and also for 
ethical awareness (B = .07, SE = .03, p < .05, R²= .37; CI 95% = .0108, .1438, N = 76; 5000 
re-samples). Hence, also without control variables we find full support for Hypothesis 4, but 
again not for Hypothesis 3. 
 
Extra Analysis with Organization Size as Moderator  
Given the above results for the analysis without organization size as control variable 
we explored a model with organization size as moderator. This makes sense as in previous 
ethics research organization size is often considered as an important contextual variable in 
relation to unethical behavior and ethical awareness (Murphy, Smith & Daley, 1992). A series 
of OLS regression analyses revealed that the three-way interactions (formal compliance 
program x informal shared ethical values x organization size) on unethical behavior were not 
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significant (lowest p-value; B = -.18, p = .13), and also in relation to ethical awareness there 
were no significant results (lowest p-value; B = .10, p = .25). Hence, including organization 
size as moderator did not significantly affect the results reported in this chapter. 
 
Further Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
Next to the fit of the entire model, we also assessed 2 alternative models to further 
evaluate the optimal goodness of fit to our data. However, these two models did not fit the 
data better than Model 1. Model 2 tested the fit of a five factor model in which the items of 
our two dependent variables, unethical behavior and ethical awareness, loaded on one single 
factor. This model yielded a worse fit to the data than model 1 (X²= 952.501, df = 454, p < 
.001, CFI = .56, RMSEA = .12, TLI = .49). Furthermore, we also tested Model 3 which went 
one step further than model 2 and also included one overarching factor with our two measures 
for position and personal power, and this yielded a worse fit to the data than Model 1 and 2 
(X²= 1022.133, df = 485, p < .001, CFI = .50, RMSEA = .13, TLI = .43). Hence, the model 
described in the chapter fits the data best. 
 
 




HOW INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL SUPERVISION IMPACT THE 
DYNAMICS BETWEEN BOARDS AND TOP MANAGEMENT TEAMS  
AND TMT REFLEXIVITY13 
 
ABSTRACT  
This chapter examines the link of internal supervision with intergroup conflict, the 
composition of internal supervisory boards, and Top Management Team (TMT) reflexivity, in 
relation to external supervision. Reflexivity can prevent TMTs from using decision biases that 
harm sound decision making. To safeguard such reflexivity TMTs are supervised internally 
by supervisory boards, and externally by independent supervisory authorities, but there is 
theoretical debate on their respective impact. We propose that frequent internal supervision is 
associated with Board-TMT relationship conflict, but this relationship will be less strong 
when TMTs are supervised by boards with an open board composition (i.e., new members 
that have entered the board recently). When such conflict occurs it can harm TMT reflexivity, 
but we expect this relationship to be less strong when external supervision increases. These 
hypotheses were largely supported by a multisource team-level field survey conducted among 
111 TMTs members and 152 members of their internal supervisory boards of 56 insurance 
companies. This chapter advances empirical knowledge on how contextual factors and 
behavioral group processes impact and explain the independent effects and interplay of 
internal and external supervision in relation to sound TMT decision making. 
 
 
13 This chapter is based on De Waal, M.M., Veltrop, D.B., Rink, F.A., & Stoker, J.I. (2018). How Internal and 
External Monitoring Impact Board-TMT Dynamics and TMT Reflexivity. The underlying paper is published as DNB 
working paper (no. 604), and was also presented at the 7th Biennial conference of the ECPR standing group on regulatory 
governance in July 2018 in Lausanne, Switzerland.   
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Scholars and practitioners are in common agreement that reflexivity by Top 
Management Teams (TMTs) - their ability to critically reflect on their own group functioning 
and adapt their behavior accordingly (West, 2000) - is necessary for TMTs to fulfill their key 
responsibilities. That is, to make strategic decisions that serve and protect the interests of all 
organizational stakeholders and thereby effectively balance the competing interests of these 
different parties necessary to ensure organizational viability (Aguilera, Desender, Bednar, & 
Lee, 2015). Due to the challenging and complex circumstances under which TMTs have to 
make such strategic decisions, for instance causing information overload, these teams become 
vulnerable to decision biases and more inclined to take shortcuts that lead to less balanced 
decisions (Boivie, Bednar, Aguilera, & Andrus, 2016; Westphal & Bednar, 2005). For 
example, TMTs may pursue their own short-term interest rather than the long-term interests 
of their organizations’ stakeholders. Thus, TMTs need to reflect on their own functioning in 
order to balance these diverging interests and to prevent that such decision biases become 
habitual routines (Gersick & Hackman, 1990). 
To safeguard that TMTs reflect on their decisions, their outcomes are supervised 
internally, by supervisory boards14 within their own organization with the main task to 
monitor whether TMT actions are in the interest of the organization and its stakeholders 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Walsh & Seward, 1990), and externally, by 
independent supervisory institutions with the legal task and authority to monitor whether 
TMT strategic decisions are compliant with the law and to safeguard stability in the larger 
 
14 Our study mainly reflects the situation in a two-tier board structure, in which a management board or Top 
Management Team (TMT, including the CEO) is formally and operationally separated from a supervisory board (Mallin, 
2007). For reasons of readability we refer to the two studied management bodies, as the supervisory board (board), 
respectively, and the Top Management Team (TMT, e.g., Boivie et al., 2016).  
This situation is formally different from one-tier board structures where these functions are combined in one 
management body; the board of directors with executive and non-executive directors (Bezemer, Maassen, van den Bosch, & 
Volberda, 2007). Despite these formal differences, the main monitoring tasks performed by internal supervisory bodies are 
similar for both members of supervisory boards and non-executives directors in a board of directors (Mallin, 2007). Hence, 
when we refer to internal supervision this might refer to the monitoring activities performed by both non-executives in a 
board of directors and by members of a supervisory board.  
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system these organizations are part of (e.g., Aguilera et al., 2015). Although the roles of both 
internal and external supervisory bodies have gained importance in response to the financial 
crisis (2007-2009) (Wouters & Van Kerckhoven, 2011), there is an ongoing theoretical debate 
about their effectiveness in influencing TMT functioning.  
In the adjacent fields of Economics, Organization Management and Business, this 
theoretical debate revolves around two streams of Corporate Governance literature that have 
fundamentally different perspectives on the extent to which internal and external supervision 
affect TMT reflexivity. One stream of literature builds on agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976), proposing that there are inherent differences between the interests of supervisory 
boards and TMTs. Therefore in this view, frequent internal and external supervision of TMT 
decisions is necessary to create alignment between these diverging interests and to prevent 
TMTs from falling prey to decision biases which make them more inclined to make self-
serving decisions (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Ward, Brown, & Rodrigues, 2009). The other 
stream of literature builds on stewardship theory (e.g., Donaldson, 1990; Donaldson & Davis, 
1991), proposing that the interests of boards and TMTs are already aligned, as both parties are 
aimed at serving the organization (Davis, Schoorman, & Donaldson, 1997; Donaldson & 
Davis, 1991). Therefore, from this view, frequent supervision, particularly internal 
supervision by boards, may merely trigger interpersonal tensions between boards and TMTs 
(Kellermanns & Eddleston, 2004) that, in turn, can undermine TMTs’ motivation to keep their 
joint organizational interests in mind (Argyris, 1964; Corbetta & Salvato, 2004). In the 
conflict literature, interpersonal tensions represent ‘relationship conflict’ (Jehn, 1995), which 
refers to conflict based on incompatible or conflicting values. This conflict can occur between 
members of the same group (i.e., intragroup level, Jehn, 1995), or between members of 
different parties, as is the case here (i.e., intergroup level, De Dreu, 2010). Relationship 
conflict is indeed found to harm TMT functioning (e.g., De Wit, Greer, & Jehn, 2012), for 
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example TMT reflexivity (Knapp, Dalziel, & Lewis, 2011). This inevitable negative effect of 
relationship conflict is often attributed to the higher difficulty to resolve such conflict 
compared to work-related types of conflict (i.e., task or process conflict15; De Dreu & 
Weingart, 2003). 
The goal of the current research is to contribute to the above debate and add insights 
from a third perspective: social identity theory (SIT, Tajfel & Turner, 1979). SIT proposes 
that people attach great value to group memberships, because they give a clear sense of ‘who 
they are’ and provide positive guidance to people’s behavior (Tajfel, 1972). Moreover, as 
groups prescribe clear behavioral norms members often belief that their own group values are 
superior to those of other groups (Robbins & Krueger, 2005), and want to protect them from 
criticism by outsiders (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). The following predictions are mainly based on 
this premise of SIT and will be further elaborated in our theoretical framework below.  
Based on this perspective, we propose that the relationship between internal 
supervision and Board-TMT relationship conflict is influenced by board compositional 
characteristics, such as team tenure (Pelled & Adler, 1994), but especially by the openness of 
boards’ composition, indicated by the degree of entry of new board members (Haslam & 
Ellemers, 2005; Ziller, 1965). Specifically, we argue that this relationship should be less 
strong for relatively open boards than for relatively closed boards, as open boards will have 
more fluid values and will be more open to differences in values with TMTs than closed 
boards (e.g., Brewer, 2001; Hogg, 1992; Tajfel, 1972). Importantly, however, we further 
propose that when Board-TMT relationship conflict does emerge, it will harm TMT 
reflexivity, and this negative effect can be mitigated when external supervision increases. 
 
15 In this study we focus on the role of (intergroup) relationship conflict between boards and TMTs. However, as 
boards and TMTs might also experience conflict regarding incompatible goals and differences of opinion about task-related 
issues (i.e., task conflict, Jehn, 1995) we have included an alternative analysis with Board-TMT task conflict in our model in 
Appendix 4C. On a final note, as boards and TMTs do not need to coordinate their work together in a two-tier system, the 
related process conflict (Jehn, 1995) is less relevant for the dynamics between boards and TMTs. 
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Accordingly, we argue that a legitimate independent third party can then intervene (Ury, 
Brett, & Goldberg, 1989), and act as a mediator to stimulate TMT reflexivity (e.g., Jehn & 
Bendersky, 2003; Karambayya, Brett, & Lythe, 1992).  
In sum, this chapter presents a conceptual model of when and why internal and 
external supervision influence TMT reflexivity. Our central goals are to demonstrate that: a) 
the relationship between internal supervision and Board-TMT relationship conflict is 
moderated by the openness of board composition, and in cases where such conflict does arise, 
that b) the relationship between Board-TMT relationship conflict and TMT reflexivity is 
moderated by external supervision.  
This chapter contributes to existing literature on TMT reflexivity and corporate 
governance in a number of important ways. First, although it is well conceived that close 
supervision of TMT decisions by internal and external supervisory bodies is important 
(Misangyi & Acharya, 2014), there is limited research on the extent to which both supervisory 
bodies are effective in their roles, and how they affect TMT functioning (Aguilera et al., 
2015). Most empirical evidence for the two primary theories in this area, agency theory and 
stewardship theory, focuses on organizational-level outcomes, such as firm financial 
performance, and therefore we know very little about the direct impact of supervision on 
TMT functioning (e.g., Madison, 2014; Rechner & Dalton, 1991; Tosi, Brownlee, Silva, & 
Katz, 2003). This study is among the first to empirically test the independent effects of 
internal and external supervision on TMT reflexivity (Aguilera et al., 2015; Walls, Berrone, & 
Phan, 2012). Second, in order to unravel the debate between agency theory and stewardship 
theory, we propose to use insights from both conflict research and SIT. This study’s explicit 
focus on the role of Board-TMT relationship conflict as an important underlying mechanism 
helps to understand how frequent internal supervision by boards may hamper TMT reflexivity 
(e.g., Jehn, 1995). Third, this study examines earlier neglected contingencies with regard to 
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these relationships, and thereby provides boundary conditions to this debate. We expect that 
the openness of boards’ composition can suppress the negative effect of internal supervision 
on Board-TMT relationship conflict, and we expect that external supervision can help to 
mitigate the negative effects of such conflict on TMT reflexivity. Our examination of the role 
of openness of board composition further adds to corporate governance research on board 
rotation (e.g., Vafeas, 2003). And, our focus on external supervision in relation to internal 
supervision shows how the presence of both forms of supervision together, and thus their 
interdependent effects, affect TMT reflexivity (Aguilera et al., 2015).  
 To test our predictions, we conducted a large field study among insurance companies 
with headquarters or independent subunits located in the Netherlands and that operated under 
a two-tier governance system with a separate internal supervisory board and TMT, and all 
operated under license and external supervision from the Dutch Central Bank. We performed 
our analysis on the matching and complete team-level data among TMTs (N = 111 TMT 
members) and their respective supervisory boards (N = 152 board members) of the same 
insurance companies (N = 56). Our psychological measures were rated by different sources, 
and this data was subsequently matched with publicly available archival data about 
supervisory board tenure. In the following sections we introduce our conceptual model with 
our propositions (see Figure 4.1).  
  






THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Theoretical Perspectives on Internal Supervision  
Agency theory. Agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) posits that there are inherent 
differences in interests between the supervisory boards (boards, the ‘principal’) and Top 
Management Teams of organizations (TMTs, the ‘agent’). Boards act on behalf of key 
organizational shareholders, or owners, to ensure organizational viability and to safeguard 
core organizational interests (Eisenhardt, 1989; Fama & Jensen, 1983). From an agency 
perspective, boards delegate decision-making powers to executives, who make up the TMT 
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decisions that ensure sales growth, investment profits, and thus, deliver shareholder value 
(Fama & Jensen, 1983). According to agency theory, TMTs are immanently less committed to 
long-term organization interests than their boards and are therefore inclined to make decisions 
that yield short-term personal results, rather than collective benefits for the organization 
(Eisenhardt, 1989).  
The proposed solution for boards to deal with this so-called “agency problem” and to 
align the diverging interests between boards and TMTs, is to supervise the actions of TMTs 
closely (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). This internal supervision entails a systematic evaluation 
of the content and results of TMT strategic decisions (Boivie et al., 2016; McDonald & 
Westphal, 2010), and specifies what TMT decision-making procedures should be used 
(McCubbins, Noll, & Weingast, 1989). Boards perform this internal supervision by 
challenging, questioning and discussing TMT proposals. In this way they hold TMTs 
accountable for their actions (Roberts, McNulty, & Stiles, 2005), and prevent TMTs from 
falling prey to decision biases (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  
Empirical evidence confirms that TMTs tend to suffer from decision biases that can 
harm organizational interests in the long term (Brauer, 2013). They are, for example, 
influenced by financial incentives that are found to motivate self-interested behavior and 
enhance self-serving TMT decisions (e.g., Frank & Obloj, 2014). Moreover, several studies 
suggest that internal supervision can prevent TMTs from using such decision biases, as it 
reduces their self-serving behavior in organizational decision dilemmas (Kosnik & 
Bettenhausen, 1992; Madison, 2014; Pitesa & Thau, 2013), and enhances the number of TMT 
investments that increase organizational profit growth (Tosi et al., 2003). So, there is some 
support for the agency theory principle that close internal supervision by boards of TMTs’ 
strategic decisions prevent TMTs from using decision biases, and ultimately that the 
diverging interests of boards and TMTs will be more aligned. 
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Stewardship theory. In response to agency theory, stewardship theory (e.g., 
Donaldson, 1990; Donaldson & Davis, 1991) represents a fundamentally different perspective 
on how internal supervision impacts the dynamic interplay between boards and TMTs. 
According to this perspective, both groups are motivated to serve the same interests, as TMTs 
are seen as “organizational stewards” who are, like boards, highly motivated and committed 
to achieve the collective interests of the organization above their personal interests (Davis et 
al., 1997; Donaldson & Davis, 1991). Scholars in this domain propose that achieving 
collective interests, such as organizational growth or increased revenues, drives TMT 
decisions because it represents an important intangible reward to them (Davis et al., 1997). 
Given the fact that common interests are best served when TMTs work in good harmony with 
the relevant stakeholders of their organization, boards should maintain good relations with 
TMTs (Davis et al., 1997; Donaldson & Davis, 1991). Boards can do so primarily by giving 
TMTs the autonomy to perform their responsibilities, and support them with a strategic 
partnership, meaning that they provide guidance and advice for TMTs future decision making 
rather than supervise their current and past actions (Anderson, Melanson, & Maly, 2007; 
Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003).  
Following this line of reasoning, scholars in this domain have argued that frequent 
internal supervision by boards of TMT decisions may actually do more harm than good, as it 
could create interpersonal tensions between boards and TMTs (Kellermanns & Eddleston, 
2004). It has been proposed that such internal supervision, for example, could decrease 
TMTs’ motivation to make decisions that are not in the organizational interest (Argyris, 1964; 
Corbetta & Salvato, 2004), diminish the perceived decision-making discretion of TMTs 
(Davis et al., 1997), and enhance TMT’s skepticism of how boards view their functioning 
(Frey, 1993).  
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Research indeed suggests that frequent internal supervision can harm the good 
working relationship between boards and TMTs, evidenced by, for example, dysfunctional 
TMT responses such as lowered work effort (Dickinson & Villeval, 2008), due to higher 
perceived distrust of the board (Falk & Kosfeld, 2006), and heightened interpersonal tensions 
between both parties (Eddleston & Kellermanns, 2007; Menon, Bharadwaj, & Howell, 1996). 
Thus, there is also some evidence for the proposition of stewardship theory that frequent 
internal supervision can lead to relational conflict between boards and TMTs. 
Social identity theory. To help solve the debate between agency and stewardship 
theory, several scholars call for a more integrative theoretical approach to study the 
effectiveness of internal supervision that also takes the dynamics between boards and TMTs 
into account (e.g., Aguilera et al., 2015; Walls et al., 2012). In this regard, governance 
literature has turned to SIT (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), which helps to explain the impact of 
supervision on underlying group processes within, and between these parties (e.g., Hillman, 
Nicholson, & Shropshire, 2008). A central premise of this theory is that people attach great 
value to group memberships, because they give a clear sense of ‘who they are’ or ‘what they 
stand for’ and provide positive guidance and meaning to people’s behavior (Tajfel, 1972). As 
groups tend to prescribe clear norms on what is considered appropriate and valuable behavior, 
members often belief that their own group values are superior to those of other groups 
(Robbins & Krueger, 2005), and want to protect their group’s values against the (potential) 
influence, or criticism of outsiders (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). These so-called identity processes 
are so pervasive that they also occur among groups within the same organization (Labianca, 
Brass & Gray, 1998), and can cause interpersonal tensions among these groups. That is, both 
parties will perceive that there are value and personal incompatibilities between members of 
the two groups (i.e., relationship conflict at the intergroup level, De Dreu, 2010).  
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Following the above reasoning based on SIT, it seems likely that frequent internal 
supervision by boards of TMTs signals that there are value differences between both parties 
and that a board has a critical attitude towards a TMT, and such differences may create Board-
TMT relationship conflict (Brewer, 2001; Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears, 1999). So, while 
agency theory and SIT both predict that there are inherent differences of interests or values 
between boards and TMTs, each theory grounds this prediction on fundamentally different 
principles about group behavior and consequently also disagree on how to align these 
different group interests (Davis et al., 1997). Interestingly, however, SIT also does not fully 
align with stewardship theory. As stewardship theory believes that both groups share the same 
organizational values (Davis et al., 1997), and SIT predicts that boards and TMTs, being two 
different parties, will hold different values and interests, in spite of representing the same 
organization (Robbins & Krueger, 2005). At the same time, however, based on both SIT and 
stewardship theory, it can be predicted that frequent internal supervision will most likely do 
more harm than good as it can either emphasize pre-existing value differences (Brewer, 2001) 
or breach relatively good interpersonal relationships (Davis et al., 1997), which may both 
result in relationship conflict. Hence, our first hypothesis is:   
Hypothesis 1A: There is a positive relationship between internal supervision and 
Board-TMT relationship conflict. 
 
The Moderating Role of the Openness of Board Composition 
Given the complexity of the above relationship, however, we propose that internal 
supervision may not lead to relationship conflict between boards and TMTs under all 
circumstances. Several scholars suggest that Board-TMT relations and conflicts are likely to 
be influenced by board compositional features, such as team tenure (Pelled & Adler, 1994), 
the education levels of board members (Hambrick, Li, Xin, & Tsui, 2001), and their collective 
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values (Jehn, Chadwick, & Thatcher, 1997). Accordingly, we propose that the openness of 
boards’ composition is a crucial variable that moderates the relationship between internal 
supervision and intergroup conflict (Haslam & Ellemers, 2005). The openness of a board 
refers to the degree to which new members have entered the group recently (Ziller, 1965), 
indicated by the lowest tenure held by individual members within the board (Hollenbeck, 
DeRue, & Guzzo, 2004).  
Our proposition can also be derived from SIT, as this perspective holds that a group’s 
inward focus should become stronger over time when groups work together longer (Tajfel, 
1972). Research in this area confirms that when a group’s composition remains relatively 
stable, members become more familiarized with each other (Harrison, Price, Gavin, & Florey, 
2002), they develop strong common group values (Jehn, 1994; Katz, 1982), and become more 
committed to these values (Ellemers, De Gilder, & Haslam, 2004). Moreover, following SIT, 
groups also expect other groups to develop such strong shared group values (Crump, 
Hamilton, Sherman, Lickel, & Thakkar, 2010), and assume that these values will be different 
from their own (Robbins & Krueger, 2005). In closed groups, these perceived value 
differences are likely to be greater, as they have less influx of new members from the outside 
world to contrast these beliefs than open groups. This reasoning is supported by scholars who 
argue that closed groups are usually less open to new or different ideas and more critical 
towards outsiders than open groups (e.g., Hogg, 1992; Hornsey & Imani, 2004).   
Building upon this line of reasoning, research suggests that the openness of a group’s 
composition will influence the presence of relationship conflict between two parties. For 
instance, studies have shown that when relatively open groups interact with other groups and 
there are less value differences, open groups are less skeptical and hold more positive 
expectations about each other’s intentions than relatively closed groups (Insko, Schopler, 
Hoyle, Dardis, & Graetz, 1990; Petersen, Dietz, & Frey, 2004). Moreover, relatively open 
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groups tend to perceive the actions of other groups less negatively than more closed groups 
(Dunbar, Saiz, Stella, & Saez, 2000), and generally act more constructively towards these 
groups (Schwartz, Struch, & Bilsky, 1990). Hence, the openness of a group’s composition 
impacts the relations with another group because it enhances perceptions of value similarity 
within the group and perceptions of value divergence with other groups.  
Now we will translate these theoretical insights from SIT and related findings 
specifically to internal supervision by boards of TMTs’ decision making. Hence, it can be 
expected that in a relatively open board composition, where new board members have entered 
recently, boards will have more fluid values (Moreland & Levine, 2002; O’Reilly, Caldwell, 
& Barnett, 1989), and will experience less value differences with TMTs (Arrow & McGrath, 
1993). Accordingly, only when boards with a relatively closed composition perform internal 
supervision it may be perceived as too critical of TMT values and signal value differences 
with TMTs, and hence lead to increased Board-TMT relational conflict (Hambrick et al., 
2001; Hornsey & Imani, 2004). When, however, boards have a relatively open composition, 
their outward supervision actions will reveal less value differences, and Board-TMT relational 
conflict will be less likely (Rokeach & Regan, 1980). Our hypothesis therefore states: 
Hypothesis 1B: The openness of board composition moderates the positive 
relationship between internal supervision and Board-TMT relationship conflict, such 
that this relationship becomes less strong when board composition is more open.  
 
Intergroup Relationship Conflict and TMT Reflexivity  
Hypotheses 1A and 1B stipulate that internal supervision is associated with Board-
TMT relationship conflict, and that the openness of board composition is an important board 
compositional characteristic that moderates this relationship. But how detrimental is such 
relational conflict between boards and TMTs for TMT reflexivity? Again following SIT, 
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typical group responses to intergroup conflict include not only actions that show negative 
skepticism towards the other group (Biernat, Vescio, & Theno, 1996; Riek, Mania, & 
Gaertner, 2006; Tajfel & Turner, 1986), but also involve actions that are in favor of the own 
group (Gaertner & Schopler, 1998; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Such actions imply that group 
members evaluate their own group’s values even more positively (Stephan, Ybarra, & 
Morrison, 2009), and demonstrate even greater group loyalty (Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 
2002). This implies that if Board-TMT relationship conflict arises, TMTs will be more likely 
to process information in their own favor (Staw, Sandelands, & Dutton, 1981). Consequently, 
TMTs will be less reflective, due to a reduced willingness to acknowledge mistakes, to 
discuss improvements or to adapt to future work challenges (Knapp et al., 2011).  
Research supports our reasoning, and demonstrates that when groups experience 
relationship conflict with another party they are more likely to evaluate their own functioning 
more positively (Balliet, Wu, & De Dreu, 2014). Moreover, research shows that in these 
situations groups are less tolerant for criticism (Eidelman, Silvia, & Biernat, 2006), and will 
also display more close mindedness (Golec & Federico, 2004). Together these outcomes 
indicate that Board-TMT relationship conflict will hamper essential elements of TMT 
reflexivity (West, 2001). Our hypothesis is therefore: 
Hypothesis 2A: There is a negative relationship between Board-TMT relationship 
conflict and TMT reflexivity.  
 
The Moderating Role of External Supervision 
Hitherto, our reasoning revolved around the impact of internal supervision on Board-
TMT relationship conflict in relation to TMT reflexivity. However, governance theorists 
argue that internal and external supervision are both important to safeguard reflexivity, such 
that TMTs make strategic decisions that protect stakeholder interests and safeguard long-term 
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organizational viability (Aguilera et al., 2015). Internal supervisory bodies provide direct 
supervision over these decisions (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Walsh & Seward, 1990), and 
external supervisory bodies supervise and enforce compliance of these decisions with 
regulation (e.g., Aguilera et al., 2015; Wouters & Van Kerckhoven, 2011). We therefore also 
examined how external supervision affects the relationship between Board-TMT relationship 
conflict and TMT reflexivity. Our conceptual model proposes that when the relationship 
between boards and TMTs becomes strained, external supervisory bodies can intervene as an 
independent party, to mitigate that the persistence of this conflict will harm TMT reflexivity 
(Peterson & Behfar, 2003; Widmer, Schippers, & West, 2009). Hence, we argue that the 
relationship between Board-TMT relationship conflict and TMT reflexivity will be moderated 
by external supervision.  
Our proposition is supported by conflict literature, stipulating that generally speaking, 
the negative effects of intergroup conflict can be mitigated when a nonpartisan third-party 
intervenes and acts as a mediator between the two conflicting parties (Dixon, 1996; Jehn & 
Bendersky, 2003). External supervisory bodies can fulfil this role because they have the 
legitimate intervention authority (Karambayya et al., 1992; Keashley & Newberry, 1995), and 
the legal instruments to step in when TMT functioning endangers organizational sustainability 
and/or risks the stability of a larger industry (Ury et al., 1989; Wouters & Van Kerckhoven, 
2011). Third-party conflict interventions are most effective when they facilitate a dialogue 
between the two conflicting parties, but leave the responsibility and control over the process 
for resolving the conflict to the respective parties (Carnevale & Pruitt, 1992; Karambayya et 
al., 1992). In order to mitigate the effects of Board-TMT relationship conflict, external 
supervision interventions can be focused on reflexivity and providing feedback on TMT 
performance (Gurtner, Tschan, Semmer, & Nägele, 2007).  
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There is empirical evidence in support of this notion, which shows that groups 
experiencing conflict with another party engage in more reflexivity after a third-party 
intervention than when no such intervention took place (Tjosvold, Hui, & Yu, 2003; 
Weinberg-Kurnik, Nadan, & Ben Ari, 2015), especially if the third party had legitimate 
authority (Keashley & Newberry, 1995). The effect on reflexivity was highest, if the 
intervention was focused explicitly on reflexivity and included providing performance 
feedback (Gabelica, Van den Bossche, De Maeyer, Segers, & Gijselaers, 2014; Konradt, 
Schippers, Garbers, & Steenfatt, 2015). Accordingly, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 2B: External supervision moderates the negative relationship between 
Board-TMT relationship conflict and TMT reflexivity, such that this relationship 
becomes less strong when external supervision increases. 
 
Our Combined Conceptual Model 
Thus far, we predict that there is a positive relationship between internal supervision 
and Board-TMT relationship conflict (Hypothesis 1A), but that a more open composition of 
boards, indicated by a higher degree of new members entering the board (i.e., the openness of 
board composition), makes this relationship less strong (Hypothesis 1B). We subsequently 
predicted that in cases where relational conflict between boards and TMTs emerges, it 
negatively relates to TMT reflexivity (Hypothesis 2A). We also proposed, that under these 
circumstances, increased external supervision mitigates this indirect effect (Hypothesis 2B). 
Our combined conceptual model (see Figure 4.1.) implies that the relationship between 
internal supervision and TMT reflexivity is explained through Board-TMT relationship 
conflict, and that this indirect effect is conditional on the openness of boards’ composition 
and on external supervision.  
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Together, these predictions represent a moderated mediation pattern, which is reflected 
in our final hypothesis:  
Hypothesis 3: Internal supervision is directly positively related to Board-TMT 
relationship conflict and indirectly negatively related to TMT reflexivity. This 
relationship is conditional on the openness of board composition, and the indirect link 
with TMT reflexivity is conditional on external supervision. 
 
METHOD 
Sample and Procedure 
Our research was conducted in 2014 among a sample of supervisory boards (boards) 
and Top Management Teams (TMTs) of Dutch insurance companies. To ensure a maximum 
response rate and limit social desirability we followed several recruitment procedures 
recommended by, for instance Westphal and Stern (2007), such as using personal 
communication and endorsements (i.e., from the Dutch Association of Insurance Companies, 
VVV16), guaranteeing anonymous and confidential treatment of the data. Given the fact that 
the survey was sent to boards and TMTs of insurance companies by the De Nederlandsche 
Bank (DNB), the external supervisory body, it was further emphasized that the data would not 
be available or useable for direct supervision of insurance companies by DNB. Moreover, to 
highlight the independence of this research, the survey was sent by the head of the research 
department of DNB. Finally, in return for their participation, each board and TMT received a 
report benchmarking their survey scores against the total sample.  
At the time of data collection, there were 290 insurance companies active in the 
Netherlands that operated under license and external supervision from DNB. Together, these 
 
16 The VVV represents the interest of the majority of insurance companies, and together their members hold more 
than 95% of the market share in the Netherlands. 
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companies hold 75 billion in gross premium income and employed 52.000 people17. After 
consultation with the insurance supervision department of DNB, we approached 135 
insurance companies to participate in our study which were under external supervision by 
DNB and had a separate internal supervisory board and TMT and accordingly fulfilled the 
following criteria18; 1) they have headquarters located in the Netherlands, or, 2) they are 
independent subunits (i.e., separate entities belonging to an insurance group holding) that are 
governed by autonomous internal supervisory boards and TMTs and did not fall under the 
direct control of the holding. We sent surveys to all TMT members (N = 245) and all 
supervisory board members (N = 408) of these insurance companies. From the approached 
TMTs, 52% of the members (N = 128) of 65 TMTs completed and returned the survey. From 
the approached boards, 47% of the members (N = 193) from 76 boards participated in our 
study. However, in order to perform our analyses we needed participation from supervisory 
board members as well as TMT members of the same insurance company. All in all, we had a 
response from 56 companies of which the TMT and the supervisory board both participated. 
As a result, our final sample consisted of 111 TMT members (Mage = 52.70, SD = 7.89, 7% 
female), and 152 board members (Mage = 58.86, SD = 8.15, 14.5% female) from 56 
organizations. 
To assess the representativeness of our final sample, we conducted a Kolmogorov-
Smirnov two-sample test (see Westphal & Bednar, 2005), and tested whether the distributions 
of key characteristics from the TMTs and boards included in our sample (i.e., their sizes, 




18 When the headquarters of the insurance company is located in the Netherlands then the institution falls under 
direct home supervision of DNB as the primary external supervisory body. Moreover, for this study it is important that 
supervisory boards and TMTs have discretionary powers over the company or subunit and can make decisions independently 
from the management body of a larger holding company, and therefore we have only selected organizations that have a 
separate and independent governance structure.  
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distributions of those same characteristics for boards and TMTs that were not included in the 
final sample (i.e., those that did not respond to our survey or those that were excluded in the 
sample on the basis of missing data). The results showed that our participating boards and 
TMTs did not differ from the non-participating boards and TMTs, in terms of size, average 
tenure and age (p-values for TMTs were respectively .74, .85, .39; p-values for boards .86, 
.34, .43, respectively).  
 
Measurement 
To avoid common source bias (Podsakoff & Organ, 1986) we assessed our measures 
through multiple sources, such that our independent measures were rated by supervisory 
board members and our dependent measure was rated by TMT members. The key 
independent variable (i.e., internal supervision) was rated by supervisory board members, the 
first moderator (i.e., openness of board composition) was obtained from archival data, the 
second moderator (i.e., external supervision) was also rated by supervisory board members, as 
was the central mediating mechanism in our model (i.e., Board-TMT relationship conflict), 
and finally our dependent variable (i.e., TMT reflexivity) was rated by members of the TMTs. 
For an overview of the different data sources used for each variable, see Table 4.1. 
Furthermore, our theory refers to the team level of analysis. We therefore used a 
referent shift informant sampling approach to gather data by framing all items at the team 
level (e.g., Van Der Vegt & Bunderson, 2005). This approach allowed that different members 
of a particular TMT, and different members of a particular board were qualified to provide 
ratings on TMT or board-level properties (e.g., Simons, Pelled, & Smith, 1999). So, for 
example, we asked all TMT members to evaluate the reflexivity of their TMT as a whole, 
rather than to report their own personal level of reflexivity. For each of our measures, we 
subsequently calculated the rwg(j) inter-agreement coefficient for multi-item indices, and we 
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compared the rwg(j) to uniform and a highly skewed distributions as recommended by James 
and colleagues (James, Demaree, & Wolf, 1984; James, Demaree, & Wolf, 1993; see also 
LeBreton & Senter, 2008). We also calculated the intra-class correlation coefficient (ICC1) to 
determine whether data aggregation to the team level was accurate and that teams differed 
significantly in their ratings (Bliese, 2000). These rwg(j) values and ICC1 scores are reported 
per measure below. All survey items are listed in Appendix 4A. 
 
TABLE 4.1 
Data Source per Study Variable 












Openness of Board 
Composition 
Moderator   X 
Board-TMT 
Relationship Conflict 
Mediator  X  
External Supervision  Moderator  X  
TMT Reflexivity Dependent 
variable 
X   
 
Measures  
Internal Supervision. The core task of internal supervision, by supervisory boards, is 
to monitor whether TMT decisions and activities are in the interest of the organization and its 
stakeholders (Boivie et al, 2016; McDonald & Westphal, 2010), therefore we have measured 
internal supervision in terms of this monitoring activity. Internal supervision was assessed 
with three items adapted from McDonald and Westphal (2010, e.g., “To what extent does the 
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supervisory board monitor the strategic decision making of the top management team?”), 
rated by board members on a 7-point scale (1 = to a very small degree, 7 = to a very large 
degree), and these items formed a reliable scale (α = .72). The rwg(j) and ICC1 statistics 
indicated that the data can be aggregated to the team-level (ICC1 = .22, p <.001; compared to 
a uniform distribution, median rwg(j) = .95, mean = .89; compared to a highly skewed 
distribution, median rwg(j) =  .85, mean = .82). 
Openness of Board Composition. The openness of board composition, the degree of 
entry of new members in a supervisory board, is generally measured by using the 
organizational tenure in years of individual members (e.g., Gundry, 1993; Morrison & 
Vancouver, 2000; Ziller, Behringer, & James. 1961), and its average is used to indicate 
membership changes or turnover in teams (Keck, 1997; Van der Vegt, Bunderson, & Kuipers, 
2010). However, these measures are criticized by scholars, as they treat the openness of 
boards’ composition as an absolute group-level trait (Hollenbeck et al., 2004), and do not 
accurately reflect the tenure of the newest members that have entered the team relative to 
other members (Rollag, 2004). For example, teams with similar mean tenure values can have 
diverging team compositions (i.e., they may consist of members that vary greatly in tenure, 
or, of members with similar, medium, levels of tenure). We therefore based our measure of 
the openness of board composition on board members’ minimum tenure (see Hollenbeck et 
al., 2004), as the board member with the lowest tenure reflects better how recent the newest 
member has entered the board. Thus in the current study, higher minimum tenure indicated a 
more closed board composition, where no new members have entered the board recently, 
whereas lower minimum tenure indicated a more open board composition, where a new 
member has entered the board more recently.   
Board-TMT Relationship Conflict. Board-TMT relationship conflict was measured 
with three items adapted from Jehn and Mannix (2001, e.g., “How much relationship tension 
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is there between the Top Management Team and the supervisory board”). Board members 
rated these items on a 7-point scale (1 = never, 7 = very often), and together these items 
formed a reliable scale (α = .82). The rwg(j) and ICC1 statistics warranted that the data could be 
aggregated to the team-level (ICC1 = .58, p <.001; compared to a uniform distribution, median 
rwg(j) = .97, mean = .91; compared to a highly skewed distribution, median rwg(j) = .92, mean = 
.74).  
External Supervision. The core task of external supervision, by independent 
supervisory authorities, is to monitor whether TMT decisions and activities are in line with 
formal regulation (Palmer & Cerruti, 2009; Sijbrand & Rijsbergen, 2013), therefore we have 
measured external supervision in terms of this monitoring activity. Similar to the items used 
for internal supervision, external supervision was assessed with three adapted items from 
McDonald and Westphal (2010), and together these items formed a reliable scale (e.g., “To 
what extent does DNB19 monitor the strategic decision making of the top management team”; 
1 = to a very small degree, 7 = to a very large degree; α = .64). The rwg(j) and ICC1 statistics 
warranted that the data could be aggregated to the team-level (ICC1 = .32, p <.001; compared 
to a uniform distribution, median rwg(j) = .81, mean = .93; compared to a highly skewed 
distribution, median rwg(j) = .90, mean = .61). 
TMT Reflexivity. TMT reflexivity is inherently an emerging group process within 
TMTs (Schippers, Den Hartog, Koopman, & Wienk, 2003), therefore we used TMT ratings 
for this measure. TMT members rated eight items adapted from Schippers and colleagues 
(Schippers, Den Hartog, & Koopman, 2007; Schippers, Den Hartog, Koopman, & Van 
Knippenberg, 2008; see also Swift & West, 1998, e.g., “We regularly discuss whether the top 
management team is working together effectively”, 1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree), 
 
19 In the Netherlands, De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) is the prudential external supervisory body that monitors the 
actions of insurance companies and their TMTs. 
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and these items formed a reliable scale (α = .80). The rwg(j) and ICC1 statistics warranted that 
the data could be aggregated to the team-level (ICC1 = .22, p < .001; compared to a uniform 
distribution, median rwg(j) = .92, mean = .91; compared to a highly skewed distribution, median 
rwg(j) = .89, mean = .54). 
Control Variables. Given that our mediator, Board-TMT relationship conflict, is an 
inter-team construct, we considered characteristics of supervisory boards as well as TMTs and 
included them as control variables. The following control variables have been found to 
influence TMTs processes and/or Board-TMT interactions in previous research: a) group size 
(e.g., Bucholtz, Amason, & Rutherford, 2005; Tuggle, Simon, Reutzel, & Bierman, 2010), 
because larger teams are more prone to experience communication problems that may hamper 
TMT reflexivity (e.g., Blau, 1970; Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993); b) age diversity, because 
this is known to impact team reflexivity and can give rise to intergroup conflict (Armstrong, 
Flood, Guthrie, Liu, MacCurtain, & Mkamwa, 2010; West, Paterson, & Dawson, 1999); c) 
the proportion of female members in teams (Hillman, Shropshire, Certo, Dalton, & Dalton, 
2011), since gender diversity has also been related to dissenting opinions, which can 
positively impact reflexivity within a team (e.g., De Dreu & West, 2001; Nijstad, Berger-
Selman, & De Dreu, 2014), but can also create conflict between teams (e.g., Li & Hambrick, 
2005); and d) openness of TMT composition20, as groups with a more open composition are 
found to develop more creative work ideas, and hence, this may affect TMT reflexivity (Choi 
& Thompson, 2005; Schippers et al., 2003).  
 
 
20 We mention openness of TMT composition as a control variable here (measured by minimum TMT tenure), as 
we expect it to affect our dependent variable TMT reflexivity (e.g., Choi & Thompson, 2005) directly, rather than through 
Board-TMT relationship conflict. Therefore, we did not include this variable as a moderator in our conceptual model, 
because we did not expect it to have a strong (moderating) effect on the relationship between internal supervision and Board-
TMT relationship conflict. Specifically, we expect this relationship to be influenced more strongly by the openness of the 
composition of the group, the board, providing the supervisory feedback of TMTs actions as this may impact whether this 
activity is perceived as critical by TMTs (see our theoretical section for a more elaborate explanation of this moderating 
effect), and less so due to openness of the composition of the group, TMTs, receiving internal supervision by the board.  
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RESULTS 
Descriptive Statistics 
Table 4.2 presents the means, standard deviations, and Pearson zero-order correlations for all 
study variables. None of the control variables were significantly related to our mediator, 
Board-TMT relationship conflict, or our dependent variable, TMT reflexivity (see Appendix 
4B). To avoid biased parameter estimates we therefore excluded all controls from further 
analysis (Becker, 2005). 21 
 
Statistical analyses 
To test hypotheses 1 A-B and 2 A-B at the team level of analysis we used ordinary 
least square (OLS) regressions. We used standardized variables for our analyses and to 
calculate our interaction terms (Aiken & West, 1991). In our OLS regression analyses, Model 
1 includes the independent predictors, and in Model 2 we included their interaction term 
 
21 There was no correlation between the control variable openness of TMT composition and TMT reflexivity. 
Therefore, for statistical reasons (Becker, 2005) we excluded this variable as control variable, similar to the other control 
variables, from our analyses and the results of our hypotheses reported in this chapter. Notably, including openness of TMT 
composition as control variable in the analyses did not significantly change the pattern of results (see Appendix 4C).  
 
TABLE 4.2 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations for Study Variables 
 Variables Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 
1 Internal supervision 5.24 0.76     
2 Openness of Board Composition  2.29 1.83 -.32*    
3 Board-TMT relationship conflict 1.73 0.65 .15 .29*   
4 External supervision 4.16 1.07 .36** -.10 .23†  
5 TMT reflexivity 4.92 0.74 .13 -.01 -.10 .04 
 N = 56. †p <.10, *p < .05, **p < .01.        
INTERNAL-EXTERNAL SUPERVISION: BOARD COMPOSITION AND CONFLICT 119 
 
(Aiken & West, 1991). In the analysis for Hypothesis 2B we also included the independent 
variables of Hypothesis 1, internal supervision and openness of board composition, as extra 
control variables in Model 1. To test our moderated mediation model proposed in Hypothesis 
3 we used Hayes’ (2012) bootstrapping analysis for conditional indirect effects (Preacher, 
Rucker, & Hayes, 2007)22, for which the bootstrap 95% confidence intervals were estimated 
at higher (+1 SD), intermediate (Mean) and lower (-1 SD) levels of openness of board 
composition and external supervision. 
 
Hypotheses Testing 
Hypothesis 1A predicted that internal supervision was positively related to Board-
TMT relationship conflict, and Hypothesis 1B predicted that this relationship was moderated 
by the openness of board composition, such that this relationship became less strong when 
board composition was more open. Consistent with Hypothesis 1A, Table 4.3 (Model 1) 
shows a significant and positive direct relationship between internal supervision and Board-
TMT relationship conflict (β = .27, p = .02, R2 = 0.15). Hence, Hypothesis 1A was supported.  
Consistent with Hypothesis 1B, Table 4.3 (Model 2) shows a significant and positive 
interaction effect of openness of board composition and internal supervision on Board-TMT 
relationship conflict (β = .26, p = .04, R2 = .20). Simple slope analyses (Aiken & West, 1991) 
further confirmed the prediction of Hypothesis 1B, that internal supervision was significantly 
stronger and positively related to Board-TMT relationship conflict, when board composition 
was more closed, indicated by higher minimum board tenure (+1 SD: β = .28, SE = .11,  p = 
.00). This relationship indeed became non-significant and weaker when board composition 
was more open, indicated by lower minimum board tenure (-1 SD: β = .01, SE = .17, p = .47). 
 
22 This procedure resolves conceptual and methodological limitations of traditional mediation analysis and allows 
for multiple moderators to be entered in the analysis (Preacher & Hayes, 2004; Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, 2007) 
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This pattern of results is illustrated in Figure 4.2. Taken together, we found support for 






 TABLE 4.3 
 Regression Results Board-TMT Relationship Conflict 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 
   
Internal Supervision (IS) 0.27* 0.17 
Openness of Board Composition (OBC) 0.38** 0.45*** 
IS x OBC  0.26* 
   




 N = 56 organizations (boards and TMTs). *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p <.001 
Standardized regression coefficients are reported. 
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FIGURE 4.2 
The Moderating Effect of Openness of Board Composition on the Relationship 
Between Internal Supervision and Board-TMT Relationship Conflict
 
 
Hypothesis 2A predicted that Board-TMT relationship conflict was negatively related 
to TMT reflexivity, and Hypothesis 2B predicted that this relationship was moderated by the 
degree of external supervision, such that this relationship became less strong when external 
supervision increased. Table 4.4 (Model 2) shows no significant direct relationship between 
Board-TMT relationship conflict and TMT reflexivity (β = -.16, p = .15, R2 = .04), hence we 
found no support for Hypothesis 2A. However consistent with Hypothesis 2B, we found a 
significant and positive interaction effect of external supervision and Board-TMT relationship 
conflict on TMT reflexivity (β = .27, p = .03, R2= .10). Simple slope analyses (Aiken & West, 
1991) further confirmed the prediction in Hypothesis 2B, that Board-TMT relationship 
conflict was significantly and negatively related to TMT reflexivity, when external 
supervision was lower (-1 SD: β = -.59, SE = .27, p = .02). This relationship became positive 
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and non-significant when external supervision was higher (+ 1 SD: β = .18, SE = .25, p = 
.23). The graphical representation of the significant interaction effects as depicted in Figure 
4.3, further illustrates a cross-over effect and confirms that the relationship between Board-
TMT relationship conflict and TMT reflexivity became less strong when external supervision 
increased (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Ahearne, & Bommer, 1995). Thus, we find support for 
Hypothesis 2B.  
 





Regression Results for TMT Reflexivity 
Variables Model 1 Model 2   Model 3 
  
 Internal Supervision  0.14 0.17  0.16 
 
Openness of Board Composition  0.03 0.09  0.06 
 
Board-TMT Relationship conflict (BTRC)    -0.16  -0.18 
 
 
External Supervision (ES)  0.02  0.11 
 
 




    
 
 
R2 0.02 0.04  0.10 
 
 
Delta R2   0.02*      0.06*    
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FIGURE 4.3 
The Moderating Effect of External Supervision on the Relationship between Board-
TMT Relationship Conflict and TMT Reflexivity
 
 
In order to test our full model as presented in Hypothesis 3, Table 4.5 presents the 
results of the moderated mediation macro using a bootstrap analysis (Preacher et al., 2007). 
Table 4.5 shows a significant conditional indirect effect of internal supervision on TMT 
reflexivity, through Board-TMT relationship conflict, when board composition was more 
closed indicated by higher minimum tenure (+1 SD), and at lower levels of external 
supervision (-1 SD; conditional indirect effect = -.16). The mediation effect of Board-TMT 
relationship conflict did not occur when board composition was more open and when external 
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TABLE 4.5 
Results for Conditional Indirect Effects on TMT Reflexivity through Board-TMT 
Relationship Conflict 
Conditional Indirect Effect at Openness of Board Composition and 








Bootstrap 95% confidence 
interval 
   lower bound upper bound 
-1 SD (0.46) -1 SD (3.09) -0.01 -.0.20 0.18 
-1 SD (0.46) Mean (4.16) -0.00 -0.10 0.06 
-1 SD (0.46) +1 SD (5.22) 0.00 -0.10 0.11 
Mean (2.29) -1 SD (3.09) -0.08 -0.27 0.03 
Mean (2.29) Mean (4.16) -0.03 -0.14 0.01 
Mean (2.29) +1 SD (5.22) 0.03 -0.03 0.20 
+1 SD (4.11) -1 SD (3.09) -0.16 -0.40 -0.01 
+1 SD (4.11) Mean (4.16) -0.05 -0.19 0.02 
+1 SD (4.11) +1 SD (5.22) 0.06 -0.07 0.31 
 N = 56 organizations (boards and TMTs). Bootstrap sample size is 1.000.   
Bootstrap 95% bias corrected and accelerated confidence interval  
 
DISCUSSION 
Scholars agree that TMT reflexivity is essential for sound strategic decision making 
and can help prevent TMTs from falling prey to decision biases. To safeguard such reflexivity 
TMTs’ decision making is supervised by internal and external supervisory bodies. However, 
there is theoretical debate and little empirical evidence with regard to how internal 
supervision and external supervision, independently and in conjunction, can influence such 
reflexivity, and scholars have therefore called for an integrative approach to study this 
question (e.g., Aguilera et al., 2015). To answer this call, this research combined corporate 
governance literature and social psychology literature to build and test a conceptual model 
that helps to understand when internal supervision is associated with relationship conflict 
between boards and TMTs, and how the openness of board composition can suppress this 
relationship. Moreover, our study further examines how external supervision, if this conflict 
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does occur, can subsequently mitigate the negative relationship between conflict and TMT 
reflexivity.  
Across a large field study among supervisory boards and TMTs of 56 insurance 
companies, in line with our predictions, we found that internal supervision by boards was 
positively related to Board-TMT relationship conflict, and that this relationship was 
moderated by the openness of board composition, such that this effect became less strong 
when board composition was more open (i.e., new members have entered the board recently). 
We did not find the proposed direct negative effect of Board-TMT relationship conflict on 
TMT reflexivity. As predicted, however, this relationship hinged on external supervision and 
Board-TMT relationship conflict had a less negative impact on TMT reflexivity when 
external supervision increased. Together, our findings demonstrated that internal supervision 
indirectly reduces TMT reflexivity, through Board-TMT relationship conflict, and this 
mediation was conditional on the openness of board composition and external supervision.  
 
Theoretical Implications  
The current study has several theoretical implications for the broad array of corporate 
governance and TMT reflexivity literature. First, our study is the first to test the independent 
effects of internal and external supervision on TMT reflexivity, and thereby provides insights 
into the fundamental debate between agency and stewardship theory. In this debate, agency 
theory, on the one hand, proposes that internal supervision and external supervision can help 
to align the inherent differences between the interests of boards and TMTs, and prevent TMTs 
from falling prey to decision biases that harm balanced TMT decision making (e.g., Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; Ward et al., 2009). Stewardship theory, on the other hand, argues that 
frequent supervision, particularly internal supervision, may trigger interpersonal tensions 
between boards and TMTs, which, in turn, can undermine TMTs’ motivation to make 
decisions in the interest of the organization (e.g., Davis et al., 1997; Donaldson & Davis, 
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1991). Our results show that internal supervision indeed indirectly, via Board-TMT 
relationship conflict, negatively affects TMT reflexivity, unless boards have a relatively open 
composition. External supervision can mitigate these negative effects, such that it can 
safeguard that TMT reflexivity maintains a sufficient level when Board-TMT relationship 
conflict does occur. Our results thus imply that each supervision body can have a positive 
influence on TMT reflexivity, but under different circumstances. This means that governance 
scholars need to take these distinct effects of internal and external supervision on TMT 
reflexivity into account to fully understand the effectiveness of supervision activities (Frink & 
Klimoski, 2004; Pennington & Schlenker, 1999).  
Generally, our results for internal supervision seem to speak more in favor of 
stewardship theory. As we find that internal supervision can lead to relationship conflict 
between boards and TMTs (e.g., Davis et al., 1997; Kellermanns & Eddleston, 2004), 
especially when boards are relatively closed, and consequently can harm TMT reflexivity. 
Our findings add insights to stewardship theory, and show that Board-TMT relationship 
conflict is a key underlying mechanism explaining why internal supervision can reduce TMT 
reflexivity. This notion is touched upon by scholars relying on stewardship theory, but it is 
not yet fully explored in related research (Eddleston & Kellermanns, 2007). Our work thus 
illustrates the importance of relationship conflict for future research regarding the 
propositions of the stewardship perspective. 
More specifically, our research helps solve the debate about the effectiveness of 
supervision and examines earlier neglected contingencies that explain when internal 
supervision is associated with Board-TMT relationship conflict and, subsequently, how 
external supervision is associated with TMT reflexivity. These contingencies have several 
implications. As for internal supervision, our results imply that it does not only matter how 
supervisory boards perform this internal supervision of TMTs (Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 
2003), it also matters how boards are composed. An open board composition prevents the 
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development of strict values and makes boards more open to differences in values with TMTs, 
which can prevent the rise of interpersonal tensions during the supervision process. This result 
also resonates well with recent corporate governance literature suggesting that board 
compositional characteristics play a role beyond board members’ independence (Johnson, 
Schnatterly, & Hill, 2013). In this regard, some scholars argue that board member rotation 
may limit the board’s ability to acquire relevant firm knowledge (Fischer & Pollock, 2004; 
Kor & Sundaramurthy, 2009; Vafeas, 2003). However, our work offers additional evidence 
that putting a maximum on board members’ tenure could increase the effectiveness of internal 
supervision, as the influx of new board members can prevent the development of strained 
relationships with TMT members (Golden & Zajac, 2001; Vafeas, 2003).  
For external supervision, our research implies that once conflict is present, 
independent external supervisory bodies can intervene in such a way that this conflict 
becomes less harmful for TMT reflexivity. Given this influence of external supervisory 
bodies, governance scholars could broaden their scope to include the role of independent 
supervisory institutions more specifically in their research, besides other external governance 
mechanisms (Ward et al., 2009). Moreover, this inclusion helps to build a more integrative 
approach that systematically examines the interdependencies between internal and external 
supervision (Aguilera et al., 2015). For example, based on our findings, it seems that the two 
forms of supervision complement each other in influencing TMTs, and thus can compensate 
for each other’s weaknesses (e.g., Tosi, Katz, & Gomez-Mejia, 1997; Walsh & Seward, 
1990), rather than act as substitutes that are mutually exclusive (e.g., Dalton, Hitt, Certo & 
Dalton, 2007). Thus, our research suggests that internal and external supervision can 
strengthen each other in their joint influence on TMT decision making, and that external 
supervision does not act independently from internal supervision (see also Chapter 2 of this 
dissertation), and we also find this in relation to an important social contextual factor; Board-
TMT relationship conflict (Misangyi & Acharya, 2014; Ward et al., 2009).  
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Strengths, Limitations, and Future Research  
The current research has several strengths. First, our research was based on complete 
psychological questionnaires and matching individual and team-level data from 56 TMTs and 
their supervisory boards that operate in a hierarchical two-tier system within the same 
organization. This is valuable data from real-life and high-level organizational groups that are 
usually hard to access for scientific research. This sample enabled us to gain insight into the 
‘black box’ of the actual behavioral group processes between boards and TMTs (Leblanc & 
Schwartz, 2007). Second, we used multiple sources to assess our psychological measures and 
this reduced common source bias (Podsakoff, Mackenzie, Lee, & Podsakoff, 2003); our 
independent variables (i.e., internal and external supervision, and Board-TMT relationship 
conflict) were rated by board members, our key dependent variable (i.e., TMT reflexivity) 
was rated by TMT members, and one moderator (i.e., openness of board composition) was 
based on archival data.  
However, our research also has some limitations. As our study was cross-sectional in 
nature, it is difficult to make inferences about the direction of causality between our study 
variables. Second, we expect that our results are applicable for all board structures because 
the monitoring tasks studied in this chapter are similar for members of the supervisory board 
in a two-tier board and non-executive directors in a one-tier board. However, some caution 
should be applied when generalizing our findings, since we have studied insurance companies 
with a two-tier board, that are specific to the Netherlands and other Rhineland countries 
(Bezemer et al., 2007). Moreover, there might be some limitation to our measure of Board-
TMT relationship conflict as we only included the ratings provided by supervisory board 
members of the conflict in order to prevent common source issues. We consider this approach 
warranted, because we did measure the conflict experiences of both parties, and find sufficient 
agreement between boards and TMTs on these experiences (Klein, Palmer, & Conn, 2000; 
Richter, Scully, & West, 2005). The use of this measure may, however, explain why we did 
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not find the hypothesized direct relationship between Board-TMT relationship conflict and 
TMT reflexivity. Finally, we realize that by measuring internal and external supervision based 
on their monitoring activities we were not able to capture the complete array of tasks and 
characteristics of internal and external supervisory bodies. This measurement approach fits 
the purpose and scope of the present study, as our measures are validated and frequently used 
in similar research to study supervision through its core monitoring activities (McDonald & 
Westphal, 2010). Nonetheless, future research can use more detailed measures to explore the 
fine-grained effects of different characteristics of internal and external supervisory bodies.  
To address these limitations, future research could consider to further study the 
combinations of used measures and include other board characteristics, to create a more 
complete insight in the studied relationships. For instance, future research could study the 
effects of other board compositional characteristics that are also found to impact intergroup 
conflict, such as educational background or group values (Hambrick et al., 2001; Jehn et al., 
1997; Pelled & Adler, 1994).  
Moreover, there is a large avenue for future research to investigate what specific skills 
and competences internal and external supervisory bodies could develop and use to 
effectively supervise the quality of Board-TMT relationships and influence TMT reflexivity. 
With regard to internal supervision, it would be worthwhile to study what supervisory boards 
can do to keep Board-TMT relationships healthy. One possibility offered by SIT scholars is 
the development of a superordinate identity, in which two different groups adhere to the same 
organizational identity and goals, and this is considered an effective way to prevent intergroup 
conflict (Gaertner, Rust, Dovidio, Bachman, & Anastasio, 1994). Future research could then 
explicitly study the degree to which boards and TMTs consider themselves as in- and 
outgroup, due to internal supervision, and tests whether having a superordinate organizational 
identity can limit the degree of Board-TMT relationship conflict as a result.     
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With regard to external supervision, one can make inferences based on conflict 
research about what an effective intervention for external supervisory bodies can look like. 
For example, external supervisory authorities should have the skills to effectively start a 
dialogue when Board-TMT conflict arises (e.g., Karambayya et al., 1992), as well as the 
expertise to design interventions that stimulate TMT reflexivity through performance 
feedback (e.g. Gurtner et al., 2007). Currently, little is known about the unique skills external 
supervisory bodies use in their interventions and their effectiveness. Therefore, this would be 
a fruitful question for future research. 
 
Practical Implications  
Our findings have practical implications for organizations and supervisory authorities 
that offer policy makers concrete tools to improve internal and external supervision, in order 
to realize healthy boardroom dynamics and enhance TMT reflexivity. First, with regard to the 
composition of supervisory boards, our results imply that a more dynamic and diverse 
succession plan for supervisory board members should be used, and this might require 
amending governance rules regarding supervisory board tenure, which ensures the timely and 
frequent appointment of new members and rotation within internal supervisory boards 
(Vafeas, 2003). Moreover, these findings imply that effective internal supervision also entails 
managing the relationship with TMTs, which requires the specific attention of supervisory 
boards and skills to effectively deal with conflict.  
Second, external supervisory authorities should actively monitor whether there are 
first signs of relational tensions between boards and TMTs. Accordingly, increased external 
supervision activities can include a risk-assessment of TMT relationships with their boards 
and determine its impact on board effectiveness. When Board-TMT relationship conflict is 
already present external supervisory bodies should actively intervene to prevent that TMT 
reflexivity will be reduced, act as mediators (Karambayya et al., 1992), and employ tailored 
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interventions to increase TMT reflexivity that includes performance feedback (Gurtner et al., 
2007; Peterson & Behfar, 2003). 
 
Conclusion  
In short, our study shows when internal supervision is associated with relationship 
conflict between boards and TMTs, and how external supervision can subsequently mitigate 
the negative effects of such conflict on TMT reflexivity. Our research shows that relational 
Board-TMT conflict due to frequent internal supervision, can be suppressed by adopting an 
open board composition, with new members entering frequently. Once this conflict is present 
we find that external supervisory bodies can act to make this conflict become less harmful for 
TMT reflexivity. Our study provides important insights for organizations, supervising 
authorities, and policy makers, to ensure that the combination of internal and external 
supervision safeguards TMT reflexivity, and reduces the potential for Board-TMT 
relationship conflict. 
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APPENDIX 4A 
Survey Measures, References and Rating Sources 
Survey measures conceptual model part 1 Reference Sources 
Internal TMT supervision  
1. To what extent does the supervisory board 
monitor the strategic decision making of the top 
management team? 
2. [In the past twelve months:] how often did 
the supervisory board asked for revisions of a 
proposed risk mitigating measures by the top 
management team?  
3. To what extent does the supervisory board 
request information to evaluate the risk 
assessment of the top management team? 
McDonald and Westphal 
(2010) 
Directors 
Board-TMT relationship conflict 
1. How much relationship tension is there 
between the top management team and the 
supervisory board?  
2. How often do the top management team and 
the supervisory board get angry during 
meetings? 
3. How much emotional conflict is there 
between the top management team and the 
supervisory board? 
Jehn and Mannix (2001) Directors  
Survey measures conceptual model part 2   
External TMT supervision 
1. To what extent does DNB monitor the 
strategic decision making of the top 
management team? 
2. [In the past twelve months:] how often did 
DNB insist on revisions of a proposed risk 
mitigating measures by the top management 
team? 
McDonald and Westphal 
(2010) 
Directors 
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3. To what extent does DNB request 
information to evaluate the risk assessment of 
the top management team? 
TMT Reflexivity 
1. We regularly discuss whether the top 
management team is working together 
effectively. 
2. We regularly have critical discussions how 
the top management team operates. 
3. The objectives of the top management team 
are regularly critically discussed. 
4. In this top management team we adapt our 
objectives in light of changing circumstances. 
5. The methods of the top management team 
are rarely changed. (R) 
6. We discuss regularly the extent to which 
information is well shared within the top 
management team. 
7. The way decisions are made in this team is 
rarely altered.(R) 
8. We regularly reflect on the way in which 
decisions are made. 













Mean S.D. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
               
1. TMT size 2.46 1.06 
            
2. Number of females in TMT 0.07 0.16 .15 
           
3. TMT age 52.35 5.21 .21 - .08 
          
4. Openness of TMT      
    composition 
4.19 3.62 -.25 -.19 .38** 
         
5. Board size 3.98 1.51 .13 -.12 -.04 .01 
        
6. Board age 57.78 5.19 -.16 .11 -.09 .07 -.00 
       
7. Openness of board            
    composition 
2.33 1.86 .24 .07 .43** .34* -.26 .06 
      
8. Number of females in board 0.13 0.18 -.04 -.12 -.18 -.11 .34* -.14 -.27* 
     
9. TMT reflexivity 4.92 0.71 -.04 -.03 .15 .10 -.16 -.05 -.00 .22 
    
10. Board-TMT relationship   
      conflict 
1.76 0.66 .14 -.05 .06 -.02 -.01 .15 .27 -.17 -.13 
   
11. Internal supervision 5.23 0.78 .06 -.03 -.04 -.32* .27 -.08 -.34* .22 .17 .15 
  
12. External supervision 4.17 1.10 .16 .02 .07 -.01 .42** .18 -.12 .23 .06 .22 .35* 
 
N = 52 *p < .05, **p < .01. 
 
           




Extra Statistical Analyses 
Extra Analysis Including Board-TMT Task Conflict in the Conceptual Model 
To test for an alternative model that assumes that internal supervision is also 
associated with task conflicts between supervisory board and TMT, and can affect TMT 
reflexivity (De Wit, Greer, & Jehn, 2012) we re-ran the analyses for Hypothesis 1A-B, 2A-B 
and 3 with Board-TMT task conflict as mediator. Board-TMT task conflict was measured 
with three adapted items of Jehn and Mannix (2001,. e.g., “How much conflict of ideas is 
there between the top management team and the supervisory board?”, “How frequently do the 
top management team and the supervisory board have work related disagreements?”, “How 
often do the top management team and the supervisory board have content related conflicting 
opinions?”). These items were rated on a 7-point scale (1 = never, 7 = very often), and 
together formed a reliable scale (α = .87). The rwg(j) and ICC1 statistics warranted that the data 
could be aggregated to the team-level (ICC1 = .28, p <.001; compared to a uniform 
distribution, median rwg(j) = .92, mean = .88; compared to a highly skewed distribution, 
median rwg(j) = .77, mean = .60). 
Post hoc analysis showed that Board-TMT task conflict was not a significant mediator 
in this alternative model. We found no significant interactive effect for openness of board 
composition (β = .05, p = .73), and there was also no significant interactive effect for external 
supervision (β = .07, p = .67). The moderated mediation macro of Preacher and colleagues 
(2007) with Board-TMT task conflict as mediator showed no significant interactions and no 
significant mediation for any level of the moderators, because the bootstrap analysis yielded a 
confidence interval that contained zero (N = 56; 1000 re-samples). 
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Extra Analysis including Control Variable Openness of TMT Composition  
To further test the robustness of our effects, we also re-ran all analyses reported in this 
chapter with the openness of TMT composition as extra control variable. Including this 
variable the results remain consistent with the results found for Hypotheses 1A-B, 2A-B and 
3, and did not change our results significantly. We found a significant and positive direct 
relationship between internal supervision and Board-TMT relationship conflict (β = .26, p = 
.03, R2 = .15). We also found significant interactive effects of openness of board composition 
on the relationship between internal supervision and Board-TMT relationship conflict, (β = 
.26, p = .04, R2 = .20). Again, we found no significant relationship between Board-TMT 
relationship conflict and TMT (β = -.15, p = .17, R2 = .05). We also found a significant 
interactive effect of external supervision on the relationship between Board-TMT relationship 
conflict and TMT reflexivity (β = .30, p = .02, R2 = .12). The Hayes Bootstrapping macro 
shows there was a significant conditional indirect effect of internal supervision on TMT 
reflexivity, through Board-TMT relationship conflict when board composition was more 
closed, indicated by higher minimum tenure (i.e., +1 SD) and lower levels of external 






Numerous events, such as the diesel-emission scandal and the financial crisis 
highlighted in Chapter 1, have illustrated the growing importance of effective internal and 
external supervision for society. Societies trust that internal and external supervisory bodies 
will effectively monitor whether decisions of organizations are sound and will protect the 
long-term interests of all relevant organizational stakeholders, including the general public 
(Aguilera, Desender, Bednar, & Lee, 2015). Although corporate governance literature has 
provided valuable insights into the isolated effects of these two supervisory bodies on the 
performance of organizations as a whole (e.g. Rechner & Dalton, 1991; Tosi, Brownlee, 
Silva, & Katz, 2003), there is still limited theoretical and empirical knowledge about their 
independent and joint effects on the actual decisions made by Top Management Teams 
(TMTs), middle managers and employees (Aguilera et al., 2015).  
Based on an integrative and interdisciplinary literature review, my dissertation 
contributes to corporate governance literature by addressing the following three interrelated 
research gaps: 1) the independent effects of internal and external supervision in comparison to 
each other, as well as their relationship in terms of their joint impact on decision making in 
organizations (Aguilera et al., 2015); 2) the effectiveness of internal supervision by the 
compliance function in conjunction with organizational values, in relation to employee 
decisions (e.g. Daily, Dalton, & Cannella, 2003; Davidson, Dey, & Smith, 2015); and 3) the 
link between structural governance factors, behavioral group processes and TMT decision 
making (e.g. Filatotchev, 2008). To address these gaps, my main research questions are:  
1. How will internal and external supervision, independently and in relation to each 
other, impact decision making of TMTs, middle managers and employees?  
2. What psychological mechanisms explain these effects? and, 
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3. How do contextual factors impact these relationships?  
In this general discussion, I will first discuss the main findings presented in each of the 
empirical chapters (2-4), before I will reflect on the findings in light of the posed research 
questions and the contributions of my research to corporate governance literature. I will 
further discuss the strengths and limitations of the used empirical approach, and I will propose 
avenues for future research. Finally, I will reflect on the practical implications of my research 
for organizations, supervisory bodies, and policymakers to enhance the effectiveness of 
internal and external supervision and their relationship in order to safeguard sound 
organizational decision making. 
 
SUMMARY OF MAIN FINDINGS PER CHAPTER 
The main goal of Chapter 2 was to examine the independent and joint impact of 
internal and external supervision, as well as their respective perceived power, in relation to 
decision making of middle managers and employees. In this chapter, I proposed that internal 
supervisory bodies would have a stronger impact on the decisions of these organization 
members than external supervisory bodies (Brass, Butterfield, & Skaggs, 1998; Emerson, 
1962), because of their higher perceived power levels (Hillman & Dalziel, 2003). 
Specifically, I expected that internal supervisory bodies would be perceived to hold more 
power derived from their formal position as well as their personal characteristics, due to their 
relationship with the organization in terms of its resources and its members (e.g., Brass et al., 
1998). Finally, I explored whether there is an additional value for the combined presence of 
both supervisory bodies.  
I tested these predictions by means of a multi-method research approach, combining a 
field survey among 418 middle managers and employees, and an experimental scenario 
among 62 financial middle managers. The results together revealed that the presence of 
GENERAL DISCUSSION  139 
 
internal supervisory bodies was indeed more strongly related to decisions of middle managers 
and employees than the presence of external supervisory bodies. This stronger relationship for 
internal supervisory bodies was explained by their higher perceived power compared to 
external supervisory bodies, and in particular their power based on formal position, and not 
their power based on personal characteristics. The findings further suggested that the presence 
of both supervisory bodies did not automatically provide additional advantages, as 
organization members primarily responded to the presence of internal supervisory bodies. 
Chapter 3 examined how internal supervision by the compliance function and its 
program of activities (i.e., compliance programs), together with the presence of organizational 
values, impact employees’ decisions. In this chapter, I proposed that the presence of 
compliance programs and organizational values are both related to sound decision making by 
employees (e.g., Kaptein, 2015; Kish-Gephart, Harrison, & Treviño, 2010), and I explored 
whether their joint presence had a stronger effect (Weaver & Treviño, 1999). In this respect, I 
expected that compliance programs and organizational values will both achieve the desired 
behavior that fosters sound decision making (e.g., Weaver & Treviño, 1999), because they 
signal different sources of perceived power of compliance officers over employees’ decision-
making behavior (French & Raven, 2001). Specifically, I predicted that compliance programs 
signal compliance officers’ power based on their position to monitor and sanction rule 
violations (e.g., Tyler & Blader, 2005). Additionally, I proposed that organizational values 
will signal power of compliance officers based on their personal characteristics, because they 
provide organization members with informal guidance to understand the common social 
norms (e.g., Van Knippenberg, 2011). 
I tested these predictions in a field survey among 78 professional compliance officers. 
The results show that either compliance programs or organizational values are related to 
employees’ decision making, but the combined presence of both organizational characteristics 
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did not have a stronger impact. In addition, I find that the relationship between organizational 
values and employee decision making was explained by compliance officers’ perceived power 
based on their personal characteristics. However, the relationship between formal compliance 
programs and employees’ decisions was not explained by compliance officers’ perceived 
power based on their formal position.   
Chapter 4 was designed to examine the link between internal supervision and 
supervisory board composition, as structural governance factor, with intergroup conflict, as 
behavioral group process, and TMT decision making, in relation to the role of external 
supervision. Specifically, I predicted that internal supervision can be related to conflict 
between internal supervisory boards and their TMTs (Board-TMT conflict), but that the 
likelihood of such conflict would be reduced when the structural composition of internal 
supervisory boards included new members who have recently entered the board (e.g., Hogg, 
1992). I also argued that when such conflict would arise it could harm TMT decision making, 
and under such circumstances, external supervision can intervene by increasing their 
monitoring activity and thereby prevent the negative consequences of such conflict (e.g., Jehn 
& Bendersky, 2003).  
I examined these predictions with a multi-level field survey among 111 TMT members 
and 152 internal supervisory board members of 56 insurance companies. The results indicated 
that frequent internal supervision is associated with Board-TMT conflict, but this relationship 
was less strong when TMTs were supervised by boards with new members who entered 
recently. The result showed that when there was Board-TMT conflict, its negative relationship 
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THEORETICAL CONTRIBUTIONS AND IMPLICATIONS 
This dissertation integrates different streams of literature in the disciplines of  
corporate governance, organizational behavior and social psychology. With this integrative 
approach my research provides some important contributions to corporate governance 
literature, and specifically to the debate between agency theory and stewardship theory 
highlighted in Chapter 1. Together my results reveal three common patterns that advance our 
understanding on, 1) the independent impact and relationship of internal and external 
supervision in relation to decision making, 2) the psychological mechanisms that explain 
these effects, and, 3) the impact of contextual factors on these relations. In the following 
sections I will highlight these theoretical contributions as well as the implications of the 
results. 
 
The Independent Impact and Relationship of Internal and External Supervision  
This dissertation provides a more comprehensive understanding of the multiple 
dimensions that comprise the effectiveness of both internal and external supervision, 
independently and together, in relation to the decisions made by TMTs, middle managers and 
employees (Aguilera et al., 2015).  
First, regarding internal supervision, the findings of Chapters 2 and 3 together show 
that internal supervisory bodies’ independent presence and their program of activities are 
directly associated with decisions of middle managers and employees. Moreover, the results 
of Chapter 4 show that the frequency of internal supervision is indirectly associated with 
TMT decision making via Board-TMT conflict. These findings have implications for the 
fundamental debate in corporate governance literature between agency theory (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976) and stewardship theory (Donaldson, 1990; Donaldson & Davis, 1991), 
especially with respect to the unique impact of internal supervision on decision making. On 
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the one hand, the results of Chapters 2 and 3 support assumptions of classical agency theory 
(e.g., Jensen & Meckling, 1976), by indicating that internal supervisory bodies can reduce 
self-serving biases in decision making of organization members. Internal supervision can thus 
have a positive effect, in the sense that individuals will consider more perspectives and make 
more sound decisions as a result (Lerner & Tetlock, 1999). On the other hand, in line with 
stewardship theory (e.g., Donaldson & Davis, 1991), Chapter 4 shows that frequent internal 
supervision can also lead to tensions in the relationship between supervisory boards and 
TMTs, and thereby hamper TMTs’ decision-making abilities. In other words, internal 
supervision can have a negative impact by inducing a threat for TMT decision making (Frink 
& Klimoski, 1998; Hall, Frink, & Buckley, 2017). Hence, my findings show that internal 
supervision can actually trigger both positive and negative effects as predicted by agency 
theory ánd stewardship theory, but that these effects occur under different circumstances.  
Second, Chapter 2 shows that the independent presence of external supervision has a 
limited direct impact on the decisions made by middle managers and employees. This result is 
in line with the argument of agency scholars that external supervisory bodies primarily 
interact with executives, and thus have little contact with other organization members who 
therefore are less aware of the presence of these bodies (Sinclair, 1995). Following this 
reasoning, external supervisory bodies are more likely to have a larger influence on executive 
decisions than on those made by middle managers and employees (Westphal, 1998).  
Finally, with regard to the relationship between internal and external supervision, 
Chapter 2 shows that a) internal supervisory bodies have a stronger impact on decision 
making than external supervisory bodies, and that, b) there is no automatic additional 
advantage of the combined presence of both bodies. In this respect, the results in Chapter 4 do 
suggest, however, that in the case that internal supervision is associated with Board-TMT 
conflict, external supervision can mitigate the negative consequences of such conflict for 
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TMT decision making. These findings provide novel insights to corporate governance 
literature about the relative influence of internal and external supervision. On the one hand, by 
studying the combination of both forms of supervision and thus going beyond the previously 
found isolated effects (e.g., Tosi et al., 2003). On the other hand, by showing that in general 
the decisions of organization members are influenced more by internal supervisory bodies 
than by external supervisory bodies (e.g., Ellemers et al., 1998; Platow & van Knippenberg, 
2001). Moreover, my findings contribute to the current debate in corporate governance 
literature about how internal and external supervision relate to each other, and my results 
tentatively point towards a complementary relationship (e.g., Walsh & Seward, 1990). In the 
sense that, external supervision can compensate for the negative consequences of ineffective 
internal supervision (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992), for example when this results in conflict 
between internal supervisory boards and TMTs. External supervisory bodies can do so by 
actively monitoring and intervening in the situation (Garcia, 2010), but they need to be careful 
not to overstep or substitute internal supervision when it is operating effectively (Frey & 
Jegen, 2001).  
 
What Psychological Mechanisms Explain the Impact and Relationship of Internal and 
External Supervision  
My dissertation also highlights the role of perceived power and intergroup conflict as 
psychological mechanisms, which explain the effectiveness of internal and external 
supervision and the combination of both in relation to decision making (Westphal & Zajac, 
2013).  
First, with regard to power, in Chapters 2 and 3, I demonstrated that high levels of 
perceived power of internal supervision explain its impact on decisions of middle managers 
and employees (e.g., Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003). On the one hand, I found that 
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internal supervisory bodies were perceived to have power, stemming from their formal 
position to administer rewards and sanctions (e.g., Tenbrunsel & Messick, 1999). On the other 
hand, in particular for the compliance function, my results indicate that their perceived power 
was primarily derived from personal characteristics to build trust and relationships with 
organization members (e.g., Ellemers, De Gilder, & Haslam, 2004). Thus, internal 
supervisory bodies can select or combine different sources of powers (French & Raven, 
2001), but the availability of these power sources may differ per internal supervisory body.  
In addition, the findings of Chapter 2 show that external supervision has some 
perceived power in the eyes of middle managers and employees, but neither their perceived 
power levels nor its specific source were directly related to the decisions of these organization 
members. These results challenge traditional views in corporate governance literature that 
external supervisory bodies can effectively influence organizational decision making due to 
their intervention powers (e.g., Barth, Lin, Ma, Seade, & Song, 2013; Laeven & Levine, 
2009). My findings indicate, however, that external supervisory bodies’ perceived power may 
have less impact on decisions of middle managers and employees, as such authorities can only 
exercise their power over these organization members indirectly, for example by fining the 
organization and its operations (Adams & Ferreira, 2012).   
With regard to the combination of internal and external supervision, the results of 
Chapter 2 show that they were also perceived to be relatively powerful when they were both 
present (in terms of position as well as personal power), but this perception did not result in a 
combined stronger impact on organization members’ decision making. When comparing the 
perceived power of the two bodies, my findings show that internal supervisory bodies are 
perceived to have higher power than external supervisory bodies, and therefore these former 
bodies have a stronger impact on organization members’ decisions. This higher perceived 
power of internal supervisory bodies is no surprise from a social psychological perspective 
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(Hillman & Dalziel, 2003; Rus, Van Knippenberg, & Wisse, 2011). Given their position 
within organizations, internal supervisory bodies have more access to organizational 
resources, and can interact more frequently with organization members than a more distant 
external supervisory bodies can (e.g., Brass et al., 1998).  
Second, with respect to conflict, the results of Chapter 4 demonstrated that Board-
TMT conflict is a key mechanism underlying the impact and relationship of internal 
supervision and external supervision in relation to TMT decision making. These findings 
provide preliminary empirical evidence for the theoretical notion that how supervisory boards 
perform their internal supervision impacts their relationship with TMTs, and consequently 
TMT decision making (Eddleston & Kellermanns, 2007). Subsequently, my results suggest 
that external supervision can prevent potential negative consequences for decision making 
when a conflict arises between internal supervisory boards and TMTs. In this respect, my 
dissertation adds insights from conflict research to corporate governance literature (e.g., De 
Dreu, 2010). One the one hand, my research shows the importance of intergroup conflict for 
the effectiveness of internal supervision (Hambrick, Werder, & Zajac, 2008; Hillman, 
Nicholson, & Shropshire, 2008). On the other hand, my findings suggest that external 
supervision, in relation to internal supervision, can act effectively as a third party in Board-
TMT conflicts (Halevy, Halali, & Zlatev, 2018).  
 
Contextual Factors and the Impact and Relationship of Internal and External 
Supervision  
My dissertation also generated valuable insights into the moderating role of certain 
contextual factors, which determine the independent impact and interplay of internal and 
external supervision in relation to decision making (e.g., Filatotchev, 2008; Misangyi & 
Acharya, 2014).  
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First, Chapter 4 shows that the team composition of internal supervisory boards is an 
important structural governance factor that determines the independent impact of internal 
supervision on TMT decisions. When this board composition also includes new members that 
have entered the board recently, the frequency of internal supervision is less related to Board-
TMT conflict. Prior work already showed the relevance of other structural board 
characteristics, such as independence, size, and diversity for effective internal supervision 
(Boivie, Bednar, Aguilera, & Andrus, 2016; Johnson, Schnatterly, & Hill, 2013). My research 
contributes knowledge to this work with regard to the positive effects of board membership 
changes on the relationship of internal supervisory boards with TMTs (for a review, see Rink, 
Kane, Ellemers, & Van der Vegt, 2013). 
Second, another notable finding regarding the relationship between internal and 
external supervision, is that when Board-TMT conflict did arise (due to little membership 
changes in the internal supervisory board) increased external supervision could effectively 
mitigate the potential negative consequences of such conflict for TMT decision making. Thus, 
while prior research primarily identified firm-level contextual factors that may influence the 
relationship between internal and external supervision (Misangyi & Acharya, 2014; Ward, 
Brown & Rodriguez, 2009), I show that also a structural board compositional feature can 
affect the nature of this relationship (Desender, Aguilera, Crespi, & García-Cestona, 2013).  
 
STRENGTHS, LIMITATIONS, AND FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS 
This dissertation has several strengths. First, I deployed a multi-method, multi-level 
research approach, by combining field and experimental studies (Chapter 2-4), and by 
studying decision making at the individual- and team-level (Chapter 2 and 3). Second, I also 
collected data from multiple sources ranging from TMT executives, internal supervisory 
board members, compliance officers, middle managers, and employees. Especially these 
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samples from the top executive level are generally difficult to access for researchers (LeBlanc 
& Schwartz, 2007). Finally, I examined internal and external supervision in general terms in 
Chapter 2 (i.e., accountability to an internal and external supervisory body), and in specific 
terms in Chapter 3 (i.e., the compliance function and its program of activities) and Chapter 4 
(i.e., the internal supervisory board, and an external supervisory body for the financial sector, 
De Nederlandsche Bank). These last two strengths enhanced the external validity of my 
research and the generalizability of the results to a wide range of organizations (Campbell & 
Stanley, 1966). 
Regardless of these strengths, this dissertation also has some methodological 
limitations that are relevant to consider when interpreting the results and also for future 
research. First of all, the limitations of cross-sectional research apply to most studies 
presented in the empirical Chapters 2-4 (except for Study 2.2), limiting the possibility to make 
inferences about causal relationships. To establish causality of the studied relationships 
longitudinal research is needed. Furthermore, most studies were conducted within the 
financial sector in the Netherlands that is regulated by Dutch Financial law (e.g., Financial 
Supervision Act), and this sector is confronted with high levels of internal and external 
supervision. This specific institutional context may have impacted the attitude and responses 
of participants with respect to supervision. Moreover, as stipulated by the Dutch Financial 
Supervision Act (Wft) most financial organizations have a two-tier board structure in which 
the internal supervisory board is separated from the TMT, as is also common in other 
Rhineland countries (Jungmann, 2006; Mallin, 2007). Hence, while I expect that my findings 
are applicable to a wide range of organizations, some caution is advised when generalizing 
these findings to other institutional contexts and/or countries (Bezemer, Maassen, Van den 
Bosch, & Volberda, 2007). 
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Furthermore, this dissertation was limited in the opportunities to gather the type of 
data needed to more objectively study the direct link between decision making and financial 
performance. In my research I focused on decision making as the most reliable proxy for 
organizational performance (Desender et al., 2013; Deutsch, 2005; Kosnik, 1987), and future 
research is still needed to more conclusively establish the direct link between decisions and 
organizational performance by collecting objective financial data (e.g., Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Fredrickson & Mitchell, 1984). To further establish this link, such financial data could be 
combined with valuable outcomes on decision making that can be collected with field surveys 
and experimental scenarios as used in this dissertation, and enriched with other research 
techniques designed to observe actual decision-making behavior, such as participative 
observations of TMT meetings (Jick, 1979).  
Beyond addressing the limitations mentioned above, my research provides interesting 
directions for future research. First, I studied the independent and joint presence of different 
internal and external supervisory bodies, and future research could enrich this knowledge by 
studying the impact of the multitude of supervisory bodies. In reality, multiple internal 
supervisory bodies are present within organizations (i.e., the internal supervisory board, as 
well as the compliance, risk management, and internal audit functions), as well as multiple 
external supervisory bodies with different mandates that are simultaneously supervising the 
same organizations. It is very likely that organization members supervised by multiple 
supervisory bodies experience competing or complementary information requests as well as 
behavioral norms that may undermine supervisory effectiveness (Tetlock, 1992). Research 
confirms this prediction by showing that such a situation may confuse organization members 
to which supervisory body they have to justify what (Tetlock & Boettger, 1994), and makes 
people avoid accountability over their decisions altogether (Green, Visser, & Tetlock, 2000). 
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Hence, future research could study how the presence of multiple internal and external 
supervisory bodies may impact their independent and joint impact on decision making.  
Second, given the attention for unethical behavior after several misconduct scandals, 
future research could investigate more explicitly how supervision can prevent such behavior 
and its consequences. In particular, the results of Chapter 3 provide preliminary insight into 
the influence of internal supervision by the compliance function in relation to such employee 
behavior, together with organizational values. Researchers could expand this work by 
studying the role of the ethical climate in teams, as recent insights show that behavior of team 
members and their manager have a more direct influence on the ethical decisions of 
individuals than collective organizational values do (Ellemers & Van der Toorn, 2015). It is 
argued that such role modelling behavior informs teammates more specifically on what is 
accepted ethical decision-making behavior (Moore & Gino, 2013). Therefore, this team 
climate, which signals whether unethical behavior is normal within the team (Duffy, Scott, 
Shaw, Tepper, & Aquino, 2012; Gino, Ayal, & Ariely, 2009), can determine if certain teams 
within the same organization are more or less prone to display unethical behavior (Goldstein, 
Martin, & Cialdini, 2008). Moreover, there is some research that shows the positive effect of 
outside observers, such as supervisors, on ethical behavior, even when unethical behavior is 
common in the group (Gino, Gu, & Zhong, 2009). With this in mind, future research could 
examine the relatively unexplored link between supervision and a team’s ethical climate 
(Scholten, 2018), and how this relates to ethical decision making.  
Third, future research could explore how the availability of resources for internal and 
external supervision impacts supervisory effectiveness. Practical case studies and reports from 
international advisory bodies suggest that an insufficient amount of organizational resources 
for internal and external supervision poses a large threat for adequately performing their daily 
work (Group of Thirty, 2015; Kirkpatrick, 2009; Van Rooij & Fine, 2018). These claims seem 
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to imply that higher quantities of organizational resources would automatically make internal 
and external supervision more effective. Whilst my research shows that it may actually be the 
quality of organizational resources that these supervisory bodies control, in terms of their 
economic and social value, which provides them with social power over organization 
members’ decisions (French & Raven, 2001; Keltner et al., 2003). The foregoing begs the 
question of whether having access to the right type of resources and thus social power can 
make supervisory bodies effective with less resources, or whether there is a threshold amount 
of resources that is always necessary to perform supervision. Future research could then 
examine how the quality and quantity of resources are both related to supervisory 
effectiveness.  
Fourth, my research in Chapter 4 on Board-TMT conflict suggests that the quality of 
the relationship between supervisory bodies and the groups they supervise is an important 
mechanism underlying supervisory effectiveness. Future research could extend these findings, 
by studying the role of trust in the supervisory relationship for both internal and external 
supervisory bodies (Six, 2013). Trust scholars argue that members of supervised 
organizations perceive trust when they share fundamental values with the supervisory body, 
and if they are treated fairly and with respect when these bodies enact procedures (Tyler & 
Huo, 2002). If so, members will repay this felt trust by increasing cooperation with the 
supervisory body (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994). Research indeed shows that such trust leads to 
achieving supervisory outcomes, such as enhanced voluntary compliance of organizations 
with the rules (e.g., Braithwaite & Makkai, 1994; Murphy, 2004b), and more disapproval of 
rule-breaking by organization members (Mulder, Verboon, & De Cremer, 2009). Despite this 
evidence, there is still debate among scholars how trust and supervision exactly relate to each 
other (Six, 2010), and future research is necessary to study how the degree of trust in the 
supervisory relationship explains internal and external supervisory bodies’ effectiveness.  
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PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS 
Effective internal and external supervision are both important to safeguard sound 
decision making in organizations in order to protect the interests of organizational 
stakeholders, including the general public (Aguilera et al., 2015). Based on the presented 
findings, I will discuss several practical recommendations that can give guidance to enhance 
the independent effectiveness of, and optimize the relationship between, internal and external 
supervision in relation to decision making in organizations.  
A first practical recommendation that can be derived from my research, is that internal 
supervision performed by different supervisory bodies, ranging from internal supervisory 
boards to the compliance function, has a large influence and perceived power over decision 
making of TMTs, middle managers and employees in organizations. Important factors that 
contribute to internal supervisory effectiveness are, amongst others, 1) the presence and 
activities of internal supervisory bodies, 2), internal supervisory bodies’ perceived power and 
its sources, 3) the composition of the internal supervisory board, and, last but not least, 4) the 
relationship between these boards and TMTs. For each of these factors, I will provide some 
examples for possible courses of action that organizations and internal supervisory bodies can 
pursue to enhance the effectiveness of internal supervision.  
A first step that organizations can take, is to assess organization members’ awareness 
of the presence and activities of different internal supervisory bodies within the organization. 
If these bodies are perceived to be (nearly) absent, organizations can start by installing some 
form of internal supervision (e.g., an internal supervisory board and/or a compliance 
function). Internal supervisory bodies can also enhance awareness of their presence through 
the activities they perform. Especially for the compliance function, my research highlights the 
value of a multi-facetted compliance program of activities. If such a compliance program is 
not yet in place or limited in scope, organizations can start with implementing a program or 
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extend the existing program, to include, for example, a code of conduct, policies, awareness 
training, and monitoring (Kaptein, 2015).  
Furthermore, my results indicate that internal supervisory bodies are perceived to have 
high levels of power over decisions of middle managers and employees, but the source of 
power (position or personal based) differs per supervisory body. In an ideal situation, internal 
supervisory bodies would be able to use both power sources in order to select and tailor their 
use to what the situation requires, because in this way they can benefit from both power 
sources’ short- and long-term effects on decision making (Deci, Koestner, & Ryan, 1999; 
French & Raven, 2001). However, internal supervisory bodies can best assess what is 
realistically possible in their situation, and focus on the power source that is available to them.  
Finally, in relation to the composition of the internal supervisory board, my research 
indicates that it is important to have a frequent influx of new directors and thereby maintain a 
certain degree of diversity of tenure within the board composition. Such an influx will prevent 
interpersonal tensions with TMTs, as it stimulates supervisory boards to periodically reflect 
on their group values and to keep an open mind in this respect (Brewer, 2001). Organizations 
for their part, can assess the current tenure distribution and sequence of planned successions 
for the internal supervisory board. Based on this assessment, those responsible can consider to 
put a maximum on director tenure or implement a sequenced rotation of directors to maintain 
a periodic entry of new members (Johnson et al., 2013; Vafeas, 2003).  
With regard to external supervision, my research also provides practical guidance for 
these supervisory bodies and the focus of their activities. My results indicate that the presence 
of external supervisory bodies is not directly related to the decisions of middle managers and 
employees, and these bodies are perceived to have less power than was expected. Instead, my 
findings of Chapter 4 indicate that external supervisory bodies could have an important 
influence when they monitor TMT decisions. Furthermore, this chapter also suggests that 
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external supervision can have a mitigating role when conflicts arise between boards and 
TMTs. In this situation, external supervisory bodies, as part of the risk assessment mentioned 
in Chapter 1 (Financial Stability Board, 2014; Group of Thirty, 2015), could more pro-
actively monitor whether there are signals of tensions in the dynamics between internal 
supervisory boards and TMTs, in order to prevent their consequences for TMT decision 
making (Sparrow, 2008).  
The above insights together also provide feedback on the optimal relationship between 
both supervisory bodies. My findings suggest that it is important for external supervisory 
bodies to build a complementary relationship with internal supervisory bodies. This type of 
interaction would provide room for internal supervisory bodies to use their potential influence 
and available power to effectively impact decisions of organization members, while external 
supervisory bodies can strengthen the effectiveness of internal supervision and intervene 
when necessary. Such a complementary relationship does imply that when internal 
supervision is effective, external supervisory bodies can prevent crowding out of internal 
supervision’s influence by refraining from independent and parallel actions on areas that are 
the primary mandate of internal supervisory bodies (Frey & Jegen, 2001). When internal 
supervision is ineffective, however, external supervisory bodies can take a more active role 
and intervene to address the weaknesses of the respective internal supervisory body (Jehn & 
Bendersky, 2003). For example, by assessing or changing the composition of the internal 
supervisory board to introduce more newcomers (Adams & Ferreira, 2012), and by 
diminishing the strain that Board-TMT conflict may put on TMT decision making through 
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Concluding Remarks  
The emission-scandal and the financial crisis described in Chapter 1 illustrated how 
important effective internal and external supervision are to protect societal interests. My 
dissertation highlights that achieving such supervisory effectiveness is a balancing act, as the 
effectiveness of internal and external supervision is often interrelated, and depends on the 
social processes and structural governance factors in organizations and teams. My findings 
echo the quote from Goethe (1833, Maxim 353) in Chapter 1 about the most effective 
governance being “that which teaches us to govern ourselves”. As I find that internal 
supervision from within the organization has a stronger influence on organizational decisions 
than external supervision as an outside force. Therefore, I argue that external supervision can 
strengthen and complement internal supervision to use its potential influence more 
effectively. This makes me conclude that both supervisory bodies are important in their own 
right, yet they could govern themselves more effectively, and reinforce each other in their 
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Effectief intern en extern toezicht zijn beide essentieel om zorgvuldige besluitvorming 
binnen organisaties te waarborgen, zodat de organisatie- en maatschappelijke belangen 
worden beschermd. De noodzaak van, en de aandacht voor, effectief intern en extern toezicht 
zijn nog eens versterkt door de recente emissieschandalen in de auto-industrie, bijvoorbeeld 
bij Volkswagen, en eerder ook door de financiële crisis. In 2015 kwam aan het licht dat 
Volkswagen software gebruikte om te verhullen dat de uitstoot van schadelijke gassen 
(stikstofoxide) door haar ogenschijnlijk 'schone’ dieselauto's hoger was dan volgens de regels 
was toegestaan. Uit dit voorbeeld blijkt dat de drie hoofdverantwoordelijke partijen, te weten 
het Top Management Team (TMT; Raad van Bestuur), bestaande uit de bestuurders waarbij 
de strategische besluitvorming was belegd, en zowel het interne als het externe 
toezichthoudende orgaan dat die besluitvorming had moeten controleren, hun 
verantwoordelijkheden niet of slechts gedeeltelijk hebben uitgevoerd. Tijdens de financiële 
crisis (2007-2009), een gebeurtenis die zowel de hele financiële sector als de maatschappij 
schokte, openbaarden zich soortgelijke problemen. Hiervoor wordt ook het falen van de 
corporate governance als een van de voornaamste oorzaken genoemd, voornamelijk het niet-
effectieve functioneren van en de moeizame verhouding tussen Top Management Teams en 
de interne en externe toezichthoudende organen.  
Een dergelijk falen van interne en externe toezichthoudende organen is een groot 
probleem voor de maatschappij, aangezien zij erop moet kunnen vertrouwen dat deze organen 
de zorgvuldigheid van de besluitvorming van organisaties effectief bewaken en de daarmee 
gemoeide langetermijnbelangen van alle relevante belanghebbenden - waaronder ook de 
maatschappij - beschermen. Interne toezichthoudende organen worden formeel door de 
organisatie zelf ingesteld om in de gaten te houden dat de besluitvorming het belang van de 
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organisatie en al haar stakeholders dient. Voorbeelden van deze organen zijn de Raad van 
Commissarissen (RvC) en de compliance functie. Externe toezichthoudende organen zijn door 
de overheid ingestelde instanties, zoals inspectoraten (bijvoorbeeld de Belastingdienst) en 
onafhankelijke markt autoriteiten (bijvoorbeeld toezichthouders op de financiële sector). Deze 
externe toezichthoudende organen controleren of de besluitvorming van organisaties voldoet 
aan wet- en regelgeving en het maatschappelijke belang waarborgt. De bovengenoemde 
voorbeelden, het emissie-schandaal en de financiële crisis, roepen de vraag op: wat maakt elk 
toezichthoudend orgaan afzonderlijk en in combinatie effectief in relatie tot besluitvorming in 
organisaties? Deze vraag staat centraal in dit proefschrift. 
Dit proefschrift is het resultaat van een gezamenlijk onderzoeksproject van De 
Nederlandsche Bank (DNB) en de Rijksuniversiteit Groningen. Vanwege deze combinatie 
vormt de Nederlandse financiële sector het specifieke kader voor mijn onderzoek en hierdoor 
heb ik voornamelijk financiële ondernemingen onderzocht waar sprake is van een dualistisch 
(‘two-tier’) bestuursmodel. In Nederland is een dergelijk bestuursmodel het meest 
gebruikelijk en op grond van de Wet financieel toezicht (Wft) zelfs verplicht voor veel 
financiële ondernemingen. In dit model is sprake van een Raad van Bestuur, oftewel het Top 
Management Team, als uitvoerend orgaan, en een Raad van Commissarissen, als 
toezichthoudend orgaan, die formeel structureel van elkaar gescheiden zijn. Aangezien de 
verdeling van werkzaamheden van uitvoerende en toezichthoudende bestuursleden in een 
monistisch (‘one-tier’) bestuursmodel vergelijkbaar zijn met die in een dualistisch model, 
verwacht ik dat mijn onderzoek ook in grote mate van toepassing is op organisaties met een 
dergelijk bestuursmodel.  
De bestaande corporate governance literatuur biedt waardevolle inzichten in de 
effecten die interne en externe toezichthoudende organen afzonderlijk van elkaar hebben op 
de financiële prestaties van organisaties als geheel. De theoretische en empirische kennis 
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omtrent de afzonderlijke én de gecombineerde effecten van beide vormen van toezicht op de 
daadwerkelijke besluitvorming door Top Management Teams, middenmanagers en 
werknemers is vooralsnog echter beperkt. Mijn proefschrift beoogt bij te dragen aan de 
volgende lacunes in de huidige literatuur: 1) de invloed van intern en extern toezicht op de 
besluitvorming binnen organisaties, zowel afzonderlijk als in onderlinge samenhang; 2) de 
invloed van intern toezicht uitgevoerd door de compliance functie, in combinatie met 
contextuele factoren, zoals de organisatiewaarden, op de besluitvorming door werknemers; en 
3) het verband tussen intern toezicht door de RvC, structurele governance-factoren zoals de 
samenstelling van de RvC, en gedragsmatige groepsprocessen zoals conflict met 
besluitvorming door het TMT. In de 3 empirische hoofdstukken draag ik hieraan bij door te 
onderzoeken hoe, waarom, en wanneer intern en extern toezicht, afzonderlijk en in 
combinatie, de besluitvorming door Top Management Teams, middenmanagers en 
werknemers beïnvloeden. De belangrijkste uitkomsten bespreek ik hieronder per hoofdstuk, 
met ieder hun respectievelijke focus op deze verschillende groepen in organisaties.  
 
De afzonderlijke en gecombineerde invloed van intern en extern toezicht 
In hoofdstuk 2 onderzoek ik wat de afzonderlijke en gecombineerde invloed van intern 
en extern toezicht is op de besluitvorming door middenmanagers en werknemers. Ook 
bestudeer ik of de mate en soorten van macht waar deze organen over beschikken hun invloed 
kunnen verklaren. Ik verwacht dat interne toezichthoudende organen een sterkere invloed 
hebben op de beslissingen van organisatieleden dan externe toezichthoudende organen, 
vanwege de hogere mate van macht waarover ze beschikken in de ogen van deze 
organisatieleden. In dit hoofdstuk beargumenteer ik in het bijzonder dat deze interne 
toezichthoudende organen meer macht wordt toegedicht, op basis van zowel hun formele 
positie als de persoonskenmerken van de betreffende toezichthouders. Deze toegedichte 
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macht wordt bepaald door de toegang die dergelijke organen hebben tot belangrijke 
organisatiemiddelen en hun mogelijkheden tot interactie en het opbouwen van relaties met 
organisatieleden. Tot slot onderzoek ik of de gecombineerde aanwezigheid van beide 
toezichthoudende organen meerwaarde heeft in relatie tot besluitvorming van 
middenmanagers en werknemers.  
Ik heb deze veronderstellingen getoetst aan de hand van verschillende 
onderzoeksmethodes, waarbij ik een veldstudie onder 418 middenmanagers en werknemers 
heb gecombineerd met een experimentele scenario-studie onder 62 financiële 
middenmanagers. Uit de uitkomsten tezamen komt naar voren dat er inderdaad een sterker 
verband is tussen de enkele aanwezigheid van interne toezichthoudende organen en de 
besluitvorming door middenmanagers en werknemers dan de enkele aanwezigheid van 
externe toezichthoudende organen. Zoals verwacht wordt dit sterkere verband verklaard door 
de hogere gepercipieerde mate van macht van interne toezichthoudende organen in 
vergelijking met die van externe toezichthoudende organen. Echter, dit komt voornamelijk 
door de macht die deze organen ontlenen aan hun formele positie, en niet zozeer aan hun 
persoonskenmerken. Verder laten de resultaten zien dat de gecombineerde aanwezigheid van 
beide toezichthoudende organen geen automatische meerwaarde heeft, aangezien 
organisatieleden voornamelijk op de aanwezigheid van interne toezichthoudende organen 
reageren. 
 
Intern toezicht en de rol van organisatiewaarden 
In hoofdstuk 3 onderzoek ik de invloed van intern toezicht door de compliance functie 
en haar activiteiten (compliance programma’s) in samenhang met de aanwezigheid van 
organisatiewaarden, in relatie tot de besluitvorming door werknemers. Ik verwacht dat de 
aanwezigheid van compliance programma’s en organisatiewaarden beide verband houden met 
SUMMARY  203 
 
zorgvuldige besluitvorming door werknemers, en ik onderzoek of hun gezamenlijke 
aanwezigheid een sterker effect heeft. Ik verwacht dat deze effecten zich voordoen doordat 
zowel compliance programma’s als organisatiewaarden het signaal afgeven dat de compliance 
officers macht hebben over het gedrag van werknemers, en dat deze macht aan verschillende 
bronnen kan worden ontleend. In dit verband beargumenteer ik dat compliance programma’s 
kunnen signaleren dat compliance officers macht hebben op basis van hun functie, omdat ze 
door middel van deze programma’s naleving van de regels controleren en indien nodig 
bestraffen. Organisatiewaarden, op hun beurt, kunnen het signaal afgeven dat compliance 
officers macht hebben op basis van hun persoonskenmerken, doordat ze die inzetten om 
informele ondersteuning te geven aan werknemers om zo de geldende sociale normen te 
helpen begrijpen.  
Ik heb deze veronderstellingen getoetst in een veldstudie onder 78 compliance 
officers. De resultaten laten zien dat zowel de aanwezigheid van compliance programma's als 
die van organisatiewaarden invloed hebben op de besluitvorming door werknemers, maar dat 
hun combinatie geen grotere invloed heeft. Daarnaast blijkt dat het verband tussen de 
organisatiewaarden en besluitvorming door werknemers wordt verklaard door de macht van 
compliance officers op grond van hun persoonskenmerken. Tegelijkertijd wordt het verband 
tussen formele compliance programma's en besluitvorming niet verklaard door de macht van 
compliance officers op grond van hun formele functie.  
 
Intern en extern toezicht en de rol van de structurele samenstelling van de RvC en RvC-
TMT-conflict  
In hoofdstuk 4 onderzoek ik het verband tussen enerzijds intern toezicht en de 
samenstelling van de RvC als structurele governance-factor, alsmede met conflict als 
onderliggend gedragsmatig groepsproces, en anderzijds besluitvorming door het TMT, in 
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relatie tot extern toezicht. In dit hoofdstuk beargumenteer ik dat intern toezicht kan leiden tot 
een conflict tussen de RvC en het TMT (RvC-TMT-conflict), maar dat er minder kans op een 
dergelijk conflict is wanneer de structurele samenstelling van de RvC ook nieuwe leden bevat 
die recentelijk zijn toegetreden. Bovendien verwacht ik dat een dergelijk conflict de 
besluitvorming door het TMT kan schaden, en dat onder die omstandigheden het externe 
toezicht kan ingrijpen door hun toezicht te intensiveren en op die manier de negatieve 
uitwerking van een dergelijk conflict kan voorkomen.  
Deze veronderstellingen heb ik getoetst in een veldstudie onder 111 TMT-leden en 
152 RvC-leden van 56 verzekeringsmaatschappijen. Uit de uitkomsten blijkt dat intensief 
intern toezicht inderdaad kan leiden tot een conflict tussen de RvC en het TMT, maar dat dit 
minder vaak het geval is wanneer een TMT onder toezicht staat van een RvC met nieuwe 
leden die recent waren toegetreden. Als een dergelijk conflict zich wel voordoet, dan is de 
negatieve impact hiervan op de besluitvorming van TMTs minder sterk wanneer het externe 
toezicht verhoogd is door actief op te treden.  
 
Conclusie en bijdrage aan theorie en praktijk 
Mijn proefschrift geeft aan dat het bereiken van effectief toezicht een balanceer act is. 
Uit mijn onderzoek blijkt namelijk dat de effectiviteit van intern en extern toezicht met elkaar 
samenhangt, en mede wordt bepaald door de groepsprocessen en structurele governance-
factoren die een rol spelen binnen organisaties en teams. De bevindingen laten zien dat intern 
toezicht een sterkere invloed en meer macht heeft in relatie tot de besluitvorming binnen een 
organisatie dan extern toezicht. Voor de effectiviteit van extern toezicht lijkt het dus vooral 
van belang om een complementaire relatie op te bouwen met het interne toezicht. Dit betekent 
dat het externe toezicht zich enerzijds richt op het versterken van het interne toezicht, zodat 
die haar potentiële invloed effectief kan uitoefenen, en anderzijds actief optreedt op het 
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moment dat intern toezicht niet voldoende effectief opereert.  
Dit proefschrift integreert verschillende literatuurstromen binnen de disciplines van 
corporate governance, organisatiegedrag en sociale psychologie en levert daarmee een 
belangrijke bijdrage aan de literatuur over corporate governance. Deze aanpak was cruciaal 
om een diepgaander inzicht te verkrijgen in de verschillende dimensies van de effectiviteit 
van intern en extern toezicht, zowel afzonderlijk als in onderlinge samenhang. De resultaten 
van mijn onderzoek maken drie patronen zichtbaar die meer inzicht bieden in, 1) de invloed 
van intern en extern toezicht op de besluitvorming binnen organisaties, zowel afzonderlijk als 
in combinatie; 2) de psychologische mechanismen die deze invloed kunnen verklaren; en 3) 
de invloed van context factoren op deze relaties. Daarnaast geven deze bevindingen 
praktische inzichten voor organisaties, toezichthoudende organen en beleidsmakers om de 
effectiviteit van intern en extern toezicht te vergroten en hun onderlinge verhouding te 
optimaliseren, zodat deze organen elkaar vanuit hun verschillende rollen kunnen versterken 









EPILOGUE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
Ik ben enorm trots dat dit proefschrift nu voor u ligt, het tastbare resultaat van jaren 
onderzoek en hard werken. Ik heb vaak gedacht dat ik er bijna was, en soms vroeg ik me af of 
het wel zou lukken. De reis om hier uiteindelijk te komen was bijzonder, met de nodige 
hobbels en kronkels, die mij zowel professioneel als persoonlijk gevormd heeft, en mijn 
onderwerpkeuze heeft beïnvloed. Daarom wil ik u eerst meenemen in de weg die ik met dit 
proefschrift heb afgelegd, waarna ik overga tot mijn dankwoord te richten aan hen die hier 
een belangrijke bijdrage aan hebben geleverd. Dit zijn mijn woorden, recht uit het hart.  
Ik heb een enorme fascinatie voor gedrag in organisaties en psychologie, en de drang 
om het ‘waarom’ achter dit gedrag te onderzoeken zat er al vroeg in. Deze interesse blijkt ook 
uit mijn uiteindelijke studiekeuze voor bedrijfskunde (al had dit ook zomaar de hotelschool 
kunnen zijn) en mijn verdere specialisaties in verandermanagement en Human Resource 
Management. Toen me werd gevraagd of ik wilde promoveren was ik snel om, helemaal toen 
het mogelijk was om dit te combineren met een baan bij De Nederlandsche Bank (DNB).  
Het bleek, vanuit mijn optiek, ook nog eens te gaan om een unieke baan, als 
toezichthouder bij het expertisecentrum voor gedrag en cultuur bij DNB. De oprichting van 
dit expertisecentrum kwam voort uit inzichten door de financiële crisis, met als doel om meer 
preventief op te kunnen treden, voordat problemen zich voordoen. Dit betekende een 
verandering in het toezicht waardoor er, naast financiële cijfers en ratio’s, ook meer expliciete 
aandacht kwam voor risico’s op het gebied van governance, gedrag en cultuur, en de 
ontwikkeling van de benodigde expertise en methodologie voor de beoordeling hiervan. Ik 
voel me bevoorrecht dat ik hierdoor de mogelijkheid kreeg om bij DNB en het 
expertisecentrum te gaan werken, en zo onderdeel ben geworden van een eerste stroming 
gedragskundigen en sociaal psychologen in het toezicht. Ik heb de afgelopen jaren de 
aandacht voor governance, gedrag en cultuur enorm zien groeien, in de financiële sector en 
208   EPILOGUE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
daarbuiten, en bij andere toezichthouders in binnen- en buitenland. Ik ben enorm trots dat ik 
vanaf het begin betrokken mocht zijn bij deze nieuwe vorm van toezicht.  
DNB bood me daarnaast de mogelijkheid om het werk van toezichthouder te 
combineren met het doen van wetenschappelijk onderzoek. Deze positie bij DNB is een grote 
inspiratie geweest voor mijn onderzoek naar de impact en verhouding van intern en extern 
toezicht, in relatie tot besluitvorming in organisaties. Dit bleek een relevant vraagstuk, vanuit 
de toezichtspraktijk in verschillende domeinen, en ook vanuit de theorie en wetenschap zijn 
hier nog veel vragen over te beantwoorden. Met dit proefschrift hoop ik aan beide een 
waardevolle bijdrage te leveren, mede door het genereren van praktische toepasbare inzichten 
die de effectiviteit van het interne en het externe toezicht, en hun relatie, verder kunnen 
vergroten. Het schrijven van een proefschrift naast een interessante en uitdagende baan is 
geen makkelijke opgave, wat in mijn geval daardoor misschien ook ‘iets’ langer heeft 
geduurd. Toch had ik het niet anders willen doen.  
Voor het mogelijk maken van dit buitengewone promotietraject, een samenwerking 
tussen De Nederlandsche Bank en de Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, wil ik allereerst de 
volgende mensen bedanken. Ik dank DNB, en in het bijzonder Wijnand en Jakob, voor deze 
unieke kans. Wijnand, jouw steun was onmisbaar voor dit traject en de succesvolle afronding 
ervan. Ik ben je zeer dankbaar voor je continue aanmoediging gedurende dit hele proces, en 
dat je me alle nodige tijd hebt geboden om dit proefschrift te schrijven naast mijn 
toezichtswerk. Jakob, dankzij jouw steun heb ik de mogelijkheid gekregen om binnen DNB 
sociaalpsychologisch onderzoek te doen, en ik ben dankbaar voor je begrip en steun voor de 
‘militaire operatie’ die nodig was voor het uitvoeren van dit project.  
Daarnaast wil ik graag mijn dank richten tot mijn promotoren, Janka en Floor. Dank, 
dat jullie de mogelijkheid om te promoveren op mijn pad hebben gebracht, en dat jullie het 
avontuur met mij zijn aangegaan als buitenpromovendus, met deze bijzondere constructie. Ik 
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ben dankbaar dat jullie mij de vrijheid hebben gegeven om te komen tot mijn eigen 
onderwerp, met relevantie voor DNB. Daarnaast is dankzij jullie altijd grondige, en soms 
kritische, commentaar alles wat ik heb geschreven scherper en beter geworden. Ik heb veel 
van jullie beide geleerd vanuit jullie complementaire vakgebieden, en jullie ervaring met 
verschillende onderzoekstechnieken en de praktijk is zeer waardevol geweest voor dit 
proefschrift.  
Hier wil ik ook graag de beoordelingscommissie bedanken voor het lezen en 
beoordelen van mijn proefschrift en de nuttige feedback hierop, en ik dank alle leden van de 
Promotiecommissie voor hun deelname. Ik kijk ernaar uit om van gedachten te wisselen over 
mijn proefschrift. Daarnaast ben ik ook veel dank verschuldigd aan iedereen die heeft 
deelgenomen of meegeholpen aan een van mijn onderzoeken.  
Het schrijven van een proefschrift kan soms een eenzaam proces zijn, waarbij deze 
promovendus vaak aan verschillende keukentafels, bureaus, of bibliotheken in Amsterdam en 
Utrecht, of tijdens menig vakantie in binnen- en buitenland, heeft zitten werken. Toch had ik 
dit zeker niet alleen kunnen doen. Door de jaren heen zijn er veel mensen geweest die me 
hebben geholpen, gesteund en gemotiveerd, en die daarmee een belangrijke bijdrage hebben 
geleverd aan de totstandkoming van dit proefschrift. Helaas kan ik niet iedereen noemen. Ik 
wil een aantal mensen in het bijzonder bedanken voor hun steun, liefde en advies tijdens dit 
hele traject, van begin tot eind. 
Ik kan niet anders dan bij het begin te beginnen, met mijn familie. Een woord van 
dank diep uit mijn hart voor mijn lieve ouders, Elly en Steven, die altijd in mij hebben 
geloofd. Ik kan altijd bij jullie terecht voor een wijs advies, luisterend oor of een steuntje in de 
rug. Het is bijna niet in woorden uit te drukken hoe belangrijk jullie voor me zijn en hoe erg 
ik jullie onuitputtelijke liefde en steun waardeer. Van jullie heb ik geleerd om je talenten in te 
zetten en naast hard te werken ook te genieten, en jullie blijven hiervoor een belangrijke bron 
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van inspiratie. Dankzij jullie heb ik altijd de vrijheid gehad om te gaan voor mijn eigen 
interesses, studiekeuzes en daarmee uiteindelijk ook om te gaan promoveren. Nu het eindelijk 
zover is, ben ik ontzettend dankbaar dat ik dit bijzondere moment met jullie allebei kan 
vieren. Ook veel dank lieve Loek en Ro, door de jaren heen zijn jullie uitgegroeid tot 
waardevolle sparringpartners, al begrepen jullie misschien niet altijd waar mijn 
promotieonderzoek nou precies over ging of waarom ik het deed (dat wist ik zelf misschien 
ook niet altijd). Loek, you rock, en dank voor je scherpe visuele- en schrijversblik waarmee je 
me vaak erg hebt geholpen, zeker op het einde met ‘dotting the i’s’ voor het boekje en de 
prachtige cover en foto op de achterkant. Ro, dank je voor hoe je bent, door jouw unieke en 
analytische manier van denken heb je me meer dan eens (misschien onbewust) weer helpen 
nadenken in een oplossing als ik was vastgelopen. Daarnaast wil ik graag alle ooms, tantes, 
neefjes en nichtjes van de families De Waal en Stallen bedanken, voor hun lieve interesse en 
steunbetuigingen voor mijn proefschrift.  
Dan kom ik al snel bij Eva, jij was er namelijk al bij op de basisschool. Toen ging het 
nog om tekenen en veters strikken, daar blonk ik niet zo in uit. Hier werd wel een vriendschap 
voor het leven gevormd, en jij bent mijn ‘oudste’ en dierbaarste vriendin. Ik koester alle 
momenten waarin we lief en leed delen, wat we gelukkig nog steeds vaak doen, als we 
gezellig gaan sporten bij de sportstudio, eten en borrelen!  
Na de middelbare school, via de mavo/havo, ging ik bedrijfskunde studeren aan de 
RuG in het mooie Groningen, samen met Esther en Renske. Jullie begrepen er eigenlijk niets 
van dat ik na twee masterscripties ook nog wilde promoveren, maar dat deed niets af aan jullie 
steun tijdens dit hele traject. Dank jullie wel, voor al die gezellige momenten waarin we altijd 
enorm samen kunnen lachen (‘altijd gezellie’!).  
In Groningen, ontstonden bij Albertus ook bijzondere vriendschappen, met Anna, 
Frederique, Ineke, Judith, Leonie, Margreet, Marieke, Marlous en Nicoline. Nadat we voor 
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een deel uit Groningen vertrokken, en verspreid zijn over het (buiten)land, is het toch gelukt 
om contact te houden, en ik dank jullie allemaal voor jullie lieve interesse in mijn proefschrift 
en alles eromheen.  
Op het interim in Groningen zat ik in het eerste en allermooiste EBF bestuur met Boy, 
Valentijn, Marloes, Dicky, Tim, en ook even met Manon, Niek, Arnold en Albert. Als we 
elkaar zien is het ouderwets gezellig, en dank voor jullie steun door de jaren heen!  
Na Groningen heb ik Amsterdam in mijn hart gesloten. Daar trof ik ook Darja, eerst 
huisgenoot in Groningen en uiteindelijk ‘buurvrouw’ in Amsterdam, dank voor alle gezellige 
avonden en mooie gesprekken. Ik heb het geluk dat ik op de mooiste plek aan het IJ mag 
wonen, en daar een hele gezellige tijd heb gedeeld met de lieve OHK’ers Marjolein, Anneloes 
en Linda. Ook al wonen we nu allemaal ergens anders, we zien elkaar als het kan. Ik koester 
jullie vriendschap, en veel dank voor de gezelligheid, ‘zen’ en ontspanning tijdens onze 
heerlijke yoga-weekenden.  
Er zijn ook een aantal vriendschappen en relaties begonnen en helaas ook geëindigd 
tijdens mijn promotietraject. Dat is verdrietig en tegelijkertijd een onvermijdelijk onderdeel 
van het leven. Desalniettemin wil ik ook hen bedanken voor hun steun en liefde in die 
betreffende periode, die heb ik zeer gewaardeerd.  
Dan zijn er nog een heleboel collega’s van DNB die ik wil bedanken, al kan ik niet 
iedereen noemen. Allereerst wil ik al mijn huidige en oud collega’s van het expertisecentrum 
governance, gedrag en cultuur bedanken (ook van voorganger COI), waar ik mee heb 
samengewerkt en van heb mogen leren de afgelopen jaren. Dank, voor het mooie werk dat we 
samen hebben gedaan, en voor de avonturen die we met elkaar hebben beleefd in Nederland 
en ook internationaal. Speciale dank aan de ‘pioniers’, Wijnand, Esther, Evert, Mirea, 
Mélanie, Wieke, Moritz en Ingeborg, voor onze bijzondere band en fijne samenwerking al die 
jaren. Mirea, je bent mijn mentor en een dierbare vriendin, je blijft een onuitputtelijke bron 
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van inspiratie, dank voor alles wat ik al van je heb mogen leren, over gedrag en cultuur, het 
combineren van werk en promoveren, en het leven. Femke, jij kan hier niet ontbreken, ik wil 
je heel erg bedanken voor onze inspirerende gesprekken, over de toepasbaarheid van mijn 
onderzoek voor het toezicht, die het vuurtje elke keer weer aanwakkerde. Daarnaast heb ik 
veel gehad aan de steun van de toch talrijke andere PhD’s bij GGC, dank Wieke en Moritz, 
voor de gedeelde-smart’ koffies en werksessies, en dank jullie wel Marleen, Arieneke en 
Myrthe, voor de wijze raad vanuit jullie eigen PhD-ervaring. Ook veel dank Saskia, Wendy, 
Paulien, Aleks, Ellis en Olgu, voor jullie interesse en medeleven tijdens de laatste loodjes. 
Vele van jullie hebben in deze jaren wel eens een stuk van mij gelezen of meegedacht, 
waarvoor oneindig veel dank. I would also like to extend a special thanks to my international 
colleagues from all over the world, whom I was fortunate to meet in relation to B&C 
supervision and discuss my PhD research with along the way, in particular the ‘early 
adopters’; Claire, Jenny, Tamara, Elizabeth, Fahmi, Stephanie, Toni, and James. 
Ik wil ook heel graag de collega’s van EBO bedanken voor de 4 jaar die ik bij de 
divisie heb doorgebracht tijdens mijn promotieonderzoek, voor de warme interesse voor mijn 
onderzoek en werk bij toezicht, en vooral voor alle gezellige lunches en borrels. Wat ik er in 
ieder geval aan over heb gehouden zijn goede collega’s en vrienden, onder wie natuurlijk 
Anneli, Irma en Lola, bedankt voor de gezellige uitjes en gesprekken. Irma, speciale dank 
voor het proeflezen van een van mijn hoofdstukken. Dennis, dank voor het samen pionieren 
op onderzoeksgebied bij DNB, voor alles wat ik van je heb mogen leren tijdens onze 
samenwerking, en ons mooie onderzoek. Daarnaast heb ik bij DNB en AFM veel waardevolle 
contacten opgebouwd met mede-PhD’s, waaronder Tessa en Irene, dank voor het delen van 
ervaringen over het doen van onderzoek naar en werken in het toezicht. 
Dan wil ik nog een aantal mensen, waar ik via mijn werk bij DNB warme 
vriendschappen mee heb opgebouwd, bedanken voor hun steun. Het begon natuurlijk allemaal 
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met de gezelligheid tijdens BOT 4, met Jantine, Bert-Jan, Marcel en TT, en gelukkig zien en 
spreken we elkaar nog geregeld. Dank voor jullie interesse, humor en borrels in deze periode. 
Jantine, nog speciale dank voor het lezen van meerdere teksten, met altijd waardevol en 
scherp commentaar. Aan een Jong DNB-commissie heb ik een bijzondere band overgehouden 
met Ben, mijn (even) kleine grote vriend, dank voor je oneindige interesse, motiverende 
woorden en waardering tijdens dit traject! Dan was er ook nog de onvergetelijke ‘inzicht in 
invloed’ cursus in Scheveningen, en speciale dank voor de goede gesprekken met Buddy 
Michel die volgden!  
Er is ook een hele groep collega’s van de universiteit, en in het bijzonder de vakgroep 
HRM & OB, die ik wil bedanken voor de waardevolle gesprekken, adviezen en gezelligheid 
door de jaren heen. Dank aan Ellen, Rina en Hanneke van de SOM, voor jullie hulp met 
praktische zaken tijdens het hele traject en rondom de promotie. Tineke, Hilde en Zedef dank 
voor jullie hulp bij alles wat met promoveren te maken heeft, jullie draaien je hand nergens 
voor om en stonden altijd voor me klaar. Tim, Ramzi, Sanne (Ponsioen), Sanne (Feenstra), 
Elena, Anca, Roxana, Yeliz, Thom en Julia, we hebben allemaal op enig moment in hetzelfde 
schuitje gezeten en ik vond het altijd gezellig met jullie ervaringen uit te wisselen, tijdens 
afdelingsuitjes en congressen in Nederland, Boston, Vancouver of Lausanne. Bart, wat ben ik 
blij dat ik met jou samen deze rollercoaster heb mogen ervaren, waar we ongeveer tegelijk 
aan begonnen als buitenpromovendi met een drukke baan ernaast. Dank voor al die keren dat 
we onze ervaringen konden delen, onder het genot van een drankje, hapje en goede 
gesprekken, en vooral voor ons bijzondere tripje naar Vancouver.  
En dan, tot slot, mijn dierbare vriendinnen en steunpilaren, Manon en Nicoline, niet 
voor niets mijn paranimfen. Het allerleukste van de afronding van mijn proefschrift - naast de 
hopelijk feestelijke en onvergetelijke dag - was misschien wel om jullie te vragen als mijn 
paranimfen. Ik ben heel dankbaar dat jullie altijd naast me staan, ook straks tijdens mijn 
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verdediging. Jullie hebben alle hoogte- en dieptepunten van de afgelopen jaren van dichtbij 
meegemaakt, en weten me altijd scherp én optimistisch te houden. Jullie verdienen daarom 
nog een speciaal, laatste woord van dank. 
Lieve Manon, ik koester onze bijzondere vriendschap. Het fundament hiervoor werd 
gelegd in ons bestuursjaar, waar we vanaf minuut 1 een klik en gedeelde humor bleken te 
hebben. Met je scherpe inzicht, nuchterheid en relativeringsvermogen, zeg je soms dingen die 
ik niet wil horen, maar daarmee houd je me met beide benen op de grond en geef je altijd 
waardevol advies. Ondanks je eigen drukke bestaan ben je altijd bereikbaar, ook al zit je nu 
wat verder weg, je voelt altijd dichtbij.  
Lieve Nicoline, het is een voorrecht dat je naast clubgenoot ook een van mijn beste 
vriendinnen bent. Jouw altijd positieve, optimistische en vrolijke houding en de vele gezellige 
avonden hebben gezorgd voor welkome afleiding. Jij staat altijd voor me klaar, met een 
bemoedigend woord of om troost te bieden, ondanks je drukke leven. Of we nou bij elkaar om 
de hoek wonen in Amsterdam of in verschillende landen zijn, onze vriendschap is voor altijd 
en overal.    
 
Tot slot, als reflectie op dit bijzondere moment, mooie woorden die voor mij alles zeggen: 
“Heel even nog heel even 
Dan wordt wat helder is weer vaag 
Alles kan nog 
Alles kan nog 
Alles kan nog vandaag” 
(couplet uit: Alles kan nog, tekst H. van der Lubbe, 2013, p. 119, In: Schrijvers uit Oost, 
Oost, Amsterdam: Babel & Vos) 
